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ABSTRACT 
 
International events since the landmark Pinochet case, increased human rights 
advocacy, efforts at a culture of accountability, as well as the recent pro-democratic 
up-rising in the Arab states sustain impetus for the consideration of Head of state 
immunity in international law. 
 
A naturalist view of international law is that there can be no Head of state immunity 
for violations of human rights. This popular view proceeds from a theoretical 
misunderstanding of the positivist concept of immunities resulting in its practical 
misapplication. However, this naturalist view must be contextualised within the 
subtleties of international rule-making. It is to this end that the inquiry into Head of 
state immunity as a concept of customary international law, emergent trends and the 
formation of a new rule of custom in this regard is necessitated. Thus, this thesis will 
inquire into the applicability, or otherwise, of Head of state immunity before certain 
fora, including national courts, international courts, and internationalised courts with 
view to discerning emergent trends in the practice of Head of state immunity.  
 
Thematic in this thesis, is the argument that a provision in the constitutive instrument 
establishing the jurisdiction of a court which makes irrelevant the fact of official 
capacity as Head of state, without more, cannot remove the immunities of Heads of 
states under customary international law. This thesis will undertake its analysis from 
the perspective of the nature of the constitutive instrument establishing an 
international court and the extent to which states are bound by the instrument.  
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This thesis will conclude this inquiry by considering the extent to which the trends 
elicited in the substantive part of the work have changed customary international law 
and the extent to which there can be said to be a new international law on Head of 
state immunity. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The development of international human rights and international criminal law as 
distinct areas within the broad framework of public international law has impelled the 
discourse on Head of state immunity in international law. Conventional obligations 
undertaken by states, at least since the 1980s, have implicated the question whether 
state officials are entitled to immunity in the face of these conventional obligations. 
This was highlighted by the case against Pinochet Ugarte before the United Kingdom 
House of Lords; a case which propelled Head of state immunity into the limelight of 
judicial and academic discourse and has resulted in an increase in proceedings against 
Heads of state. The novel practice of the United Nations Security Council of using 
international criminal proceedings under their peace and security mandate by the 
creation of ad hoc international criminal tribunals, in the 1990s, and the referral of 
situations in Darfur and Libya to the International Criminal Court as well as the 
current pro-democratic uprising in the Arab states have sustained the impetus of this 
research. 
 
The analysis of Head of state immunity in this thesis will be contextualized within the 
normative developments of international human rights and international criminal law, 
specifically as concerns war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. Thus, 
proceedings against Heads of states for crimes outside this normative context are not 
central to the thesis and will only be featured in the introductory chapters which set 
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out the theoretical foundations and challenges of the concept of Head of state 
immunity. 
 
This thesis inquires into the extent and scope of Head of state immunity in 
international law, whether there are emergent trends in this regard and the extent to 
which these trends affect existing customary international law on Head of state 
immunity. This thesis will contextualize this inquiry within the different contemporary 
categories of courts before which Head of state immunity may be implicated, i.e. 
national, international and internationalized courts. In the main, this inquiry would 
employ customary international law as well as the theory that the applicability or 
otherwise of Head of state immunity before an international court is dependent on the 
extent to which states are bound by the constitutive instrument establishing the court. 
 
This thesis particularly draws from, as well as builds upon, the important works of 
Arthur Watts, Hazel Fox, Dapo Akande, Andre Bianchi and Rosanne Van Alebeek. 
Fox generally comments on the law of state immunity, i.e. the nature, general concepts 
and sources of the law of state immunity as well as the exceptions to state immunity 
and distinction between immunity from adjudication and immunity from execution. 
Fox also specifically looks at the immunity of Heads of state and state officials albeit 
from a very general perspective. Writing more specifically with regard to Heads of 
state, Watts‟s work is a general treatise on the legal position of Heads of state and 
Heads of government in international law and sets out customary international law on 
Head of state immunity as well as its theoretical foundation.  Akande highlights the 
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overly simplistic approach of arguments that immunity is not available before 
international tribunals in the absence of a consideration of the nature of the 
constitutive instrument establishing an international tribunal and whether states are 
bound by such instrument. However, the works of these commentators are not 
specifically with regard to normative developments of international human rights and 
international criminal law. 
 
The works of Bianchi and Van Alebeek are more within the normative framework of 
this thesis. Bianchi work highlights the need for courts to interpret legal rules on 
immunity in line with the principles and goals of international law, i.e. lex ferenda, 
because international law cannot grant immunity from acts which it criminalises. Van 
Alebeek inquires into whether the established rules of immunity of states and state 
officials are still extant in view of recent and progressive developments in 
international human rights and international criminal law. Van Alebeek, while aware 
that courts of law can only apply the law as it is, argues that such application of the 
law should take into consideration lex ferenda (policy arguments) so as to ensure 
remedy for individuals for violations of human rights norms. 
 
This thesis builds upon the general works of Watts and Fox through the application of 
the general principles to a specific normative framework. It advances Akande‟s 
constitutive instrument theory through a critical analysis of the post World War II 
International Military Tribunals, international tribunals established by the United 
Nations Security Council and international courts established by treaty. The thesis 
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advances this theory beyond international courts to national courts seeking to exercise 
jurisdiction under an international instrument, for instance the Convention against 
Torture. Issues will be taken in this thesis with the work of Bianchi by showing that 
international law is not futuristic, rather it is realistic. The weaknesses of Bianchi‟s 
approach will be explored in this work with a view to a better understanding of the 
theoretical underpinnings of jurisdictional immunities and its proper application 
thereof.  Although more closely related to Van Alebeek‟s work, this thesis varies with 
hers in terms of scope, for instance while she contends that absolute state immunity 
has never been a rule of international law, this thesis argues otherwise. Unlike Van 
Alebeek‟s work and the works of the other named commentators, this thesis critically 
analyses the various approaches that have been utilised in the reconciliation of 
immunity and human rights imperatives and expressly utilises the constitutive 
instrument theory in its inquiry into whether Heads of state enjoy immunity for 
international crimes and violations of human rights. Very importantly, unlike other 
policy based approaches, this thesis considers the trends elicited in its analysis and the 
extent to which such are illustrative of a new customary international law on Head of 
state immunity. 
 
At the heart of this inquiry lies the tension between the traditional and progressive 
views of international law, i.e. the tension between a system of international 
immunities of states and state officials and a system of accountability for human rights 
violations. This thesis will argue that a system of international immunities and a 
system of international human rights are not mutually exclusive and that the value-
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content of a system of immunities is such that the imperatives of both systems are 
capable of mutual co-existence. It will also be argued that the often touted conflict 
between international immunities and human rights does not exist. 
 
This thesis is divided into three parts- the introductory chapters (1 and 2), the core 
chapters (3, 4, 5, 6 and 7) and the conclusion. Chapter 1 introduces the broad concept 
of immunity, its derivatives and the foundational basis for a system of immunities in 
international law. Chapter 2 contextualizes the thesis within the areas of international 
human rights and international criminal law and sets out the tension between 
immunity as a principle of classical positivist international law and naturalist law 
approach of international human rights and international criminal law. 
 
Chapter 3 deals with the first category of courts before which the extent and scope of 
Head of state immunity will be considered, i.e. national courts. It will consider the 
national court of states of origin where national law immunities are involved, with a 
view to clearly distinguishing national law immunities and international law 
immunities of Heads of state. This chapter will address legality and legitimacy issues 
concerning national courts like the IHT as affecting Head of state immunity. At the 
core of this chapter, is an analysis of the cases against Saddam Hussein, Pinochet 
Ugarte and Hissène Habré. 
 
Chapter 4 sets the path of inquiry of the thesis within an international context by the 
analysis of the scope and extent of Head of state immunity and any emergent trends 
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thereof before international tribunals established in the wake of the First and Second 
World Wars.  
 
Chapter 5 is concerned with the international tribunals established by the Security 
Council at the end of the „Cold War‟ in the 1990s and the cases against Milosevic 
before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and Kambanda 
before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. It is also imperative to the 
analysis in this chapter that questions of legality of the establishment of international 
criminal tribunals by the Security Council are addressed because they implicate the 
jurisdiction, and immunity from jurisdiction, of such tribunals. 
 
Chapter 6 will consider the extent and scope of Head of state immunity before the 
International Criminal Court and the cases against Al-Bashir and Gaddafi with a view 
to ascertaining any emergent trends and their impact on customary international law 
on Head of state immunity. 
 
The last category of courts, i.e. the internationalised courts forms the subject of 
analysis in Chapter 7 and includes an analysis of the Extraordinary Chambers of the 
Courts of Cambodia, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon and the Special Court of Sierra 
Leone. 
 
The non-applicability of Head of state immunity before international courts would be 
of no effect where there exists no means of securing the assistance and co-operation of 
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states with international courts. It is to this end, that it is imperative in this discourse 
that judicial assistance and co-operation with courts forms an integral part of the 
analysis of the various international and internationalised courts. 
 
This thesis will argue that the reality of international law is that immunity does not 
necessarily mean impunity. Immunity merely means that accountability for impunity 
is to be diverted to appropriate fora before which Head of state immunity will not be 
applicable. These fora will be critically analysed in Chapters 3 to 7 with any 
concomitant emergent trends with a view to ascertaining whether and to what extent 
customary international law on Head of state immunity remain extant.  
 
The thesis will conclude with an analysis of the emergent trends distilled from the 
chapters and the extent to which the trends have affected existing customary 
international law on Head of state immunity by the development of a new international 
law on Head of state immunity. 
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CHAPTER 1: THE CONCEPT OF HEAD OF STATE IMMUNITY IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Immunities are not free-standing principles of international law. The concept of 
immunities should be seen in the general context of international law as an exception 
to the jurisdictional competence of an adjudicatory body.  
 
The concept of Head of state immunity in international law is a relic from the past 
when there was no distinction between the personal sovereign and the state, seen in the 
statement of Louis XIV of France, “L’état c’est moi.”1 However, the idea of statehood 
since the Treaties of Westphalia 1648 has diminished the lack of distinction between 
the personal sovereign and the state.
2
 Likewise, monarchical sovereignty has been 
diminished by the rise of republicanism, anti-colonial nationalism and the emergence 
of democratic states. Yet, the immunity of Heads of states is, and remains, at the fore 
of international law.   
 
It is imperative that the theoretical and practical underpinnings of the concept of 
immunity are considered at the beginning of this thesis so as to lay the foundation of 
the thesis and inform the content of the thesis, as a whole. This chapter, therefore, 
                                               
1
 Ian Sinclair, „The Law of Sovereign Immunity: Recent Developments‟, (1980-II) 167 RdC 113, p.198 
2
 Text of treaty available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/westphal.asp, (Last accessed 
16/08/2011) 
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traces the evolution of the concept of Head of state immunity and sets out the 
theoretical framework of the thesis. Head of state immunity being a derivative of state 
immunity, there is considerable reliance on state immunity in setting out the 
theoretical framework of the thesis. 
 
1.2 METHODOLOGY  
 
This thesis is an inquiry into the concept of Head of state immunity as rule of 
customary international law, emergent trends and the formation of a new rule of 
custom in this regard. In the determination of whether a rule of international law is 
custom, there must be state practice of the generality states supporting the rule 
accompanied by the subjective belief of the obligatory nature of the practice (opinio 
juris sive necessitatis).
3
  
 
The methodology adopted in this thesis to determine whether there is a new customary 
international law on Head of state immunity is case law specific, i.e. it employs mainly 
case law in the ascertainment of the practice of states with regard to Head of state 
immunity. The decision to adopt such methodology is borne out of the fact that the 
content of Head of state immunity has mostly been analysed and defined by case law; 
a fact largely due to the procedural nature of the concept of jurisdictional immunities. 
This is without prejudice to the work of the International Law Commission (ILC) of 
which the topic of the immunity of state officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction is 
                                               
3
 North Sea Continental Shelf case, (1969) ICJ Reports 3, Paragraph 77; Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriyya/Malta) (1985) ICJ Reports 13, Paragraph 27; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and 
against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. US)(1986) ICJ Reports 14, Paragraphs 183 and 207  
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included in its long-term programme of work. Indeed, recourse is had in the thesis to 
Reports of the Special Rapporteur of the ILC on the immunity of state officials from 
foreign criminal jurisdiction as well as various national, regional and international 
instruments on state immunity. 
 
 
1.3 EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT OF IMMUNITY 
 
Historically, immunity is traceable to the period when monarchical governments 
reigned and sovereignty was personal to the monarch who was regarded as legibus 
solutus.
4
  The early notions of immunity vested this privilege in the personal sovereign 
who ascribed to himself a personal absoluteness which was justified on the ground that 
the King was superior in all respects to the citizens, other authorities and even on a 
claim of divinity.
5
 The influence of Christianity in this period ascribed to the monarch 
right of rulership from God, the ultimate sovereign. What was to be called the divine 
right of Kings, as the temporal representatives of God, became the foundation of the 
political absoluteness of monarchs. It was the lack of distinction between the entities 
of the personal sovereign and that of the state that led to the absoluteness of the 
personal sovereign, which gave rise to the notion of absolute immunity for states and 
Heads of states.
6
   
                                               
4
 Hersch Lauterpacht, „The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States‟, (1951) 28 BYIL 
220, p.232 
5
 F.H.Hinsley, Sovereignty, 2
nd
 edition, (Cambridge: University Press, 1986) p.16, p.38 
6
 Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law, 7th edition, (London: 
Routledge, 1997), p. 119; Mark A. Summers, „Immunity or Impunity?: The Potential Effect of 
Prosecutions of State Officials for Core International Crimes in States Like the United States That Are 
Not Parties To The Statute of The International Criminal Court‟, (2005-2006) 31 Brooklyn Journal of 
International Law 463, p.466 
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In the course of international activities and international relations of states it became 
imperative to extend the privileges and immunities of the sovereign to its diplomatic 
representatives i.e. ambassadors, as well as warships. By the middle of the eighteenth 
century, there was a clear practice recognizing the immunity of diplomats.
7
 
 
However, the Treaty of Westphalia 1648 marked the beginning of the era of the 
sovereign nation state as a modern state. Monarchical structures of state government 
gave way to democratic structures leading to a great decline in monarchies towards the 
end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth century as 
epitomized by the French Revolution of 1789 to 1799. This period fully established 
the idea of a modern state and its existence as a separate entity leading to the 
immunity of the state as distinct from that of the personal sovereign.
8
  
 
1.3.1 THE ABSOLUTE THEORY OF STATE IMMUNITY 
1.3.1.1 CIVIL CASES 
State immunity was necessitated by the pervasive competence of a state, in the 
exercise of its sovereign powers and capacities. It was, therefore, tantamount to 
                                               
7
 Emmerich De Vattel, The Law of Nations; or Principles of the Law of Nature Applied to the Conduct 
and Affairs of Sovereigns, (Translation from French) (Dublin: Luke White, 1792); Eileen Denza, 
Diplomatic Law: Commentary on The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 2
nd
 edition (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1998) p.1 
8
 See Yitiha Simbeye, Immunity and International Criminal Law (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 
2004), p.93 
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judicial impropriety for a state to exercise jurisdiction over the acts of another state 
carried out in the exercise of its sovereign powers.  
 
The customary legal endorsement of the absolute nature of state immunity is ascribed 
to The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon and others.
9
 This case concerned the 
ownership of a vessel, which was an armed national vessel within US territorial waters 
alleged to have been violently taken by persons acting under the decrees and orders of 
Emperor Napoleon of France. The defendants sought the attachment of the vessel and 
its restoration to them as the rightful owners. The Court found the jurisdiction of a 
state within its own territory to be necessarily absolute and exclusive, and that 
exceptions to the power of a state within its own territory must derive from the consent 
of the state itself. In holding that the vessel was exempt from the jurisdiction of the 
court, the court relied on an implied consent of states to exemption from their 
jurisdictions where the sovereignty of other states was implicated.  
 
While the Schooner Exchange case may have expressed the absolute jurisdiction of 
states within their territories, the absolute nature of the immunity of states is 
established through state practice as illustrated by the Parlement Belge,
10
 the Porto 
Alexandre,
11
 and the Cristina.
12
 The Parlement Belge involved a collision between 
two vessels one of which, the Parlement Belge, was the property of the King of 
Belgium used as a mail packet. Proceedings in rem were instituted against the 
                                               
9
 11 US 116 (1812) 
10
 (1880) 5 P.D. 197. For a review of other cases establishing the absolute nature of state immunity, see 
J.W. Garner, „Immunities of State-Owned Ships Employed in Commerce‟, (1925) 6 BYIL 128  
11
 [1920] P. 30; 1 ILR 149 
12
 [1938] AC 485 
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Parlement Belge but the Court of Appeal held that the immunity of the vessel as the 
property of the sovereign was not lost by reason of it also carrying merchandize and 
passengers for hire. The decision in this case was relied on in the Porto Alexandre and 
in the Cristina, cases which involved vessels that had been requisitioned by Portugal 
and Spain, respectively, for public purposes but which were used for trading activities 
and the principle that a sovereign state could not be impleaded, directly or indirectly, 
before the courts of other states was upheld.
13
  
 
These cases illustrate the practice of absolute state immunity and the adoption of a 
later practice of restrictive immunity of states underscores the fact of the hitherto 
absolute nature of state immunity. In Littrell v. United States (No. 2), it was 
acknowledged that the prevailing view of the immunity of states was absolute in 
nature.
14
  
 
1.3.1.2 CRIMINAL CASES 
The fulcrum of the international system and a foundational principle of international 
law, which is pertinent to this thesis, is that no state can claim legal superiority over 
another. This is expressed in the Latin maxim, par in parem non habet imperium.
15
 
 
                                               
13
 See The Luigi, 230 Fed. Rep. 493 
14
 100 ILR 438, p.445 
15
 This means that an equal has no power over an equal, see Bryan A. Garner (ed.), Black’s Law 
Dictionary, 9
th
 edition, (St. Paul: Thomson Reuters, 2009), p.1859 
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Criminal trials imply a vertical relationship between the party exercising jurisdiction 
over a criminal act and the party subject of the criminal proceedings. The purpose of 
criminal proceedings being to ascertain guilt and impose punishment in the form of a 
penalty or imprisonment on the accused, the rule with regard to the criminal liability 
of states is absolute immunity. Enforcement measures against a state for criminal acts 
by another state would be seen as acts of hostility and superiority. As such, there is an 
absence of conventional law removing the absolute immunity of states in criminal 
matters. The US Foreign Sovereigns Immunity Act 1976,
16
 the UK State Immunity 
Act 1978,
17
 and state immunity legislations of various jurisdictions including 
Canada,
18
 Australia,
19
 Pakistan
20
, South Africa,
21
 and Singapore,
22
 all exclude criminal 
proceedings over states. 
 
An attempt by a state to exercise criminal jurisdiction over a foreign state would 
undermine the par in parem non habet imperium principle. Moreover, the application 
of the criminal jurisdiction of a state over another would amount to an application of 
the criminal laws of a state to regulate the public acts of others.
23
  Thus, leading to the 
extension of “the legislative jurisdiction” of one state into another.24 
 
                                               
16
 (1976) 15 I.L.M. 1388, Section 1303(a) [Hereinafter FSIA] 
17
 (1978) 17 I.L.M. 1123, Section 16(4) [Hereinafter SIA] 
18
 State Immunity Act 1982, reproduced in (1982) 21 I.L.M. 798, Section 17 
19
 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 1985, reproduced in (1985) 25 I.L.M.  715, Section 3(2)  
20
 State Immunity Ordinance 1981, reproduced in UN-Materials ST/LEG/SER.B.20, p.20, Section 
17(2)(b) 
21
 Foreign States Immunity Act 1981, reproduced in UN-Materials ST/LEG/SER.B.20, p.34, Section 
2(3) 
22
 State Immunity Act 1979, reproduced in UN-Materials ST/LEG/SER.B.20, p.28, Section 19(2)(b) 
23
 Hazel Fox, The Law of State Immunity, (Oxford : OUP, 2002), p.505 
24
 Ibid 
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1.3.2 THE RESTRICTIVE THEORY OF STATE IMMUNITY 
The increased nature of state participation, particularly of socialist governments, in 
commercial and trading activities necessitated a departure from the absolute approach 
to state immunity.
25
 Lord Macmillan stated in the Cristina case that the immunity of 
foreign sovereigns was a concession to the dignity, equality and independence of 
foreign sovereigns which the comity of nations enjoined, and that in view of the 
modern approach where sovereigns have “condescended to lay aside their dignity” by 
embarking on commercial activities it is questionable “whether an immunity conceded 
in one set of circumstances should to the same extent be enjoyed in totally different 
circumstances”.26 
 
The restrictive approach to the immunity of a state involves a distinction between acts 
carried out by a state in a public or sovereign capacity (acta jure imperii) and acts 
carried out in a commercial or trading capacity (acta  jure gestionis).
27
  
 
The public (jure imperii) and private (jure gestionis) capacity distinction has been 
roundly criticized because the actor in question being a government, it naturally 
follows that all its acts would be for public purposes. According to Lauterpacht, 
 “...the state always acts as a public person. It cannot act 
otherwise. In a real sense all acts jure gestionis are acts 
jure imperii.”28 
                                               
25
 Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It, (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1994) p.79 
26
 Supra 12, p.498 
27
 Criterions for this distinction have involved the purpose of the act, nature of the act, the context of the 
act; see Rahimtoola v. Nizam of Hyderabad [1958] AC 379; I Congreso del Partido [1983] AC 244; 
Holland v. Lampen-Wolfe [2000] 1 WLR 1537; Mizushima Tomonori, „One Immunity Has 
Gone…Another: Holland v. Lampen-Wolfe‟, (2001) 64 MLR 472 
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Though tenuous and theoretically, as well as practically, impossible this distinction is 
merely adopted more for convenience than actual analysis.
29
  
 
On 19 May 1952, a „new‟ US policy on state immunity contained in a letter addressed 
by the Acting State Department Legal Adviser, Jack B. Tate to the Attorney General 
was announced.
30
  Through the espousal of a commercial exception to state immunity, 
this policy heralded the emergence of the restrictive theory of state immunity in 
customary international law. This culminated in the notable cases of The Philippine 
Admiral,
31
 the Trendtex Trading Corporation v. Central Bank of Nigeria,
32
 Alfred 
Dunhill of London Inc v. Republic of Cuba,
33
 and I Congreso,
34
 which decided that 
state immunity did not avail states with respect to disputes arising out of their 
commercial activities.  
 
In line with the new practice, conventions on state immunity, e.g. the European 
Convention on State Immunity 1972 (Basle Convention)
35
 and the United Nations 
(UN) Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Properties 2004,
36
 as 
well as national legislation on state immunity, as obtainable in the US, UK, Australia, 
                                                                                                                                       
28
 Lauterpacht, supra 4, p.224; Jürgen Bröhmer, State Immunity and the Violation of Human Rights, 
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1997) p.19 
29
 Lord Clyde in Holland v. Lampen-Wolfe, op.cit., p.1579 
30
 26 Dept of State Bulletin  984 (1952) 
31
 [1977] AC 373 
32
 [1977] 1 QB 529 
33
 66 ILR 212 
34
 Supra 27 
35
 (1972) 11 I.L.M. 470. 
36
 Adopted by the UN General Assembly in Resolution 59/38 of 16 December 2004, yet to enter into 
force. 
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Canada, South Africa, Singapore and Pakistan codify the restrictive approach to state 
immunity for commercial transactions. 
 
1.3.3 THE ABSOLUTE THEORY OF HEAD OF STATE IMMUNITY 
The nature of the office of the chief executive of a state as well as the title and the 
number of persons occupying the position depends on the constitutional set-up of a 
state. In Switzerland, there is no particular individual who is the Head of state.
37
 
Likewise, in the break-up of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, the position of Head 
of state was occupied by more than one person in the Bosnian-Serb entity. The 
constitutional set-up of states may mean that the chief executives of states may include 
Presidents, Military heads, Prime Ministers as Heads of Governments,
38
 the Pope as 
the Head of the Vatican,
 39
 and even where the chief executives holds no official title 
but rather is known as the „Leader of the Revolution‟.40 
 
As stated earlier, immunity applies as an exception to the adjudicatory or enforcement 
jurisdiction of states. It does not imply an absence of legal liability, but merely an 
absence of jurisdiction, i.e. adjudication or enforcement is circumscribed by rules on 
                                               
37
 Arthur Watts, The Legal Position in International Law of Heads of States, Heads of Government and 
Foreign Ministers, (1994-III) 247 RdC, p.21 
38
 Saltany v. Reagan, 702 F.Supp. 319 (1988) 
39
 See Guardian F. v. Archdiocese of San-Antonio, Case No. 93-CI-11345 (Tex. Dist. Ct.1994) against 
Pope John Paul II cited in Tachiona v. Mugabe, 169 F.Supp. 2d  259, p.287 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Doe v. 
The Archdiocese of Galveston-Houston, 408 F.Supp. 2d 272 (S.D.Tex. 2005) against Pope Benedict XI 
40
 This is the case with Mouammer Gaddafi as the Head of the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya. 
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immunity.
41
 The exercise of jurisdiction by a state over another being an exercise of 
imperium which violates the principle of par in parem non habet imperium, it 
logically follows that immunity is a prerogative of a state and vests in the state. It does 
not belong to individuals; it is only extended to Heads of states as the representatives 
par excellence of states. As such, the immunity of a Head of state can be waived by 
his state.
42
  
 
The traditional absoluteness of the personal sovereign fuels the modern idea of Head 
of state immunity. The sovereign was absolutely immune from legal proceedings 
before his own courts since the courts acted in the name of the sovereign and on his 
behalf. The sovereign was also immune before the courts of foreign states.  
 
The absolute immunity of the personal sovereign was recognized by the Privy Council 
in Chung Chi Cheung v. The King,
 43
 that neither the sovereign nor his envoy, 
properties including public armed ship are to be subject to legal process. This decision 
follows from earlier decisions in the nineteenth century in De Haber v. Queen of 
Portugal,
44
 and King of Hanover v. Duke of Brunswick,
45
 that personal sovereigns 
were immune from any claim brought against them in the courts of other states.  
                                               
41
 Lord Hewart, C.J in Dickinson v. Del Solar; Mobile and General Insurance Co. Ltd (3
rd
 Party), 5 ILR 
299. See also Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v. 
Belgium) Judgment of 14 February 2002, (2002) I.C.J. Reports 3, Paragraph 60 [Hereinafter Arrest 
Warrant case]; Yoram Dinstein, „Diplomatic Immunity from Jurisdiction Ratione Materiae‟, (1966) 15 
ICLQ 76, p.81  
42
 Philippines in the case against Ferdinand Marcos, see In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 817 F.2d 1108 
(4
th
 Cir.1987) and Haiti in the case against Prosper Avril, see Paul v. Avril, 812 F.Supp.207 (S.D. 
Fla.1993) 
43
 [1939] AC 160, p.175, per Lord Atkins 
44
 (1851) 17 QB 171,  p.206-207  
45
 (1844) 6 Beav. 1; (1848) 2 HLC 1  
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Though the nature of the office as chief executive and the nature of government had 
changed, at least towards the end of the 18
th
 century,
46
 the idea of the absoluteness of 
the powers of the personal sovereign subsisted. This meant that Heads of states 
enjoyed absolute immunity, like personal sovereigns, and resulted in the prevailing 
international custom that Heads of states enjoy complete immunity even for private 
acts.
47
 In Ex-King Farouk of Egypt v. Christian Dior, S.A.R.L. the French Regional 
Court of Appeal found that had the King been a sitting one that he would have enjoyed 
immunity in the action for the cost of the clothes for his wife.
 48
  In Lafontant v. 
Aristide,
49
 proceedings were instituted against President Jean-Bertrand Aristide while 
in exile in the US for the political assassination of the plaintiff‟s husband, despite the 
overthrow of Aristide‟s government, the US recognized him as the Head of Haiti and 
so he was held to be immune.  
 
In Estate of Domingo v. Republic of Phillipines,
50
 the US courts recognised the 
absolute immunity of President Ferdinand Marcos, and his wife, for the political 
assassination of opposition leaders.  In Tachiona v. Mugabe,
51
 a class action was 
brought by the plaintiffs for themselves and on behalf of some deceased victims 
alleging torture and other acts of terror against President Robert Mugabe. The Court in 
dismissing the action upheld Mugabe‟s immunity, even for private acts.  
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Even for international crimes, Heads of states are absolutely immune from the courts 
of other states. Colonel Gaddafi, as the Libyan Head of state and other persons were 
tried in absentia by the Special Court of Assizes of Paris for the destruction of an 
aircraft and the murder of the 170 passengers and crew aboard.
52
  Upon appeal, the 
Court of Cassation in terminating the proceedings held that, 
“International custom precluded Heads of state in office 
from being the subject of proceedings before the 
criminal courts of a foreign state…In the current state of 
international law, complicity in a terrorist attack, 
however serious such a crime might be, did not 
constitute one of the exceptions to the principle of the 
jurisdictional immunity of foreign Heads of state in 
office.”53 
 
The absolute nature of the immunity of Heads of states was clearly established in the 
Case Concerning Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters 
(Djibouti v. France).
54
 Here, the Republic of Djibouti requested the ICJ to adjudge and 
declare that France, by sending witness summonses to the Head of state of Djibouti 
and to senior Djiboutian officials has violated its obligations under general and 
customary international law not to attack, and to prevent attacks on, the immunity, 
honour and dignity of the Djiboutian President. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
France had stated, in relation to the summons, that “all incumbent Heads of states 
enjoy immunity from jurisdiction when travelling internationally” and that “this is an 
established principle of international law and France intends to ensure that it is 
respected.”55 
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France, while arguing that the summons was not an attack on the Djiboutian President 
recalled that it, 
“[F]ully recognises, without restriction, the absolute 
nature of the immunity from jurisdiction and even more 
so, from enforcement that is enjoyed by foreign Heads 
of state.”56  
 
The ICJ, on its part, stated that  
“A Head of state enjoys in particular “full immunity 
from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability” which 
protects him or her “against any act of authority of 
another state which would hinder him or her in the 
performance of his or her official duties.”57  
 
1.3.3.1 IMMUNITY RATIONE PERSONAE 
To ensure the complete inviolability of Heads of states, the absolute immunity enjoyed 
by Heads of states extends to crimes committed while in office and even before the 
assumption of office. This principle of inviolability was imported from diplomatic law 
to apply to Heads of states who are representatives par excellence of the state.
58
 This 
absolute immunity is also referred to as immunity ratione personae (personal or status 
immunity) and attaches to an individual by virtue of his official position.  
 
Immunity ratione personae is procedural in nature because it ensures the complete 
inviolability of the office holder through his exemption from the jurisdiction of 
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states.
59
 Apart from diplomats, Heads of state and Heads of government, the scope of 
applicability of this class of immunity has been extended to include Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs,
60
 Defence Ministers,
61
 and Ministers of the Interior.
62
  
 
The Convention on Special Missions includes Heads of states and governments as 
well as Foreign Affairs Ministers and „other persons of high rank‟ as those entitled to 
immunity from criminal jurisdiction and who are personally inviolable when on a 
special mission.
63
 There is ambiguity as to those falling within the class of „high 
ranking‟ officials of states entitling such persons to immunity ratione personae. The 
UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States only refers to the immunity 
ratione personae of Heads of states while the Commentary of the International Law 
Commission mentions the immunity ratione personae of „other officials‟ of states.64  
 
Likewise, the ICJ in its decision in the Arrest Warrant case did not decisively 
determine the scope of immunity ratione personae, thereby leaving the question of 
state officials who come within the scope of applicability of personal immunity 
uncertain. The ICJ in stating those officials who enjoy immunity from the criminal and 
civil jurisdiction of other states mentioned, 
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 “...certain holders of high-ranking office in a state, such 
as the Head of state, Head of government and Minister 
of Foreign Affairs”.65 (Emphasis added) 
 
It is evident from the use of the phrase „such as‟ by the ICJ that the list is not intended 
to be exhaustive of state officials who come within the scope of immunity ratione 
personae. Immunity ratione personae has been applied to include the members of 
family of Heads of states as was done for Charles, The Prince of Wales as the heir 
apparent to the British monarchy,
66
 as well as Cordero De La Madrid,
67
 as wife of the 
President of Mexico and Imelda Marcos,
68
 as wife of President of the Philippines.  
 
If the criteria for the applicability of immunity ratione personae is the representative 
capacity of a foreign official, then the ICJ decision in Armed Activities on the 
Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. 
Rwanda),
69
 that the Minister of Justice was representative of the Republic of Rwanda 
and as such her statements were binding, internationally, on Rwanda irrespective of 
the nature of the functions of the Minister would impact on the scope of applicability 
of immunity ratione personae. Arguably, this immunity would apply to all cabinet 
Ministers, including National Security Advisers and even Chiefs of Army and General 
Staff. This is an expansion of the traditional approach that the category of state 
officials who are representative of states and whose actions are internationally binding 
upon states are Heads of states, Heads of government and Foreign Ministers. 
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The ICJ in the Arrest Warrant case held that the circulation of an arrest warrant 
against the Foreign Minister of Congo by Belgium was liable to affect Congo in the 
conduct of its international relations.
70
 This is a further expansion by the ICJ of state 
officials who are entitled to immunity ratione personae on the basis that they are 
engaged in the conduct of international relations. Arguably therefore, lesser state 
officials while abroad for official purposes, on behalf of states, promoting 
international relations would be entitled to immunity ratione personae. This argument 
is strengthened by the Convention on Special Missions that members of missions in 
the territory of foreign states enjoy inviolability and immunity from the criminal and 
civil jurisdiction of states.
71
 Likewise, the Vienna Convention on the Representatives 
of States in their Relations with International Organizations of a Universal Character 
1975 provides for the inviolability of members of missions as well as delegates who 
are in the territory of host states for the conduct of business with the international 
organizations.
72
  
 
Therefore, immunity ratione personae may be divided into two parts- the first a more 
comprehensive immunity ensuring the complete inviolability of Heads of states and 
senior state officials like Foreign Affairs Minister when abroad irrespective of whether 
the purpose of the visit is official or private; and the second, less comprehensive 
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immunity for lesser state officials who are charged with the conduct of international 
relations or are abroad on official purposes to promote international relations.  
 
Immunity ratione personae applies to private acts committed either before assumption 
of office as well as during the subsistence of office. This is to avoid foreign states 
interfering with the functions of state officials under the guise of being private acts.
73
 
Since immunity ratione personae is effectively absolute during incumbency,
74
 and 
given that it comes to an end at the expiration of office, a serving Head of state is 
exempt from the jurisdiction of the courts of states even where the commission of a 
crime is alleged. However, the matter may be different where the court seeking to 
exercise jurisdiction is an international court.
75
  
 
1.3.4 RESTRICTIVE THEORY OF HEAD OF STATE IMMUNITY 
International law distinguishes between serving and former Heads of states for the 
purpose of applicability of immunities. The immunity of former Heads of states is 
applicable to official acts only, or acts performed in a sovereign capacity. Such acts 
are attributable to the state.
76
 As such, former leaders are vulnerable to the institution 
of proceedings of accountability against them.
77
 This is because despite the clout, 
privileges and prestige they may have even after office, they revert back to being 
“private citizens” and there is no reason not to institute proceedings against them like 
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other private citizens once grounds exist for exercising jurisdiction over acts which 
cannot be attributed to the state.
 78
  
 
1.3.4.1 IMMUNITY RATIONE MATERIAE 
The immunity of former Heads of states is restricted to acts performed in an official 
capacity, i.e. ratione materiae. Persons acting qua officials of the state are not to be 
held responsible for acts done in that capacity.
79
 A pre-requisite, therefore, for the 
applicability of this immunity is that the act in question has to be official in nature. An 
act is official “if it is performed by an organ of a state in his official capacity, so that it 
can be imputed to the state…”80  
 
Immunity ratione materiae or functional immunity is substantive in nature, i.e. it does 
not attach to the individual but attaches to the act in question, and so it does not come 
to an end when the official ceases to hold office.
81
  It endures as the official acts of the 
state and this serves to prevent the circumvention of the sovereign right of a state of 
freedom from interference in its internal affairs and structures.
82
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Immunity ratione materiae may be rationalized on the imperative of ensuring that 
officials effectively carry out their functions without any apprehension of the 
institution of legal proceedings against their person.
83
 Since the act in question is 
attributable to the state, the review of such acts by foreign courts would undermine the 
executive powers of states as it would be tantamount to second-guessing the state in its 
sovereign capacity.
84
 In Chuidian v. Philippine National Bank,
 85
 the court was of the 
view that proceedings against state officials for acts committed in an official capacity 
would effectively amount to proceedings against the state itself.  In Ex-King Farouk of 
Egypt v. Christian Dior, S.A.R.L.
86
 the court found that the purchase of designer 
clothes could not be part of the official functions of a Head of state.  
  
In its applicability to individuals, immunity ratione materiae is more extensive than 
immunity ratione personae because it covers a longer time period and applies to a 
wider category of state officials.
87
 However, immunity ratione personae is more 
extensive with regard to the nature of acts covered. 
 
 
 
1.4 BASIS OF THE CONCEPT OF IMMUNITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
The concept of immunity does not exist in vacuo in international law. It is anchored on 
certain theoretical and practical principles rationalizing its existence. Judicial and 
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academic opinion are in agreement as to the basis of the concept of immunity in 
international law. 
 
In what has become a locus classicus, Marshall C.J. in The Schooner Exchange v. 
McFaddon and others stated thus, 
“The world being composed of distinct sovereigns, 
possessing equal rights and equal independence, whose 
mutual benefit is promoted by intercourse with each 
other, and by an interchange of those good offices which 
humanity dictates and its wants require, all sovereigns 
have consented to a relaxation in practice, in cases under 
certain peculiar circumstances, of that absolute and 
complete jurisdiction within their respective territories 
which sovereignty confers… One sovereign being in no 
respect amenable to another; and being bound by 
obligations of the highest character not to degrade the 
dignity of his nation, by placing himself or its sovereign 
rights within the jurisdiction of another, can be supposed 
to enter a foreign territory only under an express license, 
or in the confidence that the immunities belonging to his 
independent sovereign station, though not expressly 
stipulated, are reserved by implication, and will be 
extended to him... This perfect equality and absolute 
independence of sovereigns, and this common interest 
impelling them to mutual intercourse, and an 
interchange of good offices with each other, have given 
rise to a class of cases in which every sovereign is 
understood to waive the exercise of a part of that 
complete exclusive territorial jurisdiction, which has 
been stated to be the attribute of every nation.”88 
 
In his Hague Academy Lectures, Sucharitkul stated the basis of immunity of states to 
include the principles of sovereignty, sovereign equality and the dignity of states, the 
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principle of reciprocity and comity of nations, the theory of representation, the 
analogy with diplomatic immunities and state immunity.
89
  
 
Sir Arthur Watts, while commenting on the specific subject of Head of state immunity 
states as follows,  
“The basis for the special treatment accorded to Heads 
of states is variously ascribed, inter alia, to the dignity 
which is a recognised quality of states as international 
persons…, the respect due to them as representatives of 
sovereign states,…, the equality and independence of 
sovereigns and sovereign states and the principle of par 
in parem non habet imperium; the incompetence of 
municipal law in an essentially international 
relationship; the practical need to ensure the free 
exercise by him of his functions as the highest organ of 
the state; the requirements of satisfactory international 
intercourse;…and  the dictates of international comity 
and courtesy…”90  
 
The justifications advanced by Marshall C.J and Sucharitkul for state immunity and 
those of Watts for Head of state immunity overlap; a fact which is attributable to the 
common origin of both concepts and the fact of Head of state immunity as an integral 
component of state immunity. These justifications will now be contextualised within 
the framework of this thesis. 
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1.4.1 THE PRINCIPLES OF SOVEREIGNTY, SOVEREIGN EQUALITY AND 
THE DIGNITY OF STATES 
Immunity in international law is anchored on the foundations of the international order 
which are the sovereignty and sovereign equality of states; and is expressed in the 
maxim „par in parem non habet imperium‟. Thus, a sovereign cannot exercise 
jurisdiction over another without its consent.
 
 
 
It is essential that the principles of sovereignty, sovereign equality and the dignity of 
states are addressed individually, rather than collectively, so as to fully understand 
each principle and its rationalisation of a system of immunities, particularly Head of 
state immunity.  
 
1.4.1.1 SOVEREIGNTY 
The concept of sovereignty presents itself as an enormous body of work, vast in scope 
and far-reaching in its ramifications. This thesis is not, and does not aspire to be about, 
the concept of sovereignty. The thesis is necessarily limited only to how the concept of 
sovereignty justifies a system of immunities. 
 
Historically, the Treaties of Westphalia of 1648 are the precursors of the modern 
autonomous state as we know it. Westphalia in ending the traditional papal rights over 
58 
 
monarchs recognized the secular rights of monarchs and left a legacy that has led to 
modern conceptions of the state as free from external control.
91
 
 
Sovereignty may be approached as a matter of competence whereby sovereignty is 
purely an articulation of “the way that political power is or should be exercised”.92 
This approach is responsible for the tendency in expressing the powers of the state as 
absolute and this is evident in the early notions on sovereignty.
93
 As such, sovereignty 
defines the powers of a state to pursue and effect its ideals through its own authorities 
and under its own laws as well as the exclusive control of a state over affairs within its 
territory.
94
  
 
From the perspective of international law, sovereignty is analysed from its external 
dimensions as the quality of a state as being independent and enjoying non-
interference in the conduct of its affairs. From this dimension, the sovereignty of a 
state is relative vis-à-vis other states.  
 
Characteristically, sovereignty as a fundamental attribute of the power of a state 
necessitates the independence of this competence from external control. The internal 
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and the external dimensions of sovereignty are not mutually exclusive; the external 
dimensions are predicated upon the internal dimensions, which have implications for, 
as well as give impetus to the external dimensions.  
 
States are bound together by certain commonalities in furtherance of which they may 
come together to establish a pluralistic international system to regulate and enforce 
their commonalities. Such a pluralistic system would be founded upon the aggregated 
sovereignties of the constituent states; the establishment of the system being an 
expression of sovereignty in itself. The concept of sovereignty would underlie the 
nature of the relationship, on the one hand, between states within the system and on 
the other hand, the relationship between states and the international system.
95
 
Likewise, the competence of international institutions would be defined by 
sovereignty as the basis for the applicability of international norms.
96
 This is 
buttressed by the consensual nature of international law,
97
 i.e. the operation and 
applicability of international rules as well as the acceptance of the international 
jurisdictional competence are premised on the consent of states. 
 
The internal dimensions of sovereignty dictate that a state is competent to act and its 
actions cannot be subject to review. As such, states and Heads of states should be 
immune from proceedings seeking to review the competence of states to act. The 
external dimensions of sovereignty necessitate immunity to ensure non-interference in 
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the acts of states. In addition, the competence of international institutions seeking to 
exercise jurisdiction over states and their Heads is determined by the consent of states. 
 
1.4.1.2 SOVEREIGN EQUALITY 
Sovereign equality is an „essential element‟ of sovereignty. 98 While sovereignty sets 
out the basis of the relationship between states as well as their relationship with the 
international order, sovereign equality characterizes the nature of the relationship 
between states.  
 
The idea of the equality of states in international law proceeds from the equality of 
men. Vattel‟s states that,  
“Since men are naturally equal, and a perfect equality 
prevails in their rights and obligations, as equally 
proceeding from nature- Nations composed of men, and 
considered as so many free persons living together in a 
state of nature, are naturally equal, and inherit from 
nature the same obligations and rights. Power or 
weakness does not in this respect produce any 
difference. A dwarf is as much a man as a giant; a small 
republic is no less sovereign than the most powerful 
kingdom.”99 
 
Juridical equality before the law with respect to access to and application of the law 
applies to all men, both great and small. However, is this notion of equality applicable 
to states?  
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It may be disingenuous to draw parallels or analogies between human beings and 
states but it would be more disingenuous to disregard the human content of statehood 
and indeed, in the functioning of states. States are made up of men who in ensuring 
continuity of existence, interests and beliefs pursue certain ideologies. That states are 
made up of humans is a fact that is very readily accepted where the commission of a 
crime under the auspices of the state is in issue. There should be consistency in the 
recognition of the human content of states.  
 
The international system being an aggregation of states, international rules and norms 
are not to be perceived outside their human content. Individuals are the objects of 
international law and increasingly, but by no means without controversy, also subjects 
of international law.  
  
The equality contemplated in this section is legal in nature and not factual. Aptly put 
by Oppenheim, 
“Whatever inequality may exist between states as 
regards their size, power, degree of civilisation, wealth 
and other qualities, they are nevertheless equals as 
international persons”.100 
 
Legal equality of states is concerned with sovereign rights of states, political 
independence and territorial integrity of states, and equality before the international 
legal regime. Whereas, factual equality is concerned with the differentials in state 
power and its relativity in international law as well as the ability of states to influence 
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international politics and rule-making
.
 Therefore, for the purposes of this work, a state 
like Nauru is no less a state than the US or the UK. 
 
The principles relating to sovereignty and sovereign equality have nothing to do with 
how powerful a state is. Granted that the index of power has no place in determining 
state sovereignty, this index is a powerful tool in the manipulation of sovereignty. 
While all states may have the capacity to participate in international organizations and 
agreements because they enjoy legal equality, not all of them will have the same 
negotiating or bargaining power. Therefore, while sovereignty empowers access into a 
sphere of activity, it does not control the specifics or vagaries of the modality of the 
conduct of activity or the result. By attainment of age of franchise, all men have an 
equal right to vote. However, in the actual exercise of the right some men will be able 
to affect and influence the process more than others by virtue of power, perhaps 
financial or political. 
 
The equality of states does not necessarily translate into equality in rights and duties. 
The reality is that not all states have equal rights and duties in international law.
101
 
However, all states possess equal capacity for rights and duties.
102
 The essence of 
equality therefore is “the absence of formal superiority and subordination in the legal 
relations between states”.103  
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The international order, under the Charter of the UN, is structured upon the principle 
of sovereign equality.
104
 The 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States re-affirms the basic 
importance of sovereign equality as a means of achieving the purposes of the UN.
105
 
International legal opinion,
106
 treaty law
107
 and judicial pronouncements
108
 lend 
support to the importance of the principle in the foundation of the international order. 
The principle has even been argued to fall within the category of jus cogens.
109
  
 
Sovereign equality impels the freedom of international association of states and their 
freedom to engage in international relations. The principle also underlies many rights 
and duties accruing to states in international law, customary or conventional such as 
the right to territorial integrity and jurisdictional competence.
110
 As a result therefore, 
rules governing inter-state relations are due to the respect of the sovereign equality of 
states.  
 
The jurisdictional competence of states emanates from their sovereignty. This 
competence is not absolute but is relative and circumscribed by the sovereign equality 
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of other states, as expressed in the par in parem non habet imperium principle. To 
avoid the exercise of imperium between sovereign equals, states and Heads of states 
are immune from the jurisdictions of foreign states.  
 
As the substantive basis for the immunities of states and Heads of states in 
international law,
111
  the concept of sovereignty and its concomitant principle of 
sovereign equality therefore imply that immunity would apply to all Heads of states 
irrespective of their personal, political or social shortcomings. It would apply,  
“…to all sovereigns no matter how nefarious, 
undemocratic or uncivilised they might be. The doctrine 
of sovereign immunity ensured that all sovereigns would 
be treated equally in deference to their position and 
regardless of the substantive politics they pursued in 
their own countries”.112 
  
Lauterpacht, in his objection to the principles of equality and independence 
rationalizing immunity of states, is doubtful whether these principles form part of 
classical international law.
113
 He argues that based on the early scholarship in 
international law reliance on these principles is absent from the works of Grotius, 
criticized by Bynkershoek and admitted by Vattel only with regard to the personal 
sovereign.
114
 Lauterpacht further argues that rather than basing exemption from 
jurisdiction on sovereignty and sovereign equality, on the contrary, such exemption is 
a refutation of sovereignty and sovereign equality.
115
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International law and its rule-making process are dynamic. It would only serve to stifle 
the development of the law if only principles that enjoy support in classical 
international law can be the only principles obtainable in contemporary international 
law. Unlike the immunity of personal sovereigns and diplomats, the immunity of 
states and Heads of states do not enjoy longevity of history. However, the immunity of 
states and Heads of states having developed from the immunity of personal 
sovereigns, the independence and equality of states recognized by Vattel as founding 
the immunity of personal sovereigns must be the source of the immunity of states, 
state officials and state property. Furthermore, the absence of these principles from the 
works of early scholars or their criticism does not remove them from general 
international law. 
 
While it is acknowledged that international legal history has witnessed the 
fragmentation of sovereignty as seen in the economic and social spheres of states, this 
is not the case with the political sphere as concerns states‟ conception of their 
statehood, of which the immunity of states and state officials is an integral part. 
 
Bianchi in objecting to the reliance on sovereignty of states as a justification for 
immunities asserts that,  
“…much depends on what one takes sovereignty to 
mean. If sovereignty is regarded as a normative concept, 
the content of which is determined by international law 
rules, then it is hard to accept that conduct which runs 
counter to the very foundation of the system can be 
shielded from scrutiny by the rules of the same legal 
system. Furthermore, to prove that a judgment issued by 
a municipal court can be prejudicial to the independence 
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of a foreign state would require demonstration that the 
exercise of jurisdiction jeopardises one of those states‟ 
functions that international law characterises as 
sovereign and to which it accords protection”.116 
 
This view conceptualizes sovereignty only from its external dimension without regard 
to its internal dimensions. As an organic whole, the content of sovereignty is 
determined internally and externally, i.e. from a national as well as an international 
perspective. Bianchi‟s criticism, therefore, is limited by his definition of sovereignty.  
 
1.4.1.3 THE DIGNITY OF STATES 
The idea of the dignity of states as articulated in Chisholm v. Georgia means that a 
state is not to degrade its sovereignty by submitting itself to the jurisdiction of another 
state.
117
 This theory postulates that the dignity of states is impugned by subjecting 
states and Heads of states to the “coercive process of judicial tribunals”.118 Based on 
this theory, the exercise of jurisdiction by a state over another state or Heads of state, 
contrary to the principle of sovereign equality will be an exercise of imperium which 
would compromise the dignity of the state over which jurisdiction is exercised. This 
notion of dignity of states was relied upon in The Schooner Exchange,
119
 The 
Parlement Belge,
120
 and in The Cristina,
 121
 in the determination of state immunity. 
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Reliance on the dignity of states as justification for a system of immunities of states 
and Heads of states becomes problematic when faced with the restrictive theory of 
state immunity. After all, the exercise of jurisdiction by a state over the commercial 
activities of another state implicates the dignity of the trading state. However, the 
dignity of a state pales where what is in issue is a commercial transaction; whereas 
with respect to proceedings against Heads of states the dignity of states is called into 
serious question, especially where there is an element of criminality and in view of the 
possible outcome of criminal proceedings. 
 
Lauterpacht argued that the reliance on the notion of the dignity of states is antiquated 
and that it would accord more with the dignity of a state to submit itself to the 
jurisdiction of another state than to assert immunity.
122
 Lauterpacht‟s idealism is not in 
consonance with reality. States vigilantly guard against matters that diminish their 
status or infringe their dignity and resist submission to the jurisdiction of another state. 
The established practice of states rendering apology to other states for acts which 
compromise the dignity of states underscores this point.  
 
Bianchi argues that it is wrong to ascribe psychological feelings to states, which are 
abstract entities.
123
 However as argued earlier, states are made up of individuals and 
while this fact is readily recognized when a crime has been committed under the guise 
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of the state, it is submitted that the wrong is not in ascribing human feelings to states 
but in the selective recognition of the human content of states. Like a state would be 
overjoyed to win the World Cup so would it be embarrassed if not allowed to conduct 
its affairs and international relations in a manner befitting of its sovereign status or if 
its principal officer were subjected to criminal proceedings in another state.  
 
1.4.2 RECIPROCITY OR COMITY  
An application of the principle of reciprocity or comity would mean that a state 
refrains from exercising jurisdiction over another state by respecting the immunities of 
foreign states and Heads of states in order that those states would accord it same 
respect. This principle was relied upon in The Parlement Belge,
124
 and Rahimtoola v. 
Nizam of Hyderabad.
125
  
 
The principle of reciprocity or comity is a dominant feature in US literature and court 
jurisprudence.
126
 Thus in Ex parte Peru,
127
 and in Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman,
128
 it 
was decided that courts should hesitate to act where to do so would amount to political 
embarrassment of the executive arm of government in its conduct of international 
                                               
124
 Supra 10 
125
 Supra 27 
126
 The Schooner Exchange, supra 8; Shobha Varughese George, „Head of State Immunity in the United 
States Courts: Still Confused After All These Years‟, (1995-1996) 64 Fordham Law Review 1051, 
p.1061; Charles E. Hickey, „The Dictator, Drugs and Diplomacy by Indictment: Head of State 
Immunity in United States v. Noriega‟, (1988-1989) 4 Connecticut Journal of International Law 729, 
p.731 
127
 318 US 588 
128
 324 US 30 
69 
 
relations. Likewise In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Doe,
129
 and in Aristide v. 
Lafontant,
130
 the courts rationalised the immunities of Heads of states on the mutual 
respect and comity among nations. This approach to Head of state immunity is to be 
seen against the background of the peculiarity of the US constitutional set-up where 
the doctrine of separation of powers is deeply entrenched in the process of government 
and suggestions of immunity are made by the State Department to the judiciary.
131
  
 
Caplan argues that basing the immunity of states and their officials based on practical 
courtesy is more in tune with the dictates of reality because it gives pride of place to 
the adjudicatory jurisdiction of other states.
132
 He maintains that this approach is better 
for an international culture of accountability, otherwise states and their officials would 
evade the jurisdiction of states whereas the practical courtesy model enables states to 
withdraw the immunity.
133
  
 
Immunities facilitate international relations and the conduct of international relations 
being solely within the competence of states it accords with reason that immunities 
belong to states, and can only be waived by the state whose immunities are implicated. 
It is therefore wrong to assume that the immunity of state A can be withdrawn by state 
B without the consent of state A.  
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The problem with the approach expressed by Caplan, is that it makes the immunity of 
a Head of state dependent on the state of origin as well as the state seeking to assert 
jurisdiction. This approach is faced with the difficulty of where the Head of state A is 
involved in legal proceedings in state B and state A asserts the immunity of its official 
but state B refuses to grant the immunity. A further problem with this model is that in 
the event that the courts of state B are free to criminally indict and proceed against 
Heads of states C and D, officials of state B would be similarly indicted and proceeded 
against in the courts of states C and D. This would entrench a tit-for-tat approach in 
the adjudicatory process leading to its de-legitimisation and would adversely affect 
international relations.  
 
The basis of reciprocity as a rationale for the existence of immunity is limited by the 
fact that the applicability of international rules is not based on reciprocal gestures.
134
 
Nevertheless, reciprocity and international courtesy are practical reasons which 
rationalise a system of immunities of states and state officials. They do not, and 
cannot, substantively justify a system of immunities of states and Heads of states.
135
   
 
1.4.3 THE THEORY OF REPRESENTATION 
The extent of the representative capacity of an official implicates the immunity the 
official may enjoy ratione personae or ratione materiae. Immunity is accorded to a 
Head of state due to the “special status” as the occupier of a “state‟s highest office” 
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possessing ius repraesentationis omnimodae, a general competence to act for the state; 
and the actions which are attributable to the state.
136
  
 
This theory of representation explains why immunities are extended to state officials 
but it does not justify the existence of the immunities. The limitation of this theory as a 
foundational basis for the immunities of state officials is illustrated where a state does 
not recognise a particular official as the representative of another state.
137
  
 
1.4.4 ANALOGY WITH DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITIES 
The immunity of diplomatic agents was established by a well-developed practice and 
was justified on the grounds of ensuring mutual respect and efficiency in the conduct 
of international relations as well as guaranteeing states that their diplomats in different 
jurisdictions would be accorded the same courtesy. Customary international law grants 
to diplomats personal inviolability (immunity ratione personae) and to former 
diplomats a qualified immunity, ratione materiae, with respect to their official acts.
138
 
These rules of customary international law were later codified by the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961.
139
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Diplomatic immunity is founded upon the representative nature of diplomats. As such, 
the representative nature of official capacity as Head of state is the basis for this 
analogy. Heads of states are the “representatives par excellence” of their states and 
their representative capacities are more extensive than those of diplomats.
140
 
Therefore, practical prudence dictated the extension of diplomatic immunities to 
Heads of states. 
 
Likewise, the absence of an international legal instrument articulating the principles of 
Head of state immunity, unlike diplomatic immunity, necessitated the application of 
principles of diplomatic immunity to Heads of states. For instance, Section 20 of the 
SIA provides for the application of diplomatic immunities to Heads of states. The 
Convention on Special Missions also extends the applicability of diplomatic privileges 
and immunities within the Convention to Heads of states when heading special 
missions.
141
  
 
While the influence of diplomatic law on the development of the concept of Head of 
state immunity is considerable, the basis of Head of state immunity cannot be founded 
upon diplomatic immunity. This is because diplomatic immunity, like Head of state 
immunity, is an aspect of the wider concept of immunity of states which is based on 
sovereignty and sovereign equality.            
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1.4.5 ANALOGY WITH STATE IMMUNITY 
Head of state immunity must be conceptualised against the backdrop of state 
immunity because the latter elucidates the substance of the former.
142
  This is so when 
one considers that the principal idea behind the immunity ratione personae and 
immunity ratione materiae of Heads of states is that the authority and decision-
making processes of states are not to be circumvented by exercising jurisdiction over 
state officials under the pretence of adjudicating the acts of the officials.  
 
Reliance on an analogy with state immunity to rationalise Head of state immunity is 
given impetus by the historical fact of a lack of distinction between the person of the 
sovereign and the state making the acts of one, acts of the other. As sovereign 
entitlements of states, immunity is extended to state officials who act in a sovereign or 
representative capacity, for instance Heads of states and diplomats.
143
  
 
An analogy with state immunity, per se, cannot suffice as the foundational basis for 
Head of state immunity, rather the analogy provides a complementary basis, to the 
concept of sovereignty and sovereign equality, for the concept of Head of state 
immunity in international law.  
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1.4.6 THE IMPERATIVE OF FUNCTIONALITY 
At the core of this theory is the functioning of government. The efficiency of 
government will be better secured where Heads of states are not inundated with legal 
proceedings which, undoubtedly, will adversely impact on their abilities to function 
efficiently.
144
  
 
The imperative of functionality of government is essential for the rights and duties of a 
state arising under international law as well as to facilitate cordial international 
relations between states.  To properly carry out their functions, especially in a 
globalised world, the nature and purpose of the office of Head of state involves 
international travel. Therefore, the fact that a state allows a foreign state to function 
within its territory or allows foreign state officials to visit its territory is indicative of 
“an implied obligation not to derogate from a grant”.145 Otherwise, it would be 
entrapment. 
 
The nature of the functions of Heads of states necessitates that there should be no 
interference in, or impediments to, the functions. The practical logic behind this theory 
is highlighted by a situation where state A is free to exercise jurisdiction over the 
policies of state B which are unpopular in state A.   
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However, the imperative of functionality does not suffice as a foundational basis for 
Head of state immunity. Rather, it merely complements the concept of sovereignty and 
the principle of sovereign equality as the basis for the existence of a system of 
immunities of states and Heads of states.       
                                                                                        
 
1.5 CONCLUSION  
 
The concept of immunity in international law is a dynamic one which has undergone 
changes as to its scope resulting in a restriction of the traditional absoluteness of the 
concept. This chapter has considered the evolutionary developments in the immunities 
of states and Heads of states as well as the nature and scope of applicability of Head of 
state immunity, bearing in mind the problem of development within boundaries that 
are far from defined; a problem illustrated by the lack of certainty as to the scope of 
immunity ratione personae. 
 
It is argued in this chapter that sovereignty is the foundation of the pluralistic 
international order in which states exist, and that the viability of this pluralistic order is 
ensured by the principle of sovereign equality.  As the fons et origo of the 
international order, all international rules draw from sovereignty and it is to this extent 
that the basis of the concepts of immunities of states and Heads of states is to be found 
in the concept of sovereignty and the principle of sovereign equality.  
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As sovereign equals, there is a competing assertion of sovereignty of a state seeking to 
assert jurisdiction and that of the state asserting immunity from the jurisdiction. It is in 
the resolution of these competing assertions that the subsidiary foundations of 
immunity, seen in the principles of reciprocity, comity of nations, dignity of states and 
the imperative of functionality, come into play to support sovereignty and sovereign 
equality as the foundational basis of Head of state immunity.        
 
With the increasing development of an international regime of human rights and a 
culture of accountability, Head of state immunity has come under serious criticism for 
entrenching a culture of impunity. The question whether Head of state immunity is a 
challenge to human rights and entrenches impunity will be considered in the next 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2: HEAD OF STATE IMMUNITY: A CHALLENGE TO 
HUMAN RIGHTS? 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The notion of the immunity of states and Heads of states originated in classical 
positivist international law at a time when states were recognized as the only subjects 
of the international law and the direct protection of the individual had not yet 
materialized into the realm of international law. Traditionally, states were the 
protectors and enforcers of the individual rights of citizens and so could espouse 
international claims on behalf of their citizenry. With the development of human rights 
as a separate branch of international law, the evolution of international law has 
witnessed an individual-oriented approach and has gradually eroded the traditional 
state-oriented approach.  
 
While the essence of immunity is the exemption of the adjudicatory and enforcement 
jurisdiction of states, human rights expanded the adjudicatory and enforcement 
jurisdiction of states thereby resulting in a „seeming‟ doctrinal conflict between the 
two systems. 
 
78 
 
More prevalent in the interface between the systems of immunities and human rights 
has been the challenge of the immunities of states for violations of human rights.
1
  
While the focus of this thesis is Head of state immunity, it is important to consider 
state immunity challenges to human rights. This is because despite a sustained practice 
of recognizing the state immunity for human rights violations, there seems to be an 
emerging change in judicial attitudes as evidenced in the bare minority decision of the 
European Court of Human Rights in Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom,
2
 the decision of 
the UK Court of Appeals in Jones v. Saudi Arabia,
3
 and the Italian Court of Cassation 
in Ferrini v. The Federal Republic of Germany.
4
  
 
This chapter will analyse the imperatives of the two systems involved in this 
discourse, on the one hand a system of human rights and on the other hand, a system 
of immunities. It will also critically analyse the various theoretical approaches that 
have been resorted to in the reconciliation of the seeming conflicting imperatives of 
the systems. Invariably, the analysis in the chapter will inform the issue of whether, 
and to what extent, there is a new customary international law on Head of state 
immunity.  
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2.2 THE IMPERATIVES OF A SYSTEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND A 
SYSTEM OF IMMUNITIES 
 
It is inherent in the dignity of humanity that human beings possess certain rights and 
freedoms. Human rights and freedoms are accepted societal values which “all human 
beings should be able to claim “as of right” of the society in which they live”.5 The 
protection of human rights is one of the fundamental objectives, and greatest 
achievements, of the international order.
6
 A system of human rights is fundamental for 
humanity, national and international peace and stability. The scope of violations of 
human rights is of great magnitude when committed by persons, like Heads of states 
and other state officials who have the machinery of state power available at their 
disposal. These violations, particularly when they are part of the policy of a state, 
impact greatly on the international system as gross flouting of universally accepted 
norms with implications for international peace and security.  
 
Immunities have been established, in the previous chapter, to be a core principle of 
public international law and its theoretical foundations structure the international order 
making it a highly respected and conservatively guarded concept. The concept of 
immunity cannot to be detached from its functions, including the facilitation of 
international diplomacy and relations.  
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2.3 THE PROBLEM SO FAR 
 
Generally, international human rights instruments are applicable to states and seek to 
ensure that state officials and agents respect the stipulated standards.
7
 However, 
human rights encounter an “enforcement crises” where immunities are involved.8 This 
is because while human rights enhance the jurisdiction of states, immunities are an 
exemption from the jurisdiction a state may ordinarily possess. The necessary 
consequence of immunity, by the exemption of a state or its official from the 
jurisdiction of a court, is the challenge to the enforcement of human rights standards. 
As such, immunity is perceived as inhibiting the development of a system of human 
rights capable of meeting international standards of accountability.
9
 
 
At the heart of this chapter are two seemingly conflicting perspectives. Firstly, the 
classical positivist view which recognizes that states are the only subjects of 
international law and that the duties and rights enunciated in the human rights 
instruments devolve on states. As such, international rules are to be interpreted against 
the backdrop of the position of the individual in traditional international law, as 
incapable of acquiring direct rights in international law.
10
 Based on this classical view 
of international law, the immunities of states and state officials are to be respected 
always.  
                                               
7
 Ilias Bantekas and Susan Nash, International Criminal Law, 2
nd
 edition, (London: Cavendish 
Publishing, 2003), p.14 
8
 M. Cherif Bassiouni, „The Proscribing Function of International Criminal Law in the Processes of 
International Protection of Human Rights‟, (1982-1983) 9 Yale Journal of World Public Order 193 
9
 Campione v. Peti-Nitrogenmuvek NV and Hungarian Republic, 65 ILR 287 p.302 
10
 Jürgen Bröhmer, State Immunity and the Violation of Human Rights, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1997), p.8 
81 
 
 
Secondly, there is the progressive human rights perspective of international law that 
there is no rule stipulating that only states can acquire direct rights and duties in 
international law. As such, nothing stops individuals and organisations from assuming 
direct rights in international law. Moreover, the trend in international law has been to 
recognize the increasing importance of non-state actors in international activities.
11
 
With the emerging trend in international law seeking to entrench a culture of 
accountability, it has been argued that the enforcement of the rights of individuals is to 
prevail even where immunities are involved.
12
 
 
It has been argued that the developments in the law regarding the immunities of states, 
i.e. from absolute to restrictive, was largely contributed to by the increasing 
significance and recognition of the individual in international law, though it may have 
only been the economic interests of individuals or at least of „the international 
business man‟.13 Following from this, it would seem that the civil interests of 
individuals should also be given the same value as their economic interests, hence 
translating into a more progressive restriction of immunities of states beyond their 
commercial activities. States, after all, exist for its citizenry and the duty of states 
includes the protection of individuals and safeguarding their fundamental freedoms. 
However, as stated in Chapter 1, the fragmentation of sovereignty in the economic 
sphere of states has not been achieved in the political sphere. 
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Like the concept of immunities, the existence of a system of human rights is founded 
upon the sovereignty of states. Indeed developments in the area of human rights are 
given impetus by the very idea of sovereignty. It becomes apposite to consider 
whether there is an actual conflict between the imperatives of a system of human 
rights and a system of immunities, and in the event of a conflict, how the values are to 
be reconciled.
14
  
 
2.4 FRAMEWORK FOR THE RESOLUTION OF THE IMPERATIVES OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE IMPERATIVES OF IMMUNITIES OF STATES 
AND STATE OFFICIALS 
 
The imperatives of a system for the protection of human rights cannot be understated. 
Likewise the importance of the immunities to which states and their officials are 
entitled cannot be whimsically disregarded. In seeking to reconcile the seemingly 
conflicting interests of both systems, the concepts of universal jurisdiction and jus 
cogens as they impact on immunities will be considered. In addition, international and 
national instruments on state immunity (with possible exceptions thereof) as well as 
the theory of implied waiver of immunity will also form part of the analysis. 
 
 
 
                                               
14
 Dan Sarooshi, „Sovereignty, Economic Autonomy, the United States, and the International Trading 
System: Representations of a Relationship‟, (2004) 15 EJIL 651, p.653 
83 
 
2.4.1 THE UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION APPROACH 
Certain fundamental rights cannot be adequately secured by a few states or through a 
“framework of bilateral relations” alone.15 To ensure effective protection and 
enforcement of these rights a mechanism that would involve the generality of the 
world community is sought to be achieved through the idea of universality of interest 
in the protection of human rights.  
 
There is no agreed definition of universal jurisdiction in general international law.
16
 
However, this does not preclude any definition which embodies the essence of the 
principle as the ability to exercise jurisdiction irrespective of territoriality or 
nationality.
17
 According to Randall, 
“This principle provides every state with jurisdiction 
over a limited category of offences generally recognized 
as of universal concern, regardless of the situs of the 
offence and the nationalities of the offender and the 
offended”.18 
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For Brown, the concept of universal jurisdiction is based on functionality in view of 
the decentralised nature of the international system; a feature that makes it difficult for 
the system to enforce its fundamental laws.
19
 
 
The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction provide that universal jurisdiction 
pertains broadly to the power of states to punish certain crimes irrespective of the 
place committed and by whom committed (i.e. in the absence of other grounds for the 
exercise of jurisdiction).
20
 This „universal‟ right of states to institute legal proceedings 
regarding gross violations of jus cogens norms entailing obligations of this character 
has been likened to the Roman Law principle of actio popularis which gave every 
member of the public the right to legal action in defence of public interest, whether or 
not one was affected.
21
 
  
Universal jurisdiction is not without controversy and this extends to its history as well 
as its applicability. While some commentators contend that the principle is novel,
22
 
earlier indications of the principle go back to the international crime of piracy. Articles 
19 and 105 of the Geneva Convention on the High Seas 1958 and the UN Convention 
on the Law of the Sea 1982 respectively, provide that, 
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“On the high seas, or in any other place outside the 
jurisdiction of any state, every state may seize a pirate 
ship or aircraft, or a ship or aircraft taken by piracy and 
under the control of pirates, and arrest the persons and 
seize the property on board.”23 
 
The fact that pirates were regarded as stateless persons coupled with the fact that acts 
of piracy were committed on the high seas outside the territorial jurisdiction of states 
would have meant that pirates were completely outside the ambit of the law. To avoid 
a situation whereby states would not have had the right to exercise jurisdiction over 
pirates, a means of asserting some sort of universal jurisdiction over piracy was 
necessitated.
24
 
 
It is commonly assumed that certain international crimes like slavery, slave trade, 
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and torture attract universal 
jurisdiction because of the „moral heinousness‟ of these crimes.25 However, „moral 
heinousness‟ is not be equated with universal jurisdiction.26 Universal jurisdiction over 
piracy was due to its peculiar nature and not any notion of heinousness; and so the 
appropriateness of relying on piracy to establish universal jurisdiction over 
international crimes based on the notion of heinousness is doubtful and without proper 
foundation.
27
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 The issue of whether there exists universal jurisdiction over a crime is dependent on 
the subtleties of international rule-making, i.e. the extent to which universal 
jurisdiction is accepted as an international rule. Furthermore, the fact that universal 
jurisdiction may exist with regard to a crime does not render the immunities of states 
and Heads of state inapplicable. The ICJ summed up the matter by asserting as 
follows, 
“It should further be noted that the rules governing the 
jurisdiction of national courts must be carefully 
distinguished from those governing jurisdictional 
immunities: jurisdiction does not imply absence of 
immunity, while absence of immunity does not imply 
jurisdiction. Thus, although various international 
conventions on the prevention and punishment of certain 
serious crimes impose on states obligations of 
prosecution or extradition, thereby requiring them to 
extend their criminal jurisdiction, such extension of 
jurisdiction in no way affects immunities under 
customary international law... These remain opposable 
before the courts of a foreign state, even where those 
courts exercise such a jurisdiction under these 
conventions.”28 
 
Randall contends that recognition of universal jurisdiction over slavery and slave 
trading can be traced to the Geneva Convention on the High Seas, the UN Convention 
on the Law of the Sea, the 1926 Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery 
and its Protocol in 1953 and Supplementary Convention in 1956.
29
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However, there is nothing in the text of these provisions conferring states with 
universal jurisdiction, indeed most of the provisions direct their obligations to state 
parties; obligations which are merely contractual.
30
 Indeed, Kontorovich argues that, 
“At most, international treaties on slave trading created 
“delegated jurisdiction” whereby several nations 
conveyed to one another the right to exercise some of 
their jurisdictional powers with respect to a particular 
offence, effectively making each state an agent of the 
others. Since such arrangements rest on state consent 
and the traditional jurisdiction of each state party to the 
agreements, they in no way…can be considered as 
examples of universal jurisdiction”.31 
 
Conceding that the international instruments on slavery do not explicitly confer 
universal jurisdiction, Randall further argues that universal jurisdiction over slavery 
and slave trading exists in customary international law. He relies on Sørensen who 
argues that customary international law as seen in the extensive efforts to abolish 
slavery, even in the absence of explicit provisions in international instruments on 
slavery providing for universal jurisdiction, sustains universal jurisdiction over these 
crimes.
32
  
 
It is doubtful if customary law sustains the view of Randall or Sørensen because there 
is no evidence of general practice of universal jurisdiction over slavery and slave trade 
which states have accepted as law.  
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The trial of Adolf Eichmann in 1961 by Israel is commonly perceived as establishing 
universal jurisdiction over crimes against humanity and war crimes.
33
 Charges were 
brought in Israel against Eichmann, under the Nazis and Nazi Collaborators 
(Punishment) Law 1950.
34
 Although a retroactive legislation, the 1950 Law provided 
the basis for exercise of jurisdiction against Eichmann.
35
  
 
It is an accepted principle of international law that states may assert jurisdiction over 
both nationals and non-national who violate their laws. The decision of the Permanent 
Court of International Justice in the Lotus case,
36
 that unless expressly prohibited by 
international law, states may extend the application of their laws to persons outside 
their jurisdiction support this argument. In addition, Israel being the “sole sovereign 
representative of the Jewish people, as well as nation where many of the victims (of 
the Holocaust) took refuge”, there was already a jurisdictional link between Israel and 
Eichmann for his „crimes against the Jewish people‟.37 Eichmann‟s actions violated 
Israeli law; therefore there was a valid basis of Israeli territorial jurisdiction over him. 
 
The Eichmann case does not support universal jurisdiction over crimes against 
humanity or war crimes. There was already in existence a valid basis on which Israel 
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exercised jurisdiction over Adolf Eichmann, and so the added ground of universal 
jurisdiction was merely superfluous. 
 
In 1993 Belgium enacted the Act Concerning the Punishment of Grave Breaches of 
International Humanitarian Law.
38
 By this legislation Belgium arrogated to itself 
universal jurisdiction over persons accused of crimes against humanity. An 
investigating Magistrate in Belgium, on 11 April 2000, issued an international arrest 
warrant through Interpol against the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo alleging crimes against humanity and war crimes. The Congo 
instituted proceedings before the ICJ contending that Belgium had, by issuing and 
circulating the arrest warrant, violated the sovereignty and sovereign equality of the 
Congo as well as violated the diplomatic immunity of its senior state official.
39
 The 
Court came to its decision on grounds other than universal jurisdiction and found that 
Belgium had failed in its international obligation to the Congo by not respecting the 
sovereignty of the Congo and the immunity ratione personae of its Foreign Minister. 
  
Also, in September 2005, a Belgian judge issued an arrest warrant against the former 
President of Chad, Hissène Habré. Habré was subsequently arrested by Senegalese 
officials but the request for his extradition to Belgium was refused by Senegal.
40
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Senegal referred the matter to the African Union (AU) which mandated Senegal to 
ensure the prosecution and trial of Habré
 
 in Senegal.
41
  
 
In February 2009, Belgium instituted proceedings against Senegal before the ICJ 
claiming that Senegal is in breach of its international obligations under the Convention 
against Torture by failing to prosecute or extradite Habré.
42
 
 
Again, any reliance on the Arrest warrant and Habré cases as authority for the 
existence of universal jurisdiction is limited. Due to political pressure from the US, the 
controversial universal jurisdiction legislation of Belgium has been amended.
43
 This 
amendment was done in the aftermath of the ICJ decision in the Arrest Warrant and is 
in line with the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.
44
 Although the ICJ 
refrained from deciding on the issue of universal jurisdiction in the Arrest Warrant 
case, the decisions of the majority of the judges do not accept that universal 
jurisdiction forms part of general international law, except as applicable to the 
international crime of piracy.
45
  
 
Furthermore, unlike the Congo in the Arrest Warrant case, Senegal is a party to the 
Convention against Torture 1984. The Convention provides in Article 5(2) that parties 
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are to ensure that they assert jurisdiction over persons accused of torture found within 
their territories or to extradite such persons. Therefore, the basis of jurisdiction by 
Belgium cannot be „pure‟ universality as it had earlier sought in the Arrest warrant 
case, but rather „treaty-based‟ universality.  
 
Universal jurisdiction has also been argued to have extended to certain crimes “so 
serious and on such a scale that they can justly be regarded as an attack on the 
international legal order…” and treaties codifying these crimes stipulate that states 
within whose territory persons guilty of such crimes are found are under a duty to 
prosecute or extradite (aut dedere, aut judicare) such persons.
46
 Rather for the sake of 
convenience than as a term of art, this category of crimes has been wrongly referred to 
as embodying „treaty-based universal jurisdiction‟ and they include genocide, war 
crimes and torture.
47
 The idea of treaty-based universal jurisdiction seems a misnomer 
in view of the fact that it is custodial and relates to contractual obligations limited only 
to parties to the agreement. 
 
With regard to treaty-based universal jurisdiction, resort is to be had to the language of 
the specific treaties. Contrary to the opinion expressed by Bassiouni,
48
 the Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1948 does not impose an 
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obligation to prosecute or extradite on parties.
49
 Rather the Convention provides that 
trials are to be by, 
“a competent tribunal of the state in the territory of 
which the act was committed, or by such international 
penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to 
those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its 
jurisdiction.”50 
 
The Convention also provides that,  
“Genocide …shall not be considered as political crimes 
for the purpose of extradition. The Contracting Parties 
pledge themselves in such cases to grant extradition in 
accordance with their laws and treaties in force.”51  
 
The interpretation of these provisions can only result in one of two outcomes. Firstly, 
proceedings for genocide may be brought by states which are obligated to exercise 
jurisdiction where there is a territorial jurisdictional link, or secondly, proceedings 
may be brought before a competent international criminal court. Where genocide has 
been committed and extradition is sought, parties to the Convention cannot qualify the 
genocide as a political offence for which there can be no extradition. Rather 
extradition is granted in accordance with municipal laws because extradition is 
dependent on the existence of a treaty or agreement in the absence of which there is no 
obligation to extradite.
52
 If anything, the provisions of the Genocide Convention leave 
no doubt that the Convention does not embody universal jurisdiction and neither does 
it confer same upon parties. In fact, the drafting history of the Genocide Convention 
supports this view because an earlier proposal providing that parties could punish 
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offenders within any territory under their jurisdiction irrespective of his nationality or 
place of commission of crime was rejected.
53
 
 
International instruments regarding war crimes and torture are more explicit in their 
provisions regarding the issue of treaty-based universal jurisdiction. Articles 49, 50, 
129 and 146 of the first,
54
 second,
55
 third,
56
 and fourth,
57
 Geneva Conventions 1949 
respectively, provide that, 
“Each High Contracting Party shall be under the 
obligation to search for persons alleged to have 
committed...grave breaches and shall bring such 
persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own 
courts. It may also, if it prefers, and in accordance with 
the provisions of its own legislation, hand such persons 
over for trial to another High Contracting Party 
concerned, provided such High Contracting Party has 
made out a prima facie case.” 
 
The extent to which it may be said that there is universal jurisdiction over war crimes 
is limited by the fact that the obligations stipulated in the Geneva Conventions are 
contractual agreements which are binding only upon parties. Higgins, Kooijmans and 
Buergenthal, in their Joint Separate Opinion in the Arrest Warrant Case, opine that the 
fact that the provisions of the Geneva Conventions did not anticipate any territorial or 
nationality jurisdictional links may be suggestive of a “true universal principle”.58 
However, in doubting whether the Geneva Conventions were reflective of universal 
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jurisdiction, the judges cited the “authoritative” Pictet Commentary on the Geneva 
Conventions that the obligation upon parties to search for offenders is with regard to 
offenders present within their territory.
59
  
 
By Articles 49, 50, 129 and 146 of the first, second, third and fourth Geneva 
Conventions, respectively, jurisdiction may be exercised by a party based on 
territoriality where persons accused of war crimes are found within its territory or it 
may surrender accused persons to another party which has made out a prima facie 
case. It is submitted that a High Contracting Party concerned who has made out a 
prima facie case is one that has some sort of jurisdictional link with an accused 
person. This, coupled with the fact that there is a dearth of case law on the matter, 
shows that reliance on the provisions of the Geneva Conventions as establishing 
universal jurisdiction for war crimes is misguided. 
Article 5 of the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Punishment 1984,
60
 obligates parties to establish jurisdiction over acts of torture 
committed within their jurisdictions or by their nationals or against their nationals. 
Article 7 of the Convention against Torture provides that a party in whose territory an 
accused person is found shall extradite him or submit the matter to its competent 
authorities for prosecution. Article 5 establishes jurisdictional links between parties 
and persons alleged to have committed torture.  
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States not party to the Geneva Convention and the Convention against Torture may 
not exercise jurisdiction under the Conventions. This is because of the pacta tertiis nec 
nocent nec prosunt principle codified in Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties 1969, i.e. a treaty cannot create rights or obligations for third parties 
without their consent.
61
 While the substance of the Conventions, i.e. the prohibition 
against war crimes and torture, are reflective of customary international law thereby 
binding states not parties to the Conventions, it would be wrong to assume that all the 
rules contained in the Conventions are reflective of customary international law. 
Arguably, the provisions on the exercise of jurisdiction by parties, which are rules of 
procedure, are not reflective of customary international law because by their nature, as 
procedural rather than substantive rules, they are incapable of becoming custom. 
 
Essentially therefore, obligations of aut dedere, aut judicare under the Geneva 
Conventions and the Convention against Torture apply to the parties on an inter partes 
basis. The conventional obligation of aut dedere, aut judicare differs from universal 
jurisdiction. Universal jurisdiction, by its very nature, extends to all states and does 
not just operate inter partes, unlike the aut dedere conventional obligation, which is 
essentially territorial jurisdiction for extraterritorial acts.
62
  
 
The treaty provisions discussed above are merely declaratory of obligation of parties. 
There is no established practice of the exercise of universal jurisdiction by states over 
war crimes and torture. Indeed, the decision of the House of Lords in Pinochet (No. 3) 
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was based on the Convention against Torture which Chile and the UK had ratified, 
Section 134 of the Criminal Justice Act and the requirement of double criminality in 
English law rather than on universal jurisdiction.
63
 
 
The existence of universal jurisdiction for human rights violations is doubtful.
64
 
Judges Higgins, etal, upon considerations of the various national legislations and case-
law in the UK,
65
 Australia,
66
 Austria,
67
 France,
68
 Germany,
69
 Netherlands,
70
 and US,
71
 
observed that though there may have been efforts to adjudicate over extra-territorial 
crimes, especially war crimes, there has been no clear instance of assertion of 
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universal jurisdiction where there has been no other jurisdictional link, with the 
exception of Belgium, as evident in the instance before the Court.
72 
 
Moreover, as the 1993 Law of Belgium currently stands, it excludes prosecution of 
Heads of states, Heads of governments, Ministers of Foreign Affairs and other persons 
enjoying international immunities during the period of incumbency.
73
 
 
For Judge ad hoc Van den Wyngaert, in her Dissenting Opinion in the Arrest Warrant 
Case, international law not only permits but also encourages universal jurisdiction for 
war crimes and crimes against humanity.
74
 This purported idea of universal 
jurisdiction for war crimes and crimes against humanity has also been argued to 
extend to Heads of states.
75
 However, this is doubtful because there is no evidence of 
established state practice of universal jurisdiction over international crimes. President 
Guillaume, in the Arrest Warrant case, found support with Lord Slynn of Hadley in 
Pinochet (No.2) that there is no universality of jurisdiction with regard to international 
crimes and he further asserted that only piracy is subject, truly, to universal 
jurisdiction in international law.
76
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Perhaps more than any other state, Spain has been in the forefront of claims of 
universal jurisdiction. Under Article 23 (4) of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial 
(Judicial Power Organization Act), Spain has jurisdiction over crimes committed by 
Spanish or foreign citizens outside Spain, including genocide, terrorism and other 
crimes in international treaties that Spain is party to.
77
 In the Spanish Guatemalan 
Genocide case, complaints for gross human rights violations were lodged, before the 
Audencia Nacional, against several Guatemalan officials, including former Heads of 
state Gral Efraín Ríos Montt, Oscar Humberto Mejías Victores and Fernando Romeo 
Lucas García for acts of terrorism, genocide and torture against the Guatemalan 
Mayan indigenous people and their supporters. The investigating judge accepted the 
complaint.  
 
Upon appeal, the Spanish Supreme Court held by a very slim majority (8:7), in 2003, 
that Spanish national interests (a jurisdictional link) had to be affected and solely with 
regard to the crime of torture for Spanish courts to exercise jurisdiction in the matter.
78
 
The Court found that the exercise of territorial and international criminal jurisdiction 
under Article 6 of the Genocide Convention 1948 was not exclusive and that any other 
criminal jurisdiction exercisable is subsidiary to the provision of Article VI.
79
 The 
Majority in noting that the Genocide Convention does not provide for universal 
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jurisdiction argued that neither was universal jurisdiction prohibited by the 
Convention.
80
  
 
To the extent that universal jurisdiction over the crime of genocide under general 
international law cannot be said to exist under treaty law (a fact which even the 
Spanish Supreme Court did not deny) or customary international law, it would be 
wrong to read it, however impliedly, into the Genocide Convention. To hold otherwise 
amounts to judicial law-making in international law and is not recognised as a source 
of international under Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ.
81
 
 
The more cautious approach of the Majority of the Spanish Supreme Court is 
preferable to that of the Minority. This is because the Majority, at least, took into 
consideration the ICJ decision in the Arrest Warrant case.
82
  
 
Article VIII of the Genocide Convention provides that a party may call upon the 
competent organs of the UN to take such action under its Charter as may be 
appropriate for the prevention and suppression of the genocidal acts. This, in no way, 
provides for the exercise of universal jurisdiction by states. Therefore, it was wrong of 
the Majority to argue that Article VIII rendered the jurisdiction of Spanish courts 
effective.
83
 Furthermore, the misinterpretation of the House of Lords decision in 
Pinochet (No.3) by the Minority judges to the effect that under international law, 
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crimes of jus cogens, including genocide, are punishable by any state flaws the 
judgment. The Pinochet decision, as earlier stated, was based on the Convention 
against Torture, which the UK and Chile were party to and had contractually agreed to 
the exercise of jurisdiction under the Convention. The effect of the designation of a 
norm as jus cogens, does not mean that it can confer a court with jurisdiction which it 
does not have under international law. 
 
Upon further appeal, in 2005, the Spanish Constitutional Court rejected the 
subsidiarity requirement of the Supreme Court and upturned the decision of the 
Supreme Court holding that Spain could investigate crimes of genocide, torture, 
murder and illegal imprisonment committed in Guatemala between 1978 and 1986 and 
that the principle of universal jurisdiction was not dependent on the existence, or 
otherwise, of national interests.
84
 The Constitutional Court was of the view that, 
“The Convention‟s silence on alternative jurisdictions 
beyond territorial and international tribunals cannot be 
read as an implicit limitation. Rather, Article VI of the 
Convention simply establishes the minimal obligations 
on states. The obligations to avoid impunity found in 
customary international law are incompatible with such 
a limited reading of the Convention and would, 
perversely, place more stringent limits on the actions of 
state parties to the Convention than those that applied to 
non-parties, which could rely on a universal jurisdiction 
founded in customary international law.”85 
 
To the extent that the Constitutional Court adopted the position of the Minority of the 
Spanish Supreme Court, it is difficult to agree with the Court, for the reasons given 
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above. The Court‟s argument, that the fact that the Genocide Convention makes no 
mention of jurisdictions other than territorial or international tribunals does not mean 
an „implicit limitation‟ on jurisdiction, is flawed. After all, neither does the silence 
mean an „implicit‟ authorization of other jurisdiction under Article VI of the 
Convention. While the sentiment behind the decision to check impunity is laudable, it 
is a misinterpretation of the law to assume that not exercising universal jurisdiction 
under said Article VI would be incompatible with the obligations of states under 
customary international law. Although customary international law, like treaty law, 
prohibits the crime of genocide, customary international law does not impose an 
obligation on states to exercise universal jurisdiction for genocide. To this end, the 
issue of limits under the Convention for parties and non-parties goes to no issue.  
 
Asserting universal jurisdiction, Spain convicted and sentenced an Argentine naval 
officer, Adolfo Scilingo to 640 years imprisonment for crimes of humanity.
86
 The 
action of Spain is not reflective of international law, lex lata; the practice of Spain is 
indicative, perhaps, of where international law might be headed.  
 
Having considered both treaty and customary international law on the matter, it is 
submitted that there is no valid authority for the claim that universal jurisdiction can 
be exercised where Heads of states violate human rights.
87
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2.4.1.1 THE PROBLEM WITH UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 
On the face of it, universal jurisdiction may seem as the panacea for the horrors of 
international crimes by ensuring that the human rights violators are brought to justice. 
However, the potential for abuse of universal jurisdiction is not to be taken for granted 
and there are practical problems with its acceptance. These include firstly, the 
consequence of judicial chaos that would arise due to a proliferation of litigation.
88
  
 
Secondly, there is also the adverse impact on legal fact-finding by national courts, 
especially in view of the fact that the courts of the states seeking to exercise universal 
jurisdiction would not have any direct link with the crime in issue. The litigation 
process is an expensive one and the increased costs for individual litigants as well as 
taxpayers must also be considered.  
 
Thirdly, there is the problem of securing the presence of witnesses from outside the 
jurisdiction of the state asserting universal jurisdiction so as to ensure a fair trial. 
Fourthly, the fact that states would use universal jurisdiction as an excuse to pursue 
citizens of other countries that they do not share the same ideals (socio-political, 
cultural, economic or religious) would have serious implications for the fairness of the 
trial of accused persons. Securing protection of rights of victims of international 
crimes is not to be achieved at the expense of the fundamental rights of accused 
persons. It would be an absurd, and indeed a dangerous, system of international 
                                               
88
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accountability that required this. Indeed this would be tantamount to importing the 
logical fallacy that „two wrongs make a right‟ into international law.  
 
Inevitably, these concerns will adversely affect the legitimacy of any decision based 
on universal jurisdiction. The establishment of a culture of accountability cannot be 
founded upon illegitimate decisions and processes. It is, in part, due to these reasons of 
practicality that universal jurisdiction is not supported. 
 
Fifthly, if it is accepted that universal jurisdiction may be exercised over Heads of 
states and state officials, in accordance with Belgium‟s initial purport, this can result 
in the harassment of officials. This would, no doubt, adversely impact on the effective 
performance of the official functions of such persons. This harassment and 
interference could have international repercussions by embarrassing a state in its 
conduct of foreign relations which could in turn cause tensions between states. There 
is the further consequence of the ultimate impact on international peace and security, 
the maintenance of which is the primary reason for the establishment of the present 
international order.
89
 
 
Sixthly, there is the added problem of forum-shopping where victims of international 
crimes as well as activists would seek to bring complaints against certain state officials 
hoping that a state will be able to institute criminal proceedings against these officials. 
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Additionally, because it is inherent in the idea of universality that there are few or no 
limits, the scope for abuse of universal jurisdiction would be virtually limitless. States 
would capitalise on the concept to further their political agendas.
90
 Interestingly, the 
two countries that have asserted universal jurisdiction over international crimes, 
namely Belgium and Spain asserted jurisdiction over nationals of their former colonial 
territories, i.e. Belgium over the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda; and 
Spain over Argentina. Belgium dropped charges against US officials in the wake of 
the amendment of its 1993 Law in 2003 but preserved the cases involving Chad and 
Rwanda.
91
 The claims by Belgium and Spain seem imperialist and suggest a re-
assertion of colonial powers by Belgium and Spain. Likewise, the power and 
economic differential between developed and developing states as well as the fact that 
the assertions of this ground for jurisdiction have emanated from developed states 
over, predominantly, nationals of developing states is a mockery of the de-
colonization process. This strengthens the legal argument about the extensive potential 
of the universal jurisdiction for abuse. 
 
The concept of universal jurisdiction is an inadequate tool for the reconciliation of the 
interests of a system of human rights and a system of immunities. This is because even 
if accepted that universal jurisdiction is an established ground for the exercise of 
jurisdiction like territoriality or nationality and that universal jurisdiction is free from 
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problems, the concept of immunity operates to exclude the jurisdiction that a state 
would ordinarily possess. Irrespective of its type, i.e. territoriality or nationality or 
universality, “jurisdiction does not imply an absence of immunity, while absence of 
immunity does not imply jurisdiction”.92  
 
2.4.2 THE JUS COGENS APPROACH 
The concept of jus cogens is reflected in the Law of Treaties as an internationally 
accepted norm which cannot be derogated from and which can only be modified by a 
subsequent norm of the same character.
 93
 Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice describes jus cogens 
as absolute obligations “which operate in an imperative manner in virtually all 
circumstances…The obligation is, for each state, an absolute obligation of law not 
dependent on its observance by others.” 94   
 
The class of norms that fall within jus cogens is not without controversy. However, the 
concept of jus cogens is accepted as applying to the use of force, the law of state 
responsibility, the principle of non-discrimination based on racial grounds, the 
principle of self-determination, grave violations of human rights amounting to 
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international crimes, namely slave trade, genocide, crimes against humanity and 
torture.
95
  
 
The inclusion of the prohibition against torture, crimes against humanity, war crimes 
and genocide into the spectrum of jus cogens as peremptory norms of international law 
is an attempt to infuse some sort of normative hierarchy into the field of public 
international law. As such, the category of rules within jus cogens have a „higher 
normativity‟ and are different from other international legal rules.96  
 
A consequence of the designation of a norm as jus cogens is evident in the nature of 
the obligations that would arise from it. It is pertinent to consider whether the 
obligations inherent in a norm are to be limited, inter partes, to only the parties to an 
agreement?  
 
It is a general rule of international law, and contained in the Law of Treaties, that an 
agreement or a treaty cannot create obligations or give rights to third parties without 
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their consent.
97
 Only the parties to whom an international obligation is due may bring 
a claim or institute proceedings with regard to breaches of the obligation.
98
 
 
However, the consequence of the designation of a jus cogens status to a norm of 
international law is two-fold. Firstly, the norms become universal in character and 
secondly, the norms become binding on states even in the absence of any conventional 
obligation.
99
 This is because the practice of confining obligations to only the parties to 
an agreement goes against the very essence of the peremptory nature of the norm, the 
essence of which is the protection of the ordre public, i.e. the fundamental values of 
the international order.
 100
 The international order is not limited to one state or a few 
states but comprises of the generality of states and the obligations arising from a jus 
cogens designation are to be extended to all states.  
 
The issue of the pervasiveness of certain obligations arose before the ICJ in the 
Barcelona Traction Light and Power Co. ltd case (Belgium v. Spain), where the Court 
stated that, 
“an essential distinction should be drawn between the 
obligations of a state towards the international 
community as a whole, and those arising vis-à-vis 
another state…By their very nature the former are the 
concern of all states. In view of the importance of the 
rights involved, all states can be held to have a legal 
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interest in their protection; they are obligations erga 
omnes.”101  
 
It is a necessary consequence of the designation of a norm as jus cogens that it implies 
pervasive obligations erga omnes.
102
 As a result, it has been argued in some quarters, 
notably by Bassiouni, that human rights which have attained jus cogens have attendant 
obligatio erga omnes and therefore prevail over other rules of international law, 
whether customary or treaty because by virtue of their peremptory nature they are 
higher norms.
103
 Therefore, legal obligations arising from the jus cogens nature of a 
norm and the erga omnes nature of these legal obligations must include the non-
recognition of immunities of states and Heads of states.
 
For Bassiouni, there are 
implications of universal jurisdiction arising as a result and this jurisdiction is 
mandatory because the implications are “those of a duty and not of optional rights; 
otherwise jus cogens would not constitute a peremptory norm of international law”.104  
 
On the face of the matter, the concepts of jus cogens, obligatio erga omnes and 
universal jurisdiction seem similar. However it would be wrong to treat the concepts 
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as necessitating the same consequence.
105
 Theoretically, it may be attractive to argue 
that there are inherent obligations which are erga omnes in jus cogens norms and that 
the violations of the norms incur universal jurisdiction of all states to protect the 
norms and enforce the obligations. Attractive as the argument may seem, it is circular 
and lacks conviction when tested out in practice.  
 
The concepts of jus cogens and obligatio erga omnes face definitional problems. 
Though there is no requirement for precise definition of legal concepts, there is the 
problem that the meaning to be attached to obligatio erga omnes is not clear. Indeed, 
the prohibition against torture is jus cogens and obligations arising under the 
Convention against Torture are erga omnes. However such obligations have been held 
not to include the duty on state parties to give civil remedies to victims under Article 
14 of the Convention where torture is alleged.
106
 Parties to the Convention may have 
consented to an obligation of aut dedere, aut judicare, however the enforcement of 
this obligation is not without its problems. A state party may lack the political will to 
exercise jurisdiction over a matter and also lack the legal bases to extradite because for 
extradition to take place, there usually has to be an extradition treaty in existence 
between the parties involved. 
 
Article 5 of the Convention against Torture provides for the exercise of jurisdiction by 
states, but its provisions cannot be taken to imply a duty to exercise jurisdiction.  This 
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position which finds favour with state practice is contrary to the position of the 
Committee against Torture which was established under Article 17 of the Convention 
against Torture. The position of the Committee is that states are to adopt necessary 
measures to fulfil the obligations under the Convention including granting civil 
remedies to victims.
107
 In the case of Suleymane Guengueng et al, which involved 
torture victims bringing a claim against Senegal with regard to Hisséne Habrè, the 
complainants claimed that Senegal was in breach of its obligations under Articles 5 
and 7 of the Convention against Torture and also claimed for compensation by virtue 
of Article 14 of the Convention.
108
 The Committee decided that Senegal had breached 
its obligations under Articles 5 and 7 of the Convention.  
 
A factor that diminishes the effect of the position of the Committee against Torture 
especially with regard to its decision against Senegal is the fact that the Committee is a 
political body that was established to monitor implementation of the Convention and 
not an adjudicatory body. Its findings and decisions can only have political and not 
legal implications. Moreover, the powers of the Committee are merely exhortatory, as 
the Convention against Torture in Article 19 provides for the powers of the Committee 
to include making comments and reports. More importantly, there are decisions of 
courts, namely Bouzari v. Iran,
109
 and Jones v. Saudi Arabia,
110
 supporting the view 
that Article 14 of the Convention against Torture does not impose an obligation on 
                                               
107
 See the Conclusion and Recommendation of the Committee Against Torture: Canada 07/07/2005 
during its 34
th
 Session, 2-20 May 2005 (CAT/C/CR/34/CAN), Paragraph 3.12 
108
 Decisions of the Committee Against Torture under Article 22 of the Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 36
th
 Session, 1-19 May 2006, 
Communication No. 181/2001: Senegal. 19/05/2006 (CAT/C/36/D/181/2001) 
109
 Supra 106 
110
 Supra 3 
111 
 
parties to grant a civil remedy. Lord Bingham of Cornhill in his judgment in Jones v. 
Saudi Arabia doubted the authoritativeness of the Committee and stated with regard to 
the recommendation of the Committee concerning Canada in 2005 that, 
“whatever its [the Committee] value in influencing the 
trend of international thinking, the legal authority of this 
recommendation is slight”.111 
 
Having said this, the decision of the Committee under its individual complaint 
mechanism (Article 22 of the Convention), a mechanism that was accepted by 
Senegal, is not to be considered to be irrelevant. It would seem that the decision is 
indicative of a new trend of accountability to ensure that parties to the Convention 
against Torture do not grant safe havens to accused persons, including Heads of states. 
 
Coming back to the issue of the purported relatedness of the jus cogens, obligatio erga 
omnes and universal jurisdiction, the process of assumption of jurisdiction over 
violations of norms of jus cogens is not a mechanical one that triggers universal 
jurisdiction, as was the view of the Minority of the Spanish Supreme Court in the 
Guatemalan Genocide case.
112
 The fact that treaties which seek to protect jus cogens 
norms through the proscription of certain acts do not provide for „true‟ universal 
jurisdiction by state parties as well as states not party to the treaties makes the issue of 
universal jurisdiction even more debatable.
113
 The erga omnes nature of the 
obligations of human rights of jus cogens status only extends to the recognition and 
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respect of such a norm. It does not extend to the extraterritorial enforcement of such a 
norm in the absence of any jurisdictional basis.  
 
Moreover, the erga omnes nature of a norm is separate from the issue of jurisdiction. 
This position is supported by the ICJ decision in the East Timor case (Portugal v. 
Australia) that, 
“…the Court considers that the erga omnes character of 
a norm and the rule of consent to jurisdiction are two 
different things. Whatever the nature of  the obligations 
invoked, the Court could not rule on the lawfulness of 
the conduct of a state when its judgment would imply an 
evaluation of the lawfulness of the conduct of another 
state which is not a party to the case. Where this is so, 
the Court cannot act, even if the right in question is a 
right erga omnes.”114 
 
The issue of universal jurisdiction has been sufficiently dealt with in the previous 
section, suffice it to say that there is lack of judicial authority as well as the benefit of 
state practice to support claims regarding universal jurisdiction over human rights. 
Therefore regarding the concepts of jus cogens, obligatio erga omnes and universal 
jurisdiction, there is a variance between the theoretical statements of commentators 
and what states do in practice; a practice evident in the jurisprudence of courts. 
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2.4.2.1 THE TRUMPING ARGUMENT 
 
The trumping argument is principally developed by legal scholars and there are 
various expressions of the argument. More articulately expressed is the contention of 
Bassiouni that by the designation of jus cogens status to certain human rights, such 
rights are to prevail over other norms of international law and obligations arising from 
the rights as peremptory norms include the non-recognition of immunities including 
those of Heads of states and the duty not to grant impunity to violators.
115
 Essentially 
the thrust of the argument is that certain human rights considerations are to prevail 
over, i.e. „trump‟ immunities because the rights form part of jus cogens while the 
immunities are merely part of customary international law. 
 
The trumping argument has formed the basis of the decisions of some national courts. 
In Ferrini v. Federal Republic of Germany the plaintiff brought a civil action in tort 
against Germany for his capture from Italy and subsequent deportation and forced 
labour in Germany during World War II.
116
 The court of first instance held that it had 
no jurisdiction because of the immunity of states for acts done jure imperii.
117
 This 
decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal. Upon further appeal, the Corte di 
Cassazione (Court of Cassation) considered that,  
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“the crucial issue was whether the foreign state was 
entitled to immunity when its conduct, due to its 
“extreme gravity”, amounted under customary 
international law to an international crime, defined as a 
violation of international law that jeopardizes “universal 
values that transcend the interests of individual national 
communities”.118 
 
The crimes involved in the Ferrini case were deportation and forced labour. The Court 
recognized that these crimes as laid down in the 1907 Hague Regulations are part of 
customary international law.
119
 However, it is difficult to agree with the reasoning of 
the Court because the fact that the prohibition of an act in violation of human rights is 
part of customary international law is not enough to elevate the prohibition to jus 
cogens. It is not, in anyway, accepted that the prohibition of deportation and forced 
labour are jus cogens norms. There is no accepted category of acts amounting to jus 
cogens and this is part of the problem with the reliance on the normative hierarchy 
argument.
120
 Bianchi, a leading scholar of the „trumping‟ school of thought concedes 
the weakness of the reasoning that deportation and forced labour are international 
crimes within the realm of jus cogens.
121
 As such, the view of the Court that 
international crimes attract universal jurisdiction is misplaced.
122
  
 
In December 2008, Germany instituted proceedings against Italy before the ICJ, 
following the Ferrini decision.
123
 Germany alleges that as a result of its judicial 
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practice, Italy has failed in its international obligation to respect the immunities of 
Germany and that the international responsibility of Italy is engaged.
124
 
 
In an earlier decision, the Court of first instance of Leivadia in Prefecture of Voiotia v. 
Federal Republic of Germany (Distomo Massacre case) found that the acts of the Nazi 
which were in violation of Article 46 of the Hague Regulations, regarding the right to 
family honour, life, property and religious convictions which are peremptory 
international norms, could not be acts jure imperii.
125
 Though the Court categorized 
the rights to family honour, life, property and religious convictions as jus cogens 
norms, the decision to award default judgment against Germany was however based 
on waiver of immunity.
126
 Germany later petitioned the Greek Supreme Court (Areois 
Pagos) which affirmed the lower court on the jus cogens nature of the rights in issue 
and the tacit waiver of immunity.
127
 
 
The assertion of the Greek courts that the rights to family honour, life, property and 
religious convictions are of a peremptory nature is not persuasive. Not only does such 
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an assertion lack any supporting evidence but shows the inherent ridiculousness of the 
trumping argument if taken to extreme lengths. The problem of limit of categorization 
of what may amount to a peremptory norm arises. Does it include socio-economic 
rights?    
 
The Ferrini and Prefecture of Voiotia stand out in having held that norms of jus 
cogens prevail over the immunity of states, though for different reasons. As will be 
seen later in the chapter, the general practice of states has been to uphold the 
immunities of states and state officials, including Heads of states, even where norms 
of jus cogens have been violated. However, the cases upholding immunity have 
approached the different imperatives of a system of human rights and a system of 
immunities from the perspective of whether there is a tort exception to immunity 
legislations.
128
  
 
2.4.2.2 THE PROBLEM WITH THE TRUMPING ARGUMENT 
The concept of sovereignty in international law is not devoid of value. As the 
foundation and framework of the international system, sovereignty essentially founds 
all international law concepts, principles and regimes; all of which must be 
approached as having inherent values and interests which they protect. While a system 
of human rights is founded on the sovereignty of states and exists to protect the values 
it seeks to promote; likewise parity of reasoning dictates that a system of immunities 
of states and state officials exists to protect the values inherent within that system. A 
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flaw in the „normative hierarchy theory‟ approach of the trumping argument is that it 
pays little or no detail to the nature and functionality of immunities and treats the 
system of immunities as value-free.
129
 
 
Other problems of the trumping argument go the issues of the scope of the concept of 
jus cogens and the effect of violations of jus cogens norms. Firstly, the scope of the 
concept of jus cogens is for the most part uncertain and undefined. Brownlie argues 
that the issue of the category of norms falling under the jus cogens is more settled than 
the content of jus cogens, per se.
130
 Though more prevalently applied to human rights, 
the concept of jus cogens is not restricted to only human rights. Its origin in the Law 
of Treaties contradicts such a claim. While certain norms of international law, like the 
prohibition against the use of force, are not doubted as being part of jus cogens, 
reference may be made to the system of human rights to discern which rights may be 
categorized as jus cogens, and this includes the prohibition against slavery, genocide 
and torture.  
 
Apart from the prohibition against slavery, genocide and torture the issue of rights 
which may be categorised as jus cogens is not settled. The Supreme Court of Greece 
in the Prefecture case included the provisions of Article 46 of the Hague Regulations 
on rights to family honour, the lives of persons, private property and religious 
convictions and practice as peremptory norms of international law. Likewise, the 
scope of jus cogens has been argued to extend to other fundamental principles of 
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international law, even the principles of pacta sunt servanda and freedom of the 
seas.
131
  
 
The apparent lack of certainty as to the scope of jus cogens may be attributable to the 
decentralized nature of the international system. However it is the potential of this 
uncertainty to invalidate the essence of jus cogens, by creating difficulty whereby 
within the normative hierarchy, there exists another hierarchy among peremptory 
norms, that contributes in undermining the trumping argument. This will be illustrated 
by the argument of a commentator that immunity being a fundamental principle of 
international law is a norm of jus cogens and as such is to prevail over human rights of 
a peremptory nature because the recognition of immunities in international law 
predates that of human rights.
132
 The commentator further argues his case based on the 
implicit wording of Article 53 VCLT which will have the effect that any human rights 
treaty which conflicts with the existing jus cogens rule on immunities will be void.
133
   
 
Apart from the usefulness of the argument above in highlighting the problems inherent 
in the uncertainty as to the scope of jus cogens, it is very difficult to agree with Black-
Branch. This is not just because it is doubted whether the importation of this 
normative hierarchy is obtainable within the realm of general international law of a 
procedural nature. For a rule to gain the status of jus cogens, such a rule must be of 
norm-creating character, i.e. it must be substantive in nature. Immunities are not 
                                               
131
 Caplan, op.cit, p.772; and A. Mark Weisburd, „The Emptiness of the Concept of Jus Cogens, as 
Illustrated by the War in Bosnia-Herzegovina‟, (1995-1996) 17 MJIL 1, p.21 
132
 Jonathan Black-Branch, „Sovereign Immunity under International Law: The Case of Pinochet‟ in 
Diana Woodhouse, (ed.), The Pinochet Case (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000) p.101 
133
 Ibid. 
119 
 
substantive in nature but procedural because though not a defence in itself, they 
operate as a bar to the exercise of jurisdiction. They, therefore, cannot be part of jus 
cogens, rules which do not permit derogation from its principles. It is implicit from the 
definition of jus cogens as norms from which there can be no derogation that 
immunities are excluded because of the right of states to waive immunity.
134
 
Furthermore, no legal authority exists for the contention that immunities is of 
peremptory status. 
 
The second issue regarding the problem of the trumping argument is the issue of the 
effect of a designation of a norm as jus cogens. It is accepted that obligations erga 
omnes are concomitant of the designation of a norm as jus cogens, meaning that states 
are obligated to recognize such norms as being peremptory. States are also under an 
obligation not to violate such norms. Having said this however, it is important to bear 
in mind that the issues of recognition of a norm as a peremptory one and the 
jurisdiction to enforce the norm are separate. The recognition of the substantive 
prohibition of an act which is a norm of jus cogens involves obligations not to violate 
the norm. However, states are not obligated to secure the enforcement of a violation of 
a norm of jus cogens.
135
  
 
In its Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in 
the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the ICJ in reiterating its earlier statement in the 
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Barcelona Traction case on the effect of erga omnes obligations stated that as a result 
of the erga omnes nature of the right of self-determination that states are under an 
obligation not to recognize the illegal construction of the wall and are also obligated 
not to assist in maintaining the situation occasioned by the construction.
136
 The 
Opinion of the Court only recognizes the construction of the wall as illegal and a duty 
on states not to further the illegality of the act. There is no obligation on states to 
enforce the self-determination of the Palestinians.  
 
As earlier stated, the ICJ in the East Timor case while recognizing the erga omnes 
character of the right of peoples to self-determination found the erga omnes character 
of a norm to be a separate issue from the rule of consent to jurisdiction.
137
  
 
Thirdly, the consequence for the violation of jus cogens is codified only with regard to 
the law of treaties.
138
 Articles 53 and 64 VCLT provide respectively that “a treaty is 
void if at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general 
international law” and “if a new peremptory norm of general international law 
emerges, any existing treaty which is in conflict with that norm becomes void and 
terminates”. It may be attractive to argue that had the intention been to attach 
consequences to the violation of human rights which have attained the status of jus 
cogens, the codification of the effects of jus cogens would have been extended beyond 
the Law of Treaties into relevant human rights instruments. However, when faced with 
the fact that codification is not exhaustive of international rule-making, this argument 
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loses its strength. Moreover, the peremptory nature of the prohibition against genocide 
and torture, which do not contain any provision to that effect in their codifying 
instruments, have been recognized. 
 
In essence, while states may be under obligation to respect certain rights as pertaining 
to jus cogens, this does not mean that they are under an obligation to enforce the 
respect of those rights, especially by exercising jurisdiction in circumstances which 
they are ordinarily not entitled to. Indeed in Bouzari and Others v. The Islamic 
Republic of Iran, the Canadian Superior Court of Justice, per Swinton, J, considered 
and agreed with the expert opinion of Professor Greenwood who disagreed with the 
contention that the effect of the prohibition of torture as a norm of jus cogens includes 
an obligation on states to provide a civil remedy against a foreign state for acts of 
torture even where such acts have not occurred within the territory of the state before 
whom the matter is brought.
139
  
 
If the contention is accepted that the effect of the designation of a norm as jus cogens 
includes a duty on states to provide civil remedies for the violation of such norms by 
asserting jurisdiction in disregard of immunities, such reasoning therefore could imply 
that the national legislations of various states like the US, UK and Canada on state 
immunity as well as international instruments like the European Convention on State 
Immunity and the UN Convention on the Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their 
Property would be in breach of jus cogens. This is because these legislations do not 
provide for an exception to immunities on grounds of violation jus cogens norms.  
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Had the argument been accepted in Bouzari v. Iran, that states are under an obligation 
to provide a civil remedy where there has been a violation of the jus cogens norm 
prohibiting torture, it would be tantamount to subverting the structure of the 
international system by giving rise to judicial law-making in international law (by 
amending international instruments on international immunities) and in national law 
(by amending national legislations of foreign states on immunity) which is a violation 
of the sovereignty of states and interference in the domestic affairs of states. 
 
While recognizing the problem that the trumping argument faces regarding the effect 
of violation of a jus cogens norm, Tomuschat has argued that although inherent in the 
peremptory nature of jus cogens rights that there are consequences for violation of the 
human rights involved, however the extent of the consequences outside the Law of 
Treaties is doubtful because, 
“if a given rule is characterized as pertaining to the body 
of jus cogens, no more is said than that the international 
community attaches great importance to compliance 
with this rule”.140  
 
This view is rather extreme and a better view would be one that accepts the extension 
of the concept of jus cogens together with its effects outside the Law of Treaties into 
general international law, but recognizes that for jus cogens to override other norms, 
the norms involved must have the same character as the peremptory norms and a 
substantive conflict between the norms must exist. Articles 53 and 64 VCLT make it 
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clear that their provisions apply to “norms having the same character”, and so this 
would mean that to prevail over immunities the jus cogens nature of the right will 
extend beyond its substantive nature into a procedural nature or contain “procedural 
guarantees” to ensure its enforcement.141 Or in the converse, immunities would extend 
beyond being a procedural rule into a substantive defence. Either way, this does not 
form part of international law. 
 
Fourthly, for a rule of international law to be in conflict with a norm of jus cogens a 
real conflict between the rule and the jus cogens norm must be shown to exist, and not 
just assumed. The most important question to be asked, therefore, is whether human 
rights of jus cogens status really conflict with immunities. This is perhaps the biggest 
problem the trumping argument faces. Having stated earlier that the issues of the 
recognition of a norm of jus cogens and the enforcement of the norm remain separate 
and that only substantive norms can be jus cogens, it is important to also mention that 
the issue of immunity and liability are different. Immunity does not mean absence of 
liability but only absence of jurisdiction. As the ICJ in the Arrest Warrant case noted, 
immunity does not mean impunity.
142
 
 
The lack of a substantive character of immunity deprives it of the ability to attain jus 
cogens status. Therefore, the character of rights which are jus cogens and the character 
of immunities are separate.   
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The issue of conflict between human rights of jus cogens status and immunities was 
considered at length by the House of Lords in the case of Jones v. Saudi Arabia.
143
 Mr 
Jones in a civil action made claims against Ministry of the Interior of The Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia and against one of the officials of the Kingdom alleging acts of torture 
while in official custody. A second claim by three others was made alleging they were 
victims of the systemic torture by Saudi officials. Saudi Arabia in February 2003 
applied to have the service of the claim to it by Jones set aside on the grounds that 
Saudi Arabia, its servants and agents are entitled to immunity under Section 1 of the 
SIA 1978, and that the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the claim. At first 
instance, the application of Saudi Arabia was allowed and the service of claims on 
Saudi Arabia was set aside, this was in view of the ECHR decision in Al-Adsani v. 
UK,
144
 while permission to serve the official was refused.
 
 
 
Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals by Jones, the Court was faced with the issues of 
the immunity of Saudi Arabia in respect of the claim of Jones and the immunity of 
Saudi officials in respect of the claims made against the officials.
145
 The Court of 
Appeal held that Saudi Arabia was entitled to immunity and dismissed the claim 
against it in line with the decision of the ECHR in Al-Adsani. Bizarrely however, the 
Court held that the state officials were not entitled to immunity,
146
 contrary to the 
earlier position of the UK courts in Propend Finance Property Ltd v. Sing.
147
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Upon further appeal, the House of Lords stated that, 
“To produce a conflict with state immunity, it is 
therefore necessary to show that the prohibition on 
torture has generated an ancillary procedural rule which, 
by way of exception to state immunity, entitles or 
perhaps requires state to assume civil jurisdiction over 
other states in cases in which torture is alleged.”148 
 
The Law Lords in deciding that both Saudi Arabia and its officials were immune 
essentially decided that there was no conflict between jus cogens and immunities of 
state and state officials, including Heads of states. The House of Lords were also 
critical of the reasoning of the Minority Decision in Al-Adsani for simply assuming 
that a conflict existed between the immunities and torture as a norm of jus cogens. 
According to Lord Hoffman, 
“The jus cogens is the prohibition on torture. But the 
United Kingdom, in according state immunity to the 
Kingdom (Saudi Arabia), is not proposing to torture 
anyone. Nor is the Kingdom, in claiming immunity, 
justifying the use of torture.”149  
 
The case of Jones v. Saudi Arabia having established that there is no conflict between 
jus cogens and immunities of states in civil matters, the matter then turns to the 
immunities of state officials in criminal matters. The ICJ in its decision in the Arrest 
Warrant Case emphasized the different natures of immunity and individual criminal 
responsibility. According to the Court, 
“Immunity from criminal jurisdiction and individual 
criminal responsibility are quite separate concepts. 
While jurisdictional immunity is procedural in nature, 
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criminal responsibility is a question of substantive 
law.”150 
 
The effect is that where immunity applies the courts of a state simply have no 
jurisdiction over the matter. As argued earlier, the designation of a norm as jus cogens 
under international law, or its breach thereof cannot confer a jurisdiction which courts 
lack in the first place.
151
  
 
The fundamentals of both jus cogens and immunities are conceptually misplaced and 
result in practical misapplication. Claims regarding the conflict between jus cogens 
and immunities lack substance and are chimeral. According to Fox, 
“State immunity is a procedural rule going to the 
jurisdiction of a national court. It does not go to 
substantive law; it does not contradict a prohibition 
contained in a jus cogens norm but merely diverts any 
breach of it to a different method of settlement. 
Arguably, then, there is no substantive content in the 
procedural plea of state immunity upon which a jus 
cogens mandate can bite.”152 
 
The trumping argument has also been rejected by the Canadian Superior Court of 
Justice in Bouzari v. Islamic Republic of Iran.
153
 The case involved an action against 
Iran for acts including torture against the plaintiff who in the alternative relied on the 
argument that torture being a norm of jus cogens prevailed over other rules of 
international law including the immunity to which Iran was entitled. The court found 
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no evidence in state practice to the effect that state immunity does not apply where a 
norm of jus cogens has been violated and held that though torture was a norm of jus 
cogens, this did not require states to disregard the immunities of states. 
 
In Al-Adsani v. The Government of Kuwait, action was brought against Kuwait for 
torture before the UK courts which found that Kuwait was entitled to immunity.
154
 
Upon refusal of leave to appeal by the House of Lords,
155
 the appellant petitioned the 
ECHR under Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights alleging a 
restriction of his right of access to court as provided for under the Convention.
156
 The 
ECHR upheld the decision of the UK.
157
 The trumping argument was raised before the 
ECHR and this argument was crucial in dividing the Judges, however the Majority of 
the Court rejected this argument.
158
  
 
As stated earlier, the trumping argument is a product of commentators. The 
preponderance of state practice does not support the trumping argument and so this 
fundamentally undermines the credibility of the argument. Though the policy rationale 
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behind the argument is commendable, it perhaps may be reflective of what the law 
should be, de lege ferenda. It is to this end that decisions of the Minority in Al-Adsani 
v. United Kingdom and the Italian Court in Ferrini v. Germany could point to the 
direction of changing judicial attitudes regarding immunities where violations of 
human rights of peremptory status are alleged, however the trumping argument cannot 
be said to reflective of the current state of international law, de lege lata. 
 
The prohibition against torture exists at both treaty level as well as customary level. 
While not all states may be party to the Convention against Torture, it is not in issue 
that all states, even those who engage in the practice of torture, renounce the act.
159
 
The recognition of the immunities where there has been violation of jus cogens norms 
like torture does not negate the prohibition of torture as a norm of international law, 
and a peremptory one at that. If a state upholds immunities where torture has been 
committed this does mean that the state permits torture contrary to the Convention.
160
  
 
The fifth issue goes to the heart of the problem with jus cogens and the normative 
hierarchy theory. While the content and scope of the concept of jus cogens may seem 
problematic, the concept is better approached not as one of hierarchical normativity, 
but one of validity.
161
 International rule-making processes are not always universal in 
scope. For instance, a treaty is only binding inter partes and cannot create obligations 
or rights for third parties without their consent. Again, customary international law 
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permits a state which has persistently objected to the formation of a rule of custom, 
from its inception, to contract itself out of the application of the rule.
162
  
 
The approach taken to torture where immunities are in issue by proponents of the 
trumping argument and normative hierarchy theory adds unnecessary complications to 
an already complicated area of law. Jus cogens as a concept of validity, rather than 
normative hierarchy is such that states cannot contract themselves out of the 
applicability of the rules either by not being party to a treaty or objecting to a custom 
from its inception. The implication of treating jus cogens as a concept of validity is 
that it becomes the benchmark by which the content of international rules is measured. 
This would mean that any rule of international law, conventional or customary which 
violates a rule of jus cogens would be invalid. This approach accords better with the 
provision of Article 53 of the VCLT to the effect that a treaty is void if, at the time of 
its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of international law.  
 
States, by supporting or upholding immunities, have not violated the prohibition of 
torture as a norm of jus cogens, neither have they contracted themselves out of the 
prohibition of torture under the Convention or customary international law. As earlier 
stated, immunities being procedural in nature cannot change the substantive nature of 
the prohibition against torture. 
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The general practice of upholding the immunity of states where norms of jus cogens 
have been violated, as seen most notably in the Al-Adsani decision, Bouzari v. Iran 
and Jones v. Saudi Arabia has contributed to the increased practice seeking the 
individual accountability of senior state officials, especially Heads of states.
163
 Hence, 
in Tachiona v. Mugabe,
164
 the submission of the amicus curiae was that fundamental 
human rights which enjoy jus cogens status imposing obligations erga omnes 
supersede the sovereignty of states and disentitle their representatives from relying on 
immunity because it is “an essential characteristic” of jus cogens norms that 
international legal obligations prevail over domestic law.
165
 However, the Court 
upheld the immunity of Robert Mugabe as Head of state of Zimbabwe. 
 
There are complications inherent in the nature of jus cogens and the trumping 
argument, complications which undermine the trumping argument as a solution to the 
problem of the iniquities of a system of immunities. Finally, if the trumping argument 
is accepted it would involve the unilateral restriction of the rights, privileges and 
entitlements of states without their consent and this would have the effect of 
fundamentally changing the basis of the international system.
166
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2.4.2.3 DISTINCTION BETWEEN CIVIL IMMUNITIES AND CRIMINAL 
IMMUNITIES 
In a bid to end impunity of state officials, a distinction has been made regarding the 
immunities of state and that of state officials, including Heads of states, by 
distinguishing the nature of the legal proceedings involved. Since states can exercise 
civil jurisdiction over foreign states, albeit limited, but cannot exercise criminal 
jurisdiction over foreign states as it can over individuals, it becomes attractive to 
accept that in criminal proceedings norms of jus cogens could override immunities, 
but not in civil proceedings.  
 
This seems to be the view taken by the ECHR in Al-Adsani v. UK.
167
 Likewise in the 
Court of Appeal decision of the UK in Jones v. Saudi Arabia, the Court was of the 
view that Saudi Arabia enjoyed immunity while its officials did not.
168
 Further to 
these, the Pinochet case centred on individual criminal responsibility, rather than civil 
liability; and the UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of State and Their 
Property is understood to exclude criminal proceedings from its ambit.
169
 The 
combined effect of these would seem to mean that immunity would be available in 
civil proceedings against states and state officials but not in criminal proceedings 
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against state officials. This, it has been argued, would ensure that nothing gets in the 
way of the duty of states to prosecute certain international crimes.
170
  
 
Attempts to distinguish between civil and criminal proceedings, especially where jus 
cogens and immunities are involved, have been criticized as being at variance with the 
requirements of international law with regard to reparation and state responsibility.
171
 
Arguably, it would seem to be a rather formalistic approach to immunities that 
regarded the recognition of immunities of states and their officials in civil proceedings 
but not the immunity of the same officials in criminal proceedings. After all, “the 
availability of immunity has always been determined on the basis of the nature or 
purpose of the underlying act rather than the type of proceeding involved”.172 
Likewise, whatever the effect of jus cogens may be, the effect is not determined by the 
nature of the proceedings but “the character of the rule as a peremptory norm and its 
interaction with a hierarchically lower rule”.173  
 
On the one hand, the liability of states and the liability of state officials in criminal 
proceedings are distinct. It is an accepted principle of international law that individual 
criminal responsibility attaches to the acts of state officials which violate human rights 
norms. However, the horizontal structuring of the international order is such that does 
not permit criminal liability for the acts of states.
174
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On the other hand, a civil action against state officials for violations of jus cogens 
would implicate states especially where the officials claim that they were acting in the 
exercise of their official functions. Thus, the liability of states and the liability of state 
officials in civil proceedings would invariably be the same because payment for 
damages or compensation would be from state funds. However, with regards to 
criminal proceedings, there is a clear difference in the liability of the state and the 
individual criminal liability of state officials. To this end, a good argument is to be 
made for the distinction between civil and criminal proceedings where the immunities 
of states and their officials are implicated. The distinction would apply only to those 
state officials who enjoy immunity ratione materiae rather than those enjoying 
immunity ratione persone, for whom immunity would be absolute. 
 
In Pinochet (No.3), Lord Hutton was of the view that though Chile was internationally 
responsible for the acts of torture with which Pinochet was accused, that Chile could 
claim state immunity if sued for damages in respect of the acts of torture in the UK 
and that there is no inconsistency with Pinochet‟s entitlement to claim immunity if 
sued in civil proceedings for damages and his lack of entitlement to claim immunity in 
criminal proceedings instituted against him in a personal capacity for torture.
175
 
Article 4 of the ILC Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 
which recognises that its provision for the responsibility of individuals is without 
prejudice to state responsibility under international law, supports this view.
176
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2.4.3 A HUMAN RIGHTS EXCEPTION TO STATE IMMUNITY 
INSTRUMENTS APPROACH 
States like the US, UK, Singapore, Canada, Australia, South Africa and Pakistan have 
enacted legislations on state immunity incorporating the restrictive approach to the 
immunities of states, found in a number of international treaties like the European 
Convention on State Immunity and the UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities 
of States and their Property.
177
 These instruments, both international and national, 
provide for certain exceptions to the immunity of states including commercial 
transactions, actions in respect of torts, employment etc.  
 
The thrust of the human rights exception approach is that human rights violations are 
included in the various exceptions in the instruments on immunities of states. In the 
event that such an exception does not exist, then in addition to the accepted 
exceptions, that human rights violations are to be read into the instruments as 
exceptional circumstances where the immunities of states will be disregarded.  
 
The US Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) led to increased litigation in the US courts 
against foreign governments and their agencies.
 178
 In Filartiga v. Pena Irala,
179
 the 
Court of Appeals held illegal the acts of torture which violated the prohibition on 
torture, a norm of customary international law.  
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The Filartiga case led to several suits against foreign states until the US Supreme 
Court put paid to the matter in a later decision in Amerada Hess Shipping Corporation 
v. Argentine Republic stating that only the Foreign Sovereigns Immunity Act (FSIA) 
could provide the basis for assumption of jurisdiction over foreign states.
180
 The 
provisions of the FSIA are clear, and save for the limited exception of where rights in 
property are taken in violation of international law, violations of human rights do not 
come under the express provisions of the Act. As stated by the Supreme Court in 
Amerada Hess,  
“immunity is granted in those cases involving alleged 
violations of international law that do not come within 
one of the FSIA‟s exceptions”.181 
 
In a bid to exercise jurisdiction against a foreign state where human rights violations 
are alleged, attempts have been made by some US courts to constructively interpret 
the exceptions in the FSIA to include human rights. Thus, in Von Dardel v. Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics,
182
 the District court in asserting jurisdiction found that the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in holding a Swedish diplomat in 
incommunicado detention for over 35 years had violated international law on 
diplomatic immunity. The court in relying on the international agreements exception 
of the FSIA as well as an implied waiver of its immunity by the acts of the USSR was 
of the view that the USSR was not entitled to immunity.  
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However, there was no appeal of this decision of the District court and the extent of 
the authoritativeness of this decision is doubtful since there are later decisions by the 
Supreme Court which do not support this decision. Though not overruled expressly, it 
has been made redundant by the later decision of the US Supreme Court in Amerada 
Hess providing for the FSIA as the sole grounds for bringing a case against a foreign 
sovereign.
183
 
 
Likewise in Nelson v. Saudi Arabia
 
involving an action against the government of 
Saudi Arabia and the King Faisal Hospital for acts of torture suffered at the hands of 
the government, the US Court of Appeal reversed the decision of the District Court 
that the acts involved did not qualify under the commercial acts exception of the FSIA 
and held that the torture suffered by the appellant resulted from his recruitment and 
hiring  and so qualified as commercial activity within the meaning of the FSIA.
184
 
Upon further appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal decision and 
upheld its earlier position that the FSIA was the sole basis for jurisdiction by US 
courts over a foreign sovereign.
185
 
 
In Siderman de Blake v. The Republic of Argentina it was held that though the 
prohibition of torture was jus cogens and any state violating the prohibition was in 
violation of jus cogens, the FSIA, however, does not contain an exception on such 
grounds and so does not confer courts with jurisdiction.
186
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Despite the fact that the Amerada Hess case did not involve human rights violations 
but rather the destruction of property, the decision is clear and the strictness of its 
application even in the face of gross human rights violations illustrates the point that 
the FSIA does not admit a human rights exception to its provisions. A case that best 
drives home this point is the case of Hugo Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany.
187
 
The facts of the case involve Mr Princz as a teenager who with his family were 
American citizens of Jewish faith. They were subjected to slave labour in Germany‟s 
war industry and the plaintiff also suffered death of his parents and sister in 
concentration camps and further had to endure watching his brothers starve to death, 
all during the Holocaust. However, just before the end of the war, Mr Princz was 
rescued by American soldiers and despite his unsuccessful efforts seeking payment ex 
gratia from Germany for compensation for his sufferings, he instituted action in 1992.  
 
The District Court in an impassioned decision held that the FSIA did not apply, 
despite acknowledging the decision of the Supreme Court in Amerada Hess and 
sought to distinguish the peculiar circumstances of the case before it as well as the fact 
that Nazi Germany being a „rogue nation‟ was estopped from relying on US law to its 
advantage.
188
 The Court of Appeal reversed this decision and held that Germany was 
entitled to immunity because the position of the law as stipulated in Amerada Hess is 
clear and therefore actions against foreign states must therefore come within the 
permissible provisions of the FSIA. 
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However, the US in 1996 enacted the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
(AEDPA) 1996 which provides that foreign states indicated by the State Department 
as sponsors of terrorism or involved in terrorism would be liable for acts of torture, 
hostage-taking and other serious violations of human rights.
189
 This resulted in the 
decision in Flatow v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, where jurisdiction was assumed 
over Iran and some of its officials, including a former Head of state, for supporting a 
terrorist attack in Israel which led to the death of an American citizen.
190
  
 
The AEDPA was passed in response to what the US felt was growing terrorism and to 
curb this phenomenon as well as provide remedies for its citizens in the event of being 
victims to acts of terror. The Act seemingly has the effect of amending the FSIA by 
providing a further exception to the FSIA for terrorist acts and human rights. The 
issues whether the effect of the AEDPA is a human rights exception to the FSIA and 
whether Congress has overridden the earlier judicial position that did not admit such a 
human rights exception to the FSIA are to be considered. 
 
Unfortunately, however optimistic the AEDPA may seem, the Act restrictively 
provides against a state which must be designated as a sponsor of terrorism and the 
claimant must be a US citizen. In addition, the statutory exceptions in the FSIA must 
apply for the property of the foreign state not to enjoy immunity from attachment or 
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execution where judgment has been obtained.
191
 As such, the decision in Amerada 
Hess is the prevailing practice of the US. 
 
The UK SIA does not expressly include a human rights exception to the immunities of 
states. This issue arose in the case of Al-Adsani v. Kuwait which involved the plaintiff, 
a dual national of both UK and Kuwait.
192 
 The plaintiff alleged he was abducted and 
tortured while in Kuwait at the behest of the Sheikh. Upon return to Britain, he 
brought action against the Kuwaiti government and the Sheikh. Both the High Court 
and Court of Appeal held that the government of Kuwait was entitled to immunity and 
that the SIA did not contain an exception to the immunity of foreign states in cases of 
torture. The ECHR upheld the decision of the UK courts that Kuwait was entitled to 
immunity, which it found was not a restriction of the applicant‟s right to access to 
court under the European Convention on Human Rights.  
 
While unlike the FSIA, the SIA includes Heads of states in its definition of foreign 
states for the purposes of the Act, however like the FSIA, the provisions of the SIA are 
clear with regard to permissible exceptions under the Act. The position under the SIA 
was stated by Lord Bingham in his decision in Jones v. Saudi Arabia, as follows, 
“I think that certain conclusions… are inescapable: 
...that none of these claims falls within any of the 
exceptions specified in the 1978 Act... On a 
straightforward application of the 1978 Act, it would 
follow that the Kingdom's claim to immunity for itself 
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and its servants or agents should succeed, since this is 
not one of those exceptional cases, specified in Part 1 of 
the 1978 Act, in which a state is not immune, and 
therefore the general rule of immunity prevails. It is not 
suggested that the Act is in any relevant respect 
ambiguous or obscure: it is, as Ward LJ observed in Al-
Adsani v Government of Kuwait…, "as plain as plain can 
be". In the ordinary way, the duty of the English court is 
therefore to apply the plain terms of the domestic 
statute.”193 (Emphasis added) 
 
Similarly, in Bouzari v. Iran, it was held that the Canadian SIA 1985 does not allow a 
human rights exception.
194
 The first plaintiff, a citizen of Iran instituted action against 
the country alleging, among other claims, assault and torture. The contention of the 
plaintiffs was that the case fell within the exceptions in the Canadian SIA, and in the 
alternative they argued that a further exception be read into the Act to permit actions 
against torture and that in the event Iran was entitled to immunity that the SIA was 
unconstitutional for being in violation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms. The Court found that, 
“The language of the State Immunity Act was clear and 
the Court could not, therefore, read into it a further 
exception to immunity even if the Act was inconsistent 
with international law... The fact that the State Immunity 
Act meant that Iran was immune from the jurisdiction of 
the Canadian courts in the present case did not mean that 
the Act was unconstitutional. The ill-treatment of the 
first plaintiff had no point of contact with Canada and 
involved acts for which Canada was not responsible. 
The Charter of Rights and Freedoms did not require 
Canada to afford the plaintiffs a remedy in the Canadian 
courts.”195 
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It is on the strength of the jurisprudence of the courts in the instances considered 
above that it is submitted that the national legislations of the US, UK and Canada do 
not contain exceptions to the immunities of states where human rights violations are 
alleged, even those of jus cogens status. Similarly, the courts of these jurisdictions 
have resisted efforts to extend the provisions of the legislations by reading into them a 
further exception to accommodate human rights, or jus cogens claims. The refusal to 
extend these legislations, which will have the effect of amending the legislations, is 
not surprising as such an act would amount to judicial law-making. 
 
Finally, it is important to note that both the European Convention on State Immunity 
and the UN Convention on the Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property 
do not contain a human rights exception. There have been calls on states not to ratify 
the UN Convention in its present form without a human rights protocol.
196
 However 
the feasibility of such an action is doubtful, this is because the UN Convention has 
taken the better part of twenty-two years to come into existence.
197
 Though not yet in 
force because it is yet to get the required ratification by states, the likelihood of the 
UN Convention becoming operational would be much slimmer if there is a human 
rights protocol because immunity of states is integral to states‟ conceptions of their 
sovereignty. Though state sovereignty has yielded to pressure in other areas of 
international law, for instance international trade and commerce, the reality evident in 
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the practice of state is that states are unwilling to compromise their sovereignty where 
human rights violations are alleged. 
 
2.4.4 THE IMPLIED WAIVER APPROACH 
The implied waiver approach in reconciling the conflicting interests of a system of 
human rights and a system of immunities postulates that in view of the jus cogens 
nature and the concomitant obligatio erga omnes of certain fundamental rights, a state 
must be deemed to have waived its immunity either where it is a party to a human 
rights agreement or where it engages in gross violations of peremptory norms of 
international law.
 198
 Though this approach recognizes the peremptory nature of certain 
human rights and the existence of state immunity legislations, it does not rely on the 
trumping argument or on a human rights exception to the legislations. Rather the 
approach relies on a waiver by a state of its immunities, however impliedly from the 
act of the state.
199
  
 
In Lois Frolova v. USSR, the US Court of Appeals rejected the argument of implied 
waiver of immunity against the USSR in a claim against the USSR by the American 
wife of a Soviet citizen for mental stress and loss of consortium as result of the refusal 
of the USSR to permit his emigration.
200
 The plaintiff in relying on Section 1604 of 
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the FSIA which provides that the immunity of foreign state shall be subject to 
„existing international agreement‟, argued that the USSR was a party to the UN 
Charter and the Helsinki Accords and so had impliedly waived its immunity. The 
Court of Appeal rejected this argument and held that more “convincing evidence” was 
required for a waiver.
201
  
 
The issue also arose in the US in Von Dardel v. USSR.
202
 The District court in 
asserting jurisdiction found that the USSR had violated international law on 
diplomatic immunity. The court in relying on the international agreements exception 
under the FSIA, as well as an implied waiver of its immunity by the acts of the USSR, 
was of the view that the fact that both the US and USSR were parties to the 1961 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
203
 and the Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons 1973,
204
 and that 
the signing of these and other human rights treaties implied a waiver by the USSR of 
its immunity. It also held that the FSIA did not extend immunity to clear violations of 
international law.  
 
However, the limits of this decision as judicial authority have been canvassed earlier. 
Suffice it to say that the U.S. Supreme Court has decided differently in Nelson v. 
Saudi Arabia,
205
 and in Amerada Hess.
206
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Similarly, in Hugo Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, the District Court decision 
that Germany had waived its immunity under the FSIA by violating norms of jus 
cogens was dismissed by the Court of Appeals.
207
 The Court of Appeal held that the 
violation, by Nazi Germany, of jus cogens norms could not be an implied waiver of 
the immunity of Germany as recognized by the FSIA.  
 
Also, in Siderman de Blake v. Argentina, the Court rejected the argument that 
violations of norms of jus cogens is an indication that immunities of states may be 
waived.
208
   
 
The decision of the Supreme Court of Greece in The Distomo Massacre case was 
rationalized on the basis that by engaging in acts which are in violation of jus cogens a 
state is deemed to have waived its immunity.
209
 However, the authority of this 
decision has been undermined by certain incidents. Despite its finding that Germany 
was not entitled to immunity from jurisdiction, the Areios Pagos later upheld that 
Germany was entitled to immunity from execution.
210
 Likewise the Federal Court of 
Justice of Germany has held that the acts involved, though illegal, being sovereign acts 
of Germany, the Greek Courts did not have jurisdiction over the matter and so it did 
not recognize the judgment of the Greek Courts.
211
 Additionally, in Kalogeropoulou et 
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al v. Greece and Germany before the ECHR,
212
 the applicants contended that the 
immunity of Germany from execution as upheld by Greece was an infringement of 
their right under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, however the 
Court relied on its earlier decision in Al-Adsani in finding that Article 6 was not 
violated, thus rejecting the contention of the applicants. 
 
With regard to human rights treaties and their state parties, it has been argued that the 
introduction of the implied waiver argument serves to ensure that the substantive 
effect of these international human rights agreements is maintained because the 
concept of immunities may work to render such agreements redundant.
213
 This 
argument has been taken further by Bianchi who argues that the human rights 
provisions of the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights are 
evidence of the implicit waiver by states of their immunity at least with regard to 
matters where human rights concerns are in issue.
214
 This argument is marred by the 
non self-executing nature of the human rights provisions in the UN Charter and the 
exhortatory nature of the Universal Declaration. Furthermore, the conclusion of 
treaties and other international agreements which create obligations on states cannot 
be taken to mean a relinquishment of state sovereignty, which for the purposes of the 
implied waiver approach, would mean lack of consent of a state to waive its 
immunity.
215
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It has been held in I Congreso del Partido,
216
 and Kuwait Airways Corporation v. 
Iraqi Airways (No.1),
217
 that it is not a requirement of international law that where a 
foreign state is accused of violating international law that the state would be 
disentitled from the immunities which it would ordinarily be entitled to under 
international law. 
 
The implied waiver approach is given impetus by the recognition in both national and 
international instruments on state immunity as well as customary international law that 
states may waive their immunities. Brownlie in acknowledging that in the UK, a 
waiver of immunity is to be “unequivocal”, asserts that a waiver of immunity by a 
state cannot be implied from the nature of the activity.
218
 Violation of norms of jus 
cogens by a state does not determine whether a state has waived its immunity.  
 
In Pinochet (No.3), Lord Goff upheld Chile‟s argument that any waiver of immunity 
must be express.
219
 Lord Goff relied upon the opinion of Jennings and Watts, that, 
“A state, although in principle is entitled to immunity, 
may waive its immunity. It may do so by expressly 
submitting to the jurisdiction of the court before which it 
is sued, either by express consent given in the context of 
a particular dispute which has already arisen, or by 
consent given in advance in a contract or an 
international agreement ... A state may also be 
considered to have waived its immunity by implication, 
as by instituting or intervening in proceedings, or taking 
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any steps in the proceedings relating to the merits of the 
case.”220  
 
He concluded that the only examples given by Jennings and Watts of implied waiver 
of immunity are with regard only to submission to jurisdiction, instituting or 
intervening in proceedings or by taking steps in proceedings.
221
 It is instructive that 
waiver of immunity was not implied from the nature of the activity of a state. 
 
Although the US provides in Section 1605(a)(1) of the FSIA that a state may waive its 
immunity explicitly or by implication, the Court of Appeal in Princz v. Germany, per 
Judge Ginsburg, opines that “an implied waiver depends upon the foreign government 
having at some point indicated its amenability to suit”.222 
 
However, the recognition of the possibility of a waiver cannot give rise to an 
exception to the immunity of states. This is because the waiver that was envisaged 
both in codified form (national and international instruments) and at customary 
international law is one that is based on the consent of states. By the consensual nature 
of international law, the reliance on “…waiver where there is no indication of any 
actual will to forego protection” would be tantamount to a fundamental change of the 
structure of the international order.
223
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2.5 RESOLVING HEAD OF STATE IMMUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
The approaches considered in this chapter have been primarily concerned with the 
immunities of states. However as stated in Chapter 1, immunity is an entitlement of 
states which extends to its officials, including Heads of states. In addition, most 
jurisdictions recognize the immunity of states to include Heads of states and certain 
senior state officials.
224
  
 
Tomuschat argues that,  
“… individuals who engage in criminal activities 
should, as a rule, not be able to benefit from the 
functional position which they occupy within the 
structure of governance of the state on whose behalf 
they are acting. To hold them accountable may also 
operate as a useful deterrent from abusing posts of 
responsibility”.225  
 
The idea that Heads of states are to be subject to criminal proceedings for 
accountability in instances where states would be immune cannot be accepted. Firstly, 
a disagreement with regard to Heads of states being subject to proceedings of 
accountability is not to be taken as a hard and fast rule, it must be contextualised 
against the constitutive instrument establishing the jurisdiction of a court and the 
extent to which states are bound by the instrument.  
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Secondly, while one agrees that there must be a distinction in the assessment of 
immunity of states and immunity of Heads of states this is only with regard to the 
nature of the liability, immunity being a matter that goes only to jurisdiction and not to 
the existence of liability. Therefore the fact that criminal liability attaches to a person 
does not mean that the person can be proceeded against, these are two different things. 
A Head of state who is implicated in violations of human rights is still a Head of state 
and continues to represent his state and people. If the reverse were the case, it would 
be difficult to justify the incumbency of Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, as well as 
Augusto Pinochet, Charles Taylor and Mouammer Gaddafi at the periods they were 
Heads of Chile, Liberia and Libya respectively. 
 
Bianchi argues that,  
“The close interrelationship between state immunity and 
Head of state immunity, given their common rationale of 
ensuring respect for the sovereignty of other states, does 
not allow one to reach conflicting conclusions about 
their scope of application. If individuals are accountable 
for crimes of international law, states also must be 
accountable in civil proceedings for analogous 
violations of human rights. Furthermore, should states 
continue to be held immune, plaintiffs would sue their 
agents, thus circumventing the jurisdictional bar of 
immunity”.226 
 
Bianchi‟s argument that states, like individuals, should be accountable for violations 
of human rights follows from a wrong premise. The nature of liabilities involved is 
separate. The existence of criminal liability does not automatically translate into civil 
liability and an analysis of contemporary jurisprudence of courts in international law 
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shows that states are entitled to immunity in civil proceedings for violations of human 
rights.  
 
It is therefore in view of the extensive jurisprudence on the matter that it can be stated 
that the argument that immunities are to be denied where violations of human rights of 
jus cogens status are alleged, according to Gavouneli and Bantekas, “has been put 
passionately, but not authoritatively.”227 Indeed, the ILC Special Rapporteur on the 
Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction reported that “... it is 
difficult to talk of exceptions to immunity as having developed into a norm of 
customary international law.”228 
 
While human rights should be adequately secured on the other hand, the process of 
governance and state functioning should not be readily compromised. A balance must 
be struck between the rights and expectations of individuals and the rights and 
expectations of the states and state officials.  
 
Despite criticisms that the ICJ decision in the Arrest Warrant case will lead to 
impunity it is maintained, alongside the Court, that immunity does not mean 
impunity.
229
 Immunity does not mean absence of liability; rather it means that the 
enforcement of the liability against those to whom the immunity attaches could be 
limited in time or depending on the forum seeking to enforce this liability.  
                                               
227
 Gavouneli and Bantekas, supra 125, p.203 
228
 Roman Kolodkin, Second Report on Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction,  
     UN Doc.A/CN.4/631, 10 June 2010, Paragraph 90 
229
 Supra 1, Paragraph 60 
151 
 
 
Approaching immunities from the perspective of liability complicates issues in the 
discourse on reconciling human rights imperatives and immunities. The matter is 
better dealt with where immunities are approached from the perspective of the 
adjudicatory competence of the courts of a state over actions of other states and state 
officials.
230
 In proceedings for enforcement of human rights, where immunities are 
implicated, the issue should not be about the moral reprehensibility of recognising 
immunities, rather it should be that the matter be directed to the proper forum where 
immunities can be appropriately addressed.
231
  
 
The often projected dilemma between Head of state immunity and human rights is 
more chimeral than real. This is because immunity does not negate the substantive 
provisions of international norms “but merely diverts any breach of it to a different 
method of settlement”.232  According to Fox, reliance on immunities 
“…immunity has served and is capable of serving valid 
purposes. Used restrictively, wisely, and in the interests 
of the general community, it has the utility, in my view, 
as a legitimate aid to the rule of law. It is a legal device 
for the allocation of authority and jurisdiction; 
procedurally it serves as a sorting mechanism for the 
appropriate method of settlement; and substantively it 
preserves certain public values, and privileges the 
general cause as determined by democratic government 
over the private interest.”233 
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Likewise, Judges Higgins, et al, state that, 
“…The law of privileges and immunities, however, 
retains its importance since immunities are granted to 
high state officials  to guarantee the proper functioning 
of the network of mutual inter-state relations, which is 
of paramount importance for a well-ordered and 
harmonious international system”.234 
 
  
2.6 CONCLUSION 
 
The aged battle between positivist and naturalist views of international law lies at the 
heart of this chapter. The chapter has considered the approaches that have been 
resorted to in an effort to resolve the competing interests of a system of immunities 
and a system of human rights as well as the inadequacies of the approaches.  
 
The chapter has also established that the international order being value-oriented, its 
principles are to be seen in that regard, even if the principles are dictated by political 
considerations. Human rights and immunities are core principles of a complex legal 
order; an order which is capable of accommodating these principles and their values.  
 
Traditional perceptions of sovereignty have been gradually eroded in the fields of 
economic and commercial activities, employment relations, contracts, trusts and 
intellectual property.
235
 This has not been the case with regard to the immunities 
where violations of human rights are concerned. It is in recognition of the moral 
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concerns that some courts have tried to circumvent the immunity hurdle by giving 
preference to human rights. However, such decisions have mostly been reversed on 
appeal. It is clear that perhaps states are not ready to accept such a progressive 
interpretation of their immunities.  
 
International law is not static. It is dynamic. It could be that the move from absolute 
immunity to restrictive immunity for states in their commercial affairs as well as 
contemporary efforts to read human rights exceptions to immunity may be indicative 
of future modification of the scope of immunities. It may be that the international law 
is gradually evolving towards the non-application of immunities for human rights 
violations. However, international law is not yet there. Infact, the ILC Special 
Rapporteur on Immunity of States from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction acknowledged 
that exceptions to immunity for state officials still remained in the realm of 
progressive developments.
236
 
 
That a concept in international law is controversial and creates difficult situations is 
not enough to do away with it. Indeed, the fact that a concept is subject to abuse 
should not be the sole basis for challenging the existence of a concept nor should the 
fact of vulnerability to abuse be enough to make a concept redundant. For instance, the 
right of self-defence is one of the most abused concepts in international law but this 
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cannot be said to be a justification for challenging its existence which is established 
under customary international law and treaty law.
237
  
 
The use of the term „conflict‟ in this chapter does not mean that there is a substantive 
conflict between human rights and immunities. The term is used loosely and employed 
only for the sake of analysis. Neither does the fact that immunities necessitate the 
exemption of the jurisdiction of a court for human rights violations where states and 
state officials are concerned mean that there is a substantive conflict between human 
rights and immunities. The concept of immunity does not take away the substantive 
jurisdiction of a court over human rights violations where such jurisdiction has been 
competently conferred by an instrument. The concept of immunity merely excludes 
states and state officials from jurisdiction. The concept does not negate the jurisdiction 
of a court over human rights violations but only makes it inapplicable in certain 
instances- instances which form the content of the rest of the thesis. 
 
Finally, in the determination of emergent trends regarding immunities of Heads of 
states, this chapter has shown the inclination of judges, domestic and international, to 
disregard immunities of states for human rights violations. While this inclination is yet 
to materialise into state practice, it is indicative perhaps of the direction of 
international law in this regard and the possibility of restriction of immunities of states 
for human rights violations. The question is whether the trend is also indicative of an 
emergent trend regarding Head of state immunity and the extent to which such trend 
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affects existing customary international law on the matter. The rest of the thesis will 
be dedicated to answering this question. 
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CHAPTER 3: HEAD OF STATE IMMUNITY BEFORE NATIONAL 
COURTS      
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The most prominent feature of the international order is its decentralized nature, with 
no central and compulsory law-making or adjudicatory organ. Thus, the adjudicatory 
mechanisms of the ICJ and the more recent ICC are limited with regard to Head of 
state immunity. While the mechanism of the ICC and its limits will be considered in 
Chapter 6; the limits of the ICJ are more straightforward. The ICJ has no criminal 
jurisdiction and by the express provision of Article 34 of its Statute, only states can be 
parties to proceedings before the Court.
1
 Therefore, the issue of legal proceedings 
against Heads of states does not arise before the ICJ. However, decisions of the Court 
are useful in the analysis of Head of state immunity and emergent trends in that 
regard. 
 
Due to a lack of central and compulsory international adjudicatory body, the national 
courts of states have become very important not just in domestic proceedings but also 
in international proceedings. Indeed, the ICJ in the Arrest Warrant case recognized 
this role of national courts while enumerating the circumstances under which the 
immunities of state officials, including Heads of states, may not operate as a bar to 
criminal proceedings against such persons. The Court enumerated the circumstances 
                                               
1
 59 Stat. 1055. However, in the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), criminal responsibility was 
indirectly in issue before the ICJ, (2007) I.C.J. Reports 1  
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under which the immunities of state officials may not bar criminal proceedings to 
include:
2
 
a) before the courts of their countries under their domestic law;  
b) before foreign courts where the state has waived the immunity;  
c) before courts of another state after expiration of office and “provided that it has 
jurisdiction under international law” in respect of acts done in a private capacity; 
d) before certain international criminal courts. 
 
While the previous chapter involved a general consideration of immunities, the 
primary focus of this chapter (like subsequent ones) will be immunities of Heads of 
states. This chapter will analyse the jurisprudence of national courts with a view to 
ascertaining whether there is an emergent trend on Head of state immunity and the 
extent to which such trend affects existing customary international law on the subject.
3
 
The jurisprudence of national courts will be considered firstly, from the perspective of 
states of origin of Heads of state and the trial of Saddam Hussein before the Iraqi High 
Tribunal will form subject of the analysis. Secondly, national courts of foreign states 
will be considered in this chapter and the UK House of Lords decision in the Pinochet 
case as well as decisions from the US, France and Senegal. 
 
Questions of legality of an adjudicatory body necessarily implicate the validity of 
jurisdiction of over a Head of state. As such, this chapter will consider events leading 
                                               
2
 (2002) ICJ Reports 3, Paragraph 61. 
3
 As stated earlier in the introduction, this thesis will employ an analysis of customary international law 
and the constitutive instrument theory in its determination of emergent trends and its impact on Head of 
state immunity. 
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up to the establishment of the Iraqi High Tribunal (IHT), whether the Coalition 
Provisional Authority (CPA) could establish the Tribunal and the legitimacy of 
invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the post-occupation legitimacy of the CPA in determining 
whether the IHT could exercise jurisdiction over Saddam Hussein and the extent to 
which the decision of the Tribunal is indicative of an emergent trend affecting 
customary international law on Head of state immunity. 
 
 
3.2 HEAD OF STATE IMMUNITY BEFORE NATIONAL COURTS OF 
STATE OF ORIGIN  
 
The immunities of states are extended to Heads of states to ensure effectiveness, 
efficiency and independence in the conduct of official duties by not subjecting Heads 
of states to legal proceedings while in office. However, immunities of Heads of states 
vary according to the regime under consideration. The issue of immunities of Heads of 
states in international law applies before foreign jurisdictions while the issue of 
immunities of Heads of state before courts of their state of origin is dependent on 
municipal law, i.e. constitutional provisions to that effect.
4
 Therefore, while Heads of 
states are entitled to immunity under international law, not all Heads of states will be 
entitled to immunity within their states. For instance the Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria provides for the immunity of its President from domestic legal 
                                               
4
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are silent on the matter. 
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proceedings while the UK has no such provision.
5
 Indeed, a sitting UK Prime Minister 
was subjected to questioning and investigation over the issue of cash-for-peerages.
6
 
 
In the exercise of its legislative sovereignty a state may provide for, or against, the 
immunity of its own Head of state in proceedings before its own courts. As such, a 
Head of state would be disentitled from relying on the sovereign attribute of the state 
to the disadvantage of the state and to his personal advantage. For instance, in a case 
not concerning international immunities, former President of Peru, Alberto Fujimori 
was charged with human rights violations before the Peruvian courts.
7
 Also Saddam 
Hussein was charged with crimes against humanity and was tried before the Iraqi High 
Tribunal, convicted and sentenced to death by hanging.  
 
International immunities are not involved in proceedings before national courts of 
states of origin. International immunities (the focus of this thesis) are implicated where 
a foreign state or court asserts jurisdiction over a Head of state of another state 
contrary to the principle of sovereign equality, i.e. par in parem non habet imperium. 
While the case against Fujimori in Peru did not involve international immunities, the 
                                               
5
 Section 308.  See also the Constitutions of Pakistan (Article 248), Guyana (Article 182), Belgium 
(Article 88), and Sri Lanka (Article 35). Some states like the US and Singapore (Article 22k of the 
Constitution) grant a limited immunity to their Heads of states, see Clinton v. Jones, 520 US 681; US v. 
Nixon, 418 US 683; and Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 US 731. In the UK, the Crown Proceedings Act 
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6
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7
 See Ronald Gamarra, „A Leader Takes Flight: The Indictment of Alberto Fujimori‟, in Ellen Lutz and 
Caitlin reiger (eds.), Prosecuting Heads of State (Cambridge:CUP, 2009) 95-109 
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case against Saddam Hussein is not so clear because of events leading to the 
establishment of the IHT.  
 
3.2.1 THE IRAQI HIGH TRIBUNAL AND THE TRIAL OF SADDAM 
HUSSEIN 
For a proper legal analysis of the trial of Saddam Hussein before the IHT, the factual 
background leading up to the establishment of the Court as well as the nature of the 
court will be considered. 
3.2.1.1 FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
In 1990, Iraq invaded and purportedly annexed Kuwait. While acting under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council in Resolution 660 condemned the 
invasion by Iraq and requested its withdrawal from Kuwait.
8
 Subsequently, and also 
acting under its Chapter VII mandate, the Council in Resolution 678 authorized states 
to „use all necessary means‟ to uphold and implement relevant Resolutions and to 
restore international peace and security in the concerned area.
9
 In 1991, a coalition of 
forces intervened on behalf of the Security Council to repel Iraq.  
 
In 2003, a coalition of states including, most notably, the US and the UK embarked on 
a military action in Iraq alleging that Iraq was in material breach of Resolution 687 
and Resolution 1441 imposing terms of the ceasefire including disarmament 
                                               
8
 S/RES/660 (1990) 
9
 S/RES/678 (1990); see also Christopher Greenwood, „International Law and the Pre-emptive Use of 
Force: Afghanistan, Al-Qaida and Iraq‟, (2003) 4 San Diego International Law Journal 7, p.26 
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requirements by Iraq and calling upon Iraq to comply with disarmament obligations, 
respectively.
10
 Upon the invasion of Iraq by the coalition relying on the revival of the 
mandate to use force against Iraq based on a combined effect of Resolutions 678, 687 
and 1441, the CPA was established upon the occupation of Iraq to administer the 
country.
11
 The CPA established an Iraqi Governing Council under its authority and an 
interim constitution was put in place for Iraq.  
 
The CPA delegated to the Iraqi Governing Council, in CPA Order Number 48, the 
authority to create a special tribunal in Iraq.
12
 The Governing Council established the 
Iraqi Special Tribunal, and adopted the Statute of the Court. The establishment of the 
Special Tribunal became effective on 10 December 2003 upon signing of Order 48 by 
the CPA Administrator.
13
 However, on 11 August 2005, the Iraqi Transitional 
Assembly, as part of the Transitional Government, revised the Statute of the Special 
Tribunal and the name of the Special Tribunal changed to the Iraqi High Tribunal 
(IHT). Due to a legislative procedural defect, i.e. failure to refer the draft legislation to 
the State Consultative Council for review, the law was re-enacted with amendments as 
Law No.10 of 2005 in September 2005.
14
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 S/RES/687 (1991) and S/RES/1441 (2002) 
11
 Unlike the authorisation to use force against Iraq in 1991, the authorisation to use force against Iraq 
in 2003 is entrenched in considerable controversy that undermines its legitimacy, see Vaughan Lowe, 
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The trial chamber of the IHT, in its judgment of 5 November 2006, stated that the 
Governing Council which had established a temporary Constitution, among other 
things, emphasized the establishment of a Special Iraqi Court of Law.
15
 An interim 
government was elected on 3 May 2005 and the Security Council in Resolution 1546 
acknowledged the interim government as the “independent, sovereign government of 
Iraq”.16 Further to this, Law No.10 of 2005 which re-affirmed the Court was passed by 
a government which enjoyed legitimacy, as it was elected by 78% of the Iraqi 
citizenry, the said Law having involved the citizenry in a national referendum.
17
 
 
3.2.1.2 THE TRIAL OF SADDAM HUSSEIN BEFORE THE IHT 
In what has come to be known as the „Dujail trial‟, which was the first case 
investigated and tried by the Court, former President Saddam Hussein as well as other 
senior Iraqi officials were indicted for crimes against humanity and tried.
18
 Saddam 
Hussein was convicted and sentenced to death.
19
  
 
The involvement of the CPA in the establishment of the IHT has implicated the 
legality of the IHT. As such, it is imperative for the validity of the jurisdiction and 
proceedings of the IHT that questions about the legality of the Court are resolved. If 
                                               
15
 „Unofficial‟ English translation of the decision provided by the Frederick K. Cox International Law 
Centre at the Case Western Reserve University School of Law, available at 
http://law.case.edu/saddamtrial/dujail/opinion.asp, (accessed 16/08/2011) [Hereinafter Dujail 
Judgment] 
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 Ibid., p.30; S/RES/1546 (2004) 
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 Dujail Judgment, ibid 
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 Supra 14, p.2 
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the CPA lacked the powers to establish the IHT then the implications would be that 
the IHT was invalidly established and as such had no jurisdiction over Saddam 
Hussein. It would also mean that the IHT would not be an Iraqi court but the court of 
foreign states, thereby involving the international immunities of Saddam Hussein.  
 
3.2.1.3 LEGALITY OF THE IHT 
It must be stated at the onset that the issues concerning the fairness of the proceedings 
against Saddam Hussein or his punishment do not affect the question of his immunity 
before the IHT.
20
 This is because immunity is separate from the conduct of the trial 
and the merits of the case. Major criticisms of the Court and its proceedings have been 
directed at the legitimacy of the invasion of Iraq by the Coalition and the post-
occupation legitimacy of the CPA.
21
 Bassiouni argues that, 
“No norm or precedent exists in international law for an 
occupying power, the legitimacy of which is in doubt, to 
establish an exceptional national criminal tribunal.”22 
  
As a general proposition, the issue of the legality of an invasion must remain separate 
from the occupation arising from the invasion. The illegality, or otherwise, of the 
                                               
20
 For problems of procedural fairness in the IHT, see ICTJ, Briefing Paper: Creation and First Trials of 
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invasion of Iraq in 2003 has no legal implication for the conduct of the occupation by 
the CPA or the validity of the establishment of the IHT. The conduct of a military 
occupation arising from an invasion, contrary to the rules of jus ad bellum, cannot be 
invalidated by the illegality of the invasion even when the occupying power observes 
the laws of military occupation as provided in the Hague Regulations of 1907,
23
 and 
the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949.
24
 If this were the case, parity of reasoning 
would then suggest that a lawful use of force against a state would serve to legalize the 
actions of the occupying forces even where such actions are in violation of the Hague 
Convention. Such a restrictive argument can only turn the law completely upside 
down. The laws of military occupation as laid down in The Hague Regulations and 
Fourth Geneva Convention are applicable to any belligerent occupation, irrespective 
of the lawfulness, or otherwise, of the use of force.
25
 
 
A controversial issue arising with regard to the establishment of the IHT and its 
jurisdiction over Saddam Hussein is the extent of the powers of an occupier to change 
the criminal or penal laws of the occupied territory and whether an occupying power 
may change laws as well as make laws that last beyond the period of occupation. The 
Geneva Conventions and Hague Regulations collectively do not permit an occupying 
power to change the existing legal system, change the penal legislation of the occupied 
                                               
23
 Hague Convention (No. IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (and Annexed 
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 Op.cit. 
25 Christopher Greenwood, „The Administration of Occupied Territory in International Law‟, in Emma 
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territory, issue new penal provisions, or to change the tribunals of the occupied 
territory, or prosecute inhabitants for acts committed before the occupation. 
 
The core of the duties of an occupying power is articulated in Article 43 of the Hague 
Regulations annexed to the Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs 
of War on Land 1907 as follows, 
“The authority of the legitimate power having in fact 
passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall 
take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, 
as far as possible, public order and safety, while 
respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force 
in the country.”26 
 
This provision is reflective of customary international law;
27
 and is essential in the 
determination of the authority of the occupying power with regard to the establishment 
of the IHT. While providing the duty to respect the laws of the land, it is implicit from 
a textual reading of the provision that not all laws must be obeyed, thereby 
recognizing the right of the occupying power to disregard certain laws in existence in 
the occupied territory.
28
 Article 43 permits the occupying power to deviate from the 
laws in force, in the interests of the occupying power.
29
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 Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff, Documents on the Laws of War, 3
rd
 edition, (Oxford: OUP, 2000), 
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The second point is that under Article 43 an occupying power has a duty to take all 
measures in his power to restore public order and civil life. There is nothing in the 
Hague Regulations and Geneva Conventions preventing an occupying power from 
establishing adjudicatory bodies like the IHT. Indeed Article 67 of Geneva 
Conventions IV makes mention of “properly constituted, non-political military courts” 
sitting in the occupied territory; and this provision does not exclude other types of 
courts and tribunals.  
  
An occupying power is required, under Article 43, to restore and to ensure, as far as 
possible, public order and safety. The situation in Iraq before the invasion in 2003 and 
the situation of chaos and anarchy after the invasion highlight the duty to restore and 
ensure public order and safety. The establishment of the IHT is a means of restoring 
and ensuring public order and safety. A textual reading of the provision in Article 43 
supports this interpretation, because though vague, the use of the phrase “as far as 
possible” gives a wide margin of discretion to the power in the observance of this 
duty. In the case of Iraq, it is immaterial that there was no public order and safety prior 
to the invasion and occupation in 2003, to be restored. Moreover, such a restrictive 
interpretation of the duty under Article 43 would be against the spirit of the provision 
and would serve to ignore the latter part of the phrase, which imposes a duty to ensure 
public order and safety.
30
 
 
                                               
30
 A Teachers’ Housing Cooperative Society vs. The Military Commander of the Judea and Samaria 
Region, et al, HC 393/82; See Edmund H. Schwenk, „Legislative Power of the Military Occupant under 
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In The Christian Society for the Holy Places vs. Minister of Defence, et al it was held 
that a military order of an occupying power could only be implemented on the 
establishment of a new arbitration body.
31
 An arbitration body is without a doubt, an 
adjudicatory body and this case, at least, establishes that an occupying power would be 
within its authority and duties under Article 43 of the Hague Regulations if it 
establishes an adjudicatory body. The type of adjudicatory body that would be 
established would be immaterial.  
 
Similarly, during the occupation of Germany by the Allied Forces after World War II, 
Control Council Law No. 10 was promulgated for the punishment of persons guilty of 
war crimes, crimes against peace and crimes against humanity, Article III, sub-section 
2 of which provided for the establishment of courts or tribunals.
32
 
 
Although an occupying power is to respect and not tamper with the organization of 
courts and other adjudicatory bodies in the occupied territory, the occupying power 
may, however, in certain circumstances establish special tribunals. These 
circumstances include:
33
 
a) Where the citizens of the occupied territory have committed offences against 
the occupying power or members of its armed forces or in violation of the 
regulations of the occupying power; 
b) Where there is a breakdown of the local courts for the administration of justice; 
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c) Where the members of the armed forces of the occupying power are to be dealt 
with; 
d) Where the political system and courts of the occupied territory constitute a 
threat to the security of the occupant‟s army. 
 
From the foregoing, especially in view of the collapse of the Iraqi judiciary, the 
constitution and the political system of Iraq which were threats to public order and 
safety as well as the military interests of the Coalition Forces, the CPA could validly 
have established the IHT. 
 
With regard to the issue raised concerning the legislative authority of an occupying 
power to make new laws or to change the penal law of the occupied territory, again, 
the provision of Article 43 of the Hague Regulations provides the answer. Article 43 
provides that the occupying power is to respect, unless absolutely prevented, the laws 
in force in the occupied territory. A literal reading of the provision is to the effect that 
the restriction on an occupying power from making new law or changing the existing 
law is not absolute. There is judicial as well as academic support for this view.
34
 
  
Furthermore, Article 64 of the Geneva Convention IV, like the Hague Regulations, 
recognizes that the duty of the occupying power to respect the laws of the occupied 
territory exists subject to the military and security needs of the occupying power.
35
 
However, Article 64 goes further to make such duty subject to the Geneva 
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Convention, i.e. the duty may be disregarded if it prevents the application of the 
Convention.
36
 
 
Therefore, the existing penal laws of an occupied territory are to be respected by the 
occupying power except due to necessity arising out of either the interests of public 
order and safety of the occupied territory or military interests of the occupying power 
in the occupied territory.
37
 Saddam Hussein had entrenched Ba‟athism, tyranny and 
fear in Iraq. This together with the overall situation in Iraq as well as the necessities of 
the interest of public order and safety and the military interests of the Coalition Forces 
justified changes in the laws of Iraq (like the Allied Powers changed racially 
discriminatory laws in Nazi Germany during its occupation of Germany after World 
War II). Since the duties of an occupying power are extensive, the legislative powers 
of an occupying power within the provisions of The Hague Regulations and Geneva 
Convention IV must be extensive so as to accommodate these duties.
38
 
 
In view of the above, the merits of the arguments against the legality of the IHT being 
established under the authority of the CPA are doubtful. Perhaps, the only issue that 
could have been validly raised concerns the legitimacy and functioning of the IHT that 
was established under the CPA after the CPA had ended its occupation of Iraq. 
However, these arguments have essentially been overtaken by events because the 
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current source of legitimacy of the IHT arose from the legislative acts of the Iraqi 
Transitional Assembly in September 2005. 
 
3.2.1.4 HEAD OF STATE IMMUNITY BEFORE THE IHT 
In the Dujail Trial case, the IHT rejected Head of state immunity raised on behalf of 
Saddam Hussein for two reasons.
39
 Firstly, since the alleged acts involved were crimes 
against humanity, Saddam could not rely on immunity. Secondly, the IHT was of the 
view that with the overthrow of the old regime and the establishment of a new 
government in Iraq, and by referring the case to the IHT for trial, the new government 
had waived any immunity to which Saddam was entitled.  
 
The IHT further relied on the Nuremberg precedent by arguing that the Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal provided against immunities and official capacities.
40
 
The IHT also relied on Article 7 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia, which provides against immunities and official capacities 
for international crimes, including crimes against humanity.
41
 In justifying its stance, 
the IHT stated that official capacity cannot be an exemption from punishment or the 
commutation of punishment. It also held that the fact that the commission of crimes by 
state officials was a matter reasonably within Saddam Hussein‟s knowledge and for 
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which he did not take the necessary steps to prevent could not exempt him from 
criminal liability.
42
 
 
The IHT‟s argument that the issue of immunity does not arise where the acts in issue 
are crimes against humanity is unfounded in customary and conventional international 
law. As established in the previous chapter, there is no clear-cut instance of state 
practice where it was held that immunities do not apply with regard to crimes against 
humanity. By its specificity, instruments like the Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal at Nuremberg, the Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunals for 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda as well as Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court 
removing immunities of Heads of states for crimes against humanity are limited to the 
courts established by the instruments.
43
  
 
In view of the legislative acts of the Iraqi Transitional Assembly, the Dujail Trial and 
the question of the immunity of Saddam Hussein did not occur in the jurisdiction of a 
foreign state. As stated earlier, the issue of Head of state immunity before the courts of 
states of origin is dependent on municipal law. As such, the IHT would have 
considered the provisions of the new constitution of Iraq.
44
 Although the old 
constitution provided for absolute immunity for the Head of state, the new constitution 
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makes no provision for immunity of the Head of state.
45
 Also, the facts that Saddam 
Hussein was no longer an incumbent Head of state and the acts committed were acts 
committed in a personal capacity as well as the fact that the new government set up 
under the new constitution had referred the case to the IHT for trial were decisive of 
the matter. The absolute immunity under the old constitution was no longer in 
existence, even if Saddam Hussein was entitled to immunity under the new 
constitution the immunity was effectively removed by the new government. 
 
Although the decision of the IHT was right in recognising that Saddam was not 
entitled to immunity before it as a national court of Iraq, the reasons relied on by the 
IHT in support of its decision are flawed and only serve to further complicate an 
already complex area of law.  
 
The theoretical misunderstanding of the immunities of Heads of states is highlighted 
by the IHT‟s reliance on the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the Statutes of the 
Yugoslavian and Rwandan Tribunals. The Nuremberg, Yugoslavian and Rwandan 
Tribunals are international courts, which the IHT is not, despite its appliance of 
principles of international law and reliance on international assistance. This theoretical 
misunderstanding is also evident in the IHT‟s opinion that official capacity cannot be 
an exemption from criminal liability or the commutation of punishment. Immunity, 
whether under international law or national law, is not a substantive defence and 
cannot negate criminal liability, it merely goes to jurisdiction. The inclusion of 
obedience to superior orders and responsibility of superiors in the determination of 
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whether Saddam was entitled to immunity further illustrates the misunderstanding of 
the IHT.
46
  
 
3.3 HEAD OF STATE IMMUNITY BEFORE NATIONAL COURTS OF 
FOREIGN STATES 
 
International immunities arise before foreign jurisdictions where the sovereignty and 
sovereign equality of states are implicated. The question of international immunities of 
Heads of states before national courts of foreign states is determined by customary 
international law. The ICJ‟s enumeration of the national courts of foreign states where 
immunity has been waived and national courts of foreign states after expiration of 
office in respect of private acts where jurisdiction exists under international law will 
be considered against the backdrop of the relevant case law. The courts of the UK, US, 
France and Senegal provide the necessary material for this analysis. 
 
3.3.1 THE UK AND THE PINOCHET CASE 
The Pinochet case launched Head of state immunity into the limelight of academic and 
judicial discourse. Proceedings were instituted against Augustus Pinochet Ugarte in 
the Spanish national court alleging genocide, murder, torture and hostage-taking 
between 1973 and 1990, during Pinochet‟s tenure as the President of Chile. While on a 
medical check-up to the UK in 1998, after expiration of Pinochet‟s incumbency, an 
extradition request was issued from Spain to the UK so that Pinochet could stand trial 
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in Spain. Proceedings for determination of whether Pinochet was entitled to immunity 
from arrest and extradition were instituted and Pinochet claimed immunity from any 
criminal process including extradition.
47
 He argued that he was entitled to state 
immunity under Section 1 of the UK SIA and personal immunity as a Head of state 
under Section 20 of the Act.
48
   
 
The Divisional Court upheld Pinochet‟s claim and held that as a former Head of state, 
Pinochet was entitled to immunity even for international crimes committed in the 
course of his official functions as Head of state.
49
 An appeal before the House of 
Lords was lodged by the Commissioner of Police and the Government of Spain and 
this led to an interesting chain of decisions from the Law Lords.  
 
3.3.1.1 PINOCHET 1 
The Lords held that, 
“A claim to immunity by a Head of state or a former 
Head of state applied only to acts performed by him in 
the exercise of his functions as Head of state. Although 
that referred to any of his functions as a Head of state 
and not just those acts which had an international 
character, acts of torture and hostage-taking could not be 
regarded in any circumstances as a function of a Head of 
state. It was a principle of international law, as shown by 
the Conventions against the Taking of Hostages and 
Torture, that hostage-taking and torture were not 
acceptable conduct on the part of anyone, including a 
Head of state. It followed that since the acts of torture 
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and hostage-taking with which the applicant was 
charged were offences under United Kingdom statute 
law, in respect of which the United Kingdom had taken 
extra-territorial jurisdiction, the applicant could not 
claim immunity from the criminal processes, including 
extradition, of the United Kingdom”.50  
 
The Law Lords rightly stated that torture is an internationally unacceptable act, even 
for Heads of states. However, there is a variance between what is unacceptable and the 
legal definition of torture under the Convention against Torture.
51
 Article 1 of the 
Convention provides that for an act of torture to fall within the remit of the 
Convention that it must have been committed under an official capacity.
 52
  
 
Lord Slynn dismissed the appeal and in his dissenting opinion argued that despite the 
clear indication of a movement towards the recognition of certain crimes with respect 
to which head of state immunity would be inapplicable before international tribunals, 
that, 
“It does not seem… that it has been shown that there is 
any state practice or general consensus let alone a 
widely supported convention that all crimes against 
international law should be justiciable in national courts 
on the basis of the universality of jurisdiction. Nor is 
there any jus cogens in respect of such breaches of 
international law which require that a claim of state or 
head of state immunity, itself a well-established 
principle of international law, should be overridden.”53 
                                               
50
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51
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Further to this, Lord Slynn interpreted the Convention against Torture to exclude 
Heads (or former Heads) of state from the term „public officials‟ under the 
Convention, either because states did not wish to provide for the prosecution of Heads 
(or former Heads) of state or because they were not able to agree that a plea in bar to 
the proceedings based on immunity should be removed.
54
 His Lordship attributes this 
omission to political and diplomatic difficulties but maintains that if states wanted to 
exclude immunity of former Heads of states, specifically as regards certain crimes or 
generally, then they must do so in clear terms and not relegate the matter to national 
courts.
55
  
 
While also dissenting from the majority Lord Lloyd argued that in view of the “special 
international tribunals” that had been established over the years with jurisdiction over 
genocide, crimes against humanity and torture, such crimes when committed by Heads 
of states cannot be tried in the national courts of foreign states because, “if they could, 
there would be little need for the international tribunal”.56 Going further, he 
enumerated instances, similar to that of the ICJ in the Arrest Warrant case, in which 
jurisdiction may be exercised over Heads of states including national courts of own 
state, courts of foreign states where immunity has been waived by own state, the ICC 
or a “specially constituted international court”.57  
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Lord Lloyd‟s argument is somewhat sociological and lacks legal conviction. The 
existence of international tribunals does not remove the valid jurisdiction of national 
courts. The implication of Lord Lloyd‟s decision would have meant that Pinochet was 
outside the law because no proceedings were being brought against Pinochet in Chile 
and Chile had not waived immunity; rather Chile asserted immunity. Further, the ICC 
was yet to be established by the time of the decision and in any case the temporal 
framework of the acts alleged fell outside the jurisdiction of the Court, and no 
“specially constituted international court” like the Yugoslavian and Rwandan 
Tribunals had been established to exercise jurisdiction over the alleged acts.  
 
The Lords, by a majority decision, upheld the appeal and effectively reversed the 
decision of the Divisional Court. The decision allowing the appeal on the ground that 
there could be no immunity in international law for crimes under international law and 
that Pinochet was not entitled to immunity because torture is not part of the official 
functions of a Head of state was wrong.
58
 Heads of states or former Heads of states 
cannot be reasonably excluded from the provision of the Convention against Torture. 
This is because a Head of state is the chief representative of a state, a „public official‟ 
par excellence and more importantly, the travaux preparatoire of the Convention does 
not support such a restrictive interpretation of the term „public official‟.59  
 
The Convention against Torture must be distinguished from the Nuremberg Charter, 
the Statutes of the Yugoslavian and Rwandan Tribunals as well as the ICC which are 
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the constitutive instruments of the Nuremberg Tribunal, ICTY, ICTR and the ICC. 
The Convention proscribes the act of torture while the constitutive instruments of the 
ICTY, ICTR and ICC establish special courts with jurisdiction over certain 
international crimes including torture and expressly provide against immunities of 
Heads of states before the special courts.  
 
While this thesis agrees that Pinochet was not entitled to Head of state immunity in 
this case, it was not for the reasons advanced in Pinochet 1. It was not until Pinochet 3 
that the matter was properly analysed and decided. 
 
3.3.1.2 PINOCHET 2 & 3 
After the decision of the House of Lords in Pinochet 1, the defence discovered that 
Lord Hoffmann, one of the presiding judges during the appeal, was involved as an 
unpaid director and chairman of Amnesty International Charity Limited, and Amnesty 
International had been granted leave to intervene in the appeal. Pinochet applied to 
have the decision set aside because of Lord Hoffmann‟s involvement with the charity 
organisation on grounds of bias.
60
 As such the decision in Pinochet 1 was overturned 
in Pinochet 2.  
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In Pinochet 3,
61
 a reconstituted House of Lords on rehearing the appeal allowed the 
appeal in part and reversed, in part, the decision of the Divisional Court. The Lords 
held that by virtue of Section 20 of the SIA and Article 39(2) of the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations (made effective in the UK by the Diplomatic 
Privileges Act 1964) that a former Head of state had immunity from the criminal 
proceedings in the UK for acts done in his official capacity as Head of state. The 
Lords went on to hold that the coming into effect of the Convention against Torture 
which provides for an obligation of aut dedere, aut judicare on state parties nullified 
immunity ratione materiae for acts of torture.
62
  
 
The Lords were of the opinion that the application of the express terms of the 
Convention against Torture was such that the state parties could not uphold the 
immunity ratione materiae of public officials including former Heads of state. To do 
otherwise would be inconsistent with obligations of the parties under the 
Convention.
63
 
  
Lords Millett and Phillips of Matravers were of the opinion that prior to the 
Convention torture was an international crime for which there was no immunity in 
customary international law. While the Lords are correct in stating that the prohibition 
against torture existed under customary international law prior to the Convention, 
there is no supporting state practice or opinio juris to corroborate the opinion that 
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there was no immunity under customary international law for acts of torture by Heads 
of states.
64
  
 
The immunities of Heads of states and the prohibition against torture are rules of 
custom and for the customary rule of immunity not to apply to the customary rule 
against torture there must be shown to be a later custom to the contrary or that a new 
rule is to be found in conventional or treaty law. Where a conventional rule departs 
from a pre-existing customary rule, the conventional rule will take precedence over the 
customary rule because it is later in time and also because of the express provision to 
that effect. However, the conventional rule is necessarily restricted to contracting 
parties. 
 
The prohibition against torture under customary international law did not override the 
existing customary rule of immunity ratione materiae. Rather this was achieved under 
the regime of Convention against Torture. Spain, UK and Chile were parties to the 
Convention and so were bound by the Convention under which the UK court exercised 
jurisdiction. In essence, the UK courts were national courts before which there could 
be no immunity of Heads of state because the courts were vested with jurisdiction 
under international law over acts of torture.  
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3.3.2 TORTURE AS PART OF OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS OF HEADS OF 
STATE 
Heads of states are entitled to absolute immunity ratione personae by Section 20 of 
the UK SIA. However upon vacation of office, Heads of states have a continuing but 
limited immunity ratione materiae with respect to acts done in the exercise of 
functions in that capacity.  This statement of the principle in customary international 
law is not problematic and indeed is reflected in the opinions of all the judges, both at 
the Divisional Court and House of Lords.  
 
However, in their various decisions Lords Nicholls and Steyn obfuscated matters by 
arguing that certain crimes like torture, which are egregious violations of international 
law, are so heinous that they could not be regarded as part of the functions of Heads of 
states. Lord Steyn argued that certain acts like torture fall outside the scope of 
functions of a Head of state;
65
 and Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead argued that while 
international law provides the test for judging the legality of the functions of Heads of 
states that torture could not be regarded as a function of Heads of states.
66
 This line of 
reasoning is found in Lord Browne-Wilkinson‟s decision in Pinochet 3; however he 
restricted this reasoning with regards to its applicability after the Convention against 
Torture.
67
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It is difficult to take the view that the functions of Heads of states exclude the 
commission of crimes without proper analysis. The issue must be given the close 
analysis that it merits. The issue of whether acts of torture were committed in an 
official capacity and the issue of whether there can be immunity for the acts of torture 
must be considered independently of each other. This is because two separate aspects 
of international law are involved namely, the law of responsibility and the law of 
immunity.   
  
In the performance of the functions of Heads of states, illegal acts may be committed 
and the official nature of the functions of Heads of states cannot be removed simply 
because of the criminal nature of the act involved.
68
 The issue is best approached from 
the perspective of whether a criminal act, either under domestic or international law, 
was committed in the course of the performance of lawful official functions as Head 
of state. Adopting a “critical test”, which was considerably relied on in Pinochet 3,69 
Watts stated that, 
“A Head of state clearly can commit a crime in his 
personal capacity; but it seems equally clear that he can, 
in the course of his public functions as Head of state, 
engage in conduct which may be tainted by criminality 
or other forms of wrongdoing. The critical test would 
seem to be whether the conduct was engaged in under 
colour of or in ostensible exercise of the Head of state‟s 
public authority. If it was, it must be treated as official 
conduct, and so not a matter subject to the jurisdiction of 
                                               
68
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other states whether or not it was wrongful or illegal 
under the law of his own state.”70 
 
It is not enough to say that it cannot be part of the functions of a Head of state to 
commit a crime. The Law Lords should have embarked upon a closer analysis of the 
issue. After all, actions which are criminal under local law can still have been done 
officially and therefore give rise to immunity ratione materiae.   
 
It is a general principle of law that immunity may arise, ratione materiae, for criminal 
acts which were done in the course of performance of official functions. This 
proposition is supported by the principle enunciated in I Congreso del Partido,
71
 and 
Kuwait Airways Corporation v. Iraqi Airways (No.1),
72
 that the violation of norms of 
domestic or international law does not remove the immunities to which a state is 
entitled. The fact that a state official has acted ultra vires does not justify the 
qualification of the act in issue as not an official act. According to Lord Goff in 
Pinochet 3, 
“…the mere fact that the conduct is criminal does not of 
itself exclude the immunity, otherwise there would be 
little point in the immunity from criminal process; and 
this is so even where the crime is of a serious 
character.”73 
 
Lord Lloyd had argued that the difficulty in seeing the acts of torture with which 
Pinochet was charged as part of his official functions as Head of state is resolved by 
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the substitution of the word “official” with “governmental” thereby clarifying the 
distinction between official and private acts.
74
 Following from this reasoning, if the 
acts of torture were in the interests of the government and the state they would not 
qualify as the private acts of the individual. For instance, the example given by Lord 
Steyn of a Head of state who kills his gardener out of rage or who tortures people for 
his own personal gratification clearly falls outside the scope of official or 
governmental acts.
75
  
 
However, the substitution of words is superfluous because for an act to qualify as 
„official‟ or „governmental‟ it would have to have been done on behalf of the state. In 
Ex-King Farouk of Egypt v. Christian Dior, it was held that the purchase of clothes for 
the wife of the King were clearly private acts for which there could be no immunity 
ratione materiae.
76
 
  
The reasoning that torture as a norm of jus cogens is such a heinous act that it cannot 
be part of the official functions of Heads of states for which there can be no immunity 
ratione materiae is fraught with difficulty, the implications of which are manifold. 
Firstly, this reasoning is reflective of the normative hierarchy theory and this has been 
earlier argued to be a flawed theory which fosters obscurity, rather than clarity, of 
issues. Secondly, the reasoning is contrary to the definition of torture under Article 1 
of the Convention against Torture. This is because for an act to qualify as torture 
under the Convention, the act has to be committed by a public official or person acting 
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in an official capacity. Acts committed by private individuals or in a private capacity 
cannot be legally described as torture under the Convention. The practical effect of 
this would mean that the acts alleged against Pinochet would fall outside the scope of 
the Convention against Torture, an instrument which gave basis to the case.  
 
There is the further problem of the stand-off between the principles of individual 
criminal responsibility and state responsibility which this reasoning engenders. If 
torture is argued to be removed from the domain of official acts this would have 
serious implications for the law of state responsibility and, as such, would fly in the 
face of international legal developments. Developments post World War II established 
the state responsibility of Germany and Japan for acts of their officials. The law of 
state responsibility forms a considerable and important part of the international legal 
order under the auspices of the UN, its organs and agencies including the ICJ and the 
ILC.
77
  
 
By holding that torture was not part of the official functions of Pinochet, as President 
of Chile, this meant that there would be no basis for finding that Chile was in breach 
of its international obligations under the Convention. In other words, there would be 
no question of imputability of the acts of Pinochet to Chile. Acts of torture implicate 
both individuals (state officials) and states. States being abstract entities, the question 
of imputability is important for the engagement of the responsibility of states. In the 
Massey claim, between US and Mexico, the Claims Commissioner opined that, 
                                               
77
 See the Rainbow Warrior Case, 74 ILR 241 and the ILC Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts 2001, reproduced in UNGA Res 56/83 (12 December 2001). See also 
Eileen Denza, „Ex parte Pinochet: Lacuna or Leap‟, (1999) 48 ICLQ 949, p.952-956 
186 
 
“I believe that it is undoubtedly a sound general 
principle that, whenever misconduct on the part of 
[persons in state service], whatever may be their 
particular status or rank under domestic law, results in 
the failure of a nation to perform its obligations under 
international law, the nation must bear the responsibility 
for the wrongful acts of its servants”.78  
 
Similarly, in the Caire claim, a case which arose before the Franco-Mexican Claims 
Commission in 1929 and involved the successful claim by France against Mexico for 
the arrest, torture and death of its national by Mexican officials, the President of the 
Commission stated that, 
“…The state also bears an international responsibility 
for all acts committed by its officials or its organs which 
are delictual according to international law, regardless of 
whether the official organ has acted within the limits of 
his competency or has exceeded those limits…”79  
 
In this case, it was also decided by the Commission that, 
“…In order to justify the admission of objective 
responsibility of the state for acts committed by its 
officials or organs outside their competence, it is 
necessary that they should have acted, at least 
apparently, as authorised officials or organs, or that, they 
should have used powers or measures appropriate to 
their official character…”80 
 
Fourthly, the argument that acts tainted with illegality cannot be considered to be part 
of the official functions of state officials was presented in Hatch v. Baez and was 
rejected.
81
 Lord Lloyd stated that, in Hatch v. Baez, 
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 “The plaintiff contended (just as the appellants have 
contended in the present appeal) that the acts of the 
defendant must be regarded as having been committed 
in his private capacity...But the court rejected the 
plaintiff's argument. Gilbert J. said…: "The wrongs and 
injuries of which the plaintiff complains were inflicted 
upon him by the Government of St. Domingo…They 
consist of acts done by the defendant in his official 
capacity of President of that Republic. The sole question 
is, whether he is amenable to the jurisdiction of the 
courts of this state for those acts." The court concluded 
[that] "the fact that the defendant has ceased to be 
President of St. Domingo does not destroy his immunity. 
That springs from the capacity in which the acts were 
done, and protects the individual who did them..."”82 
 
Fifthly, the reasoning is besieged by the problem of boundaries.
83
 According to Lord 
Bingham of Cornhill, C.J,  
“A former Head of state is clearly entitled to immunity 
in relation to criminal acts performed in the course of 
exercising public functions. One cannot therefore hold 
that any deviation from good democratic practice is 
outside the pale of immunity. If the former sovereign is 
immune from process in respect of some crimes, where 
does one draw the line?”84 
 
It was argued that the nature of torture was such that an exception must be made to the 
customary international rule on Head of state immunity and also that being a crime 
against international law that it would be illogical for international law to outlaw a 
conduct and also grant immunity from prosecution for the outlawed conduct.
85
 The 
requirements for the formation of a rule of customary international law are state 
practice and opinio juris, therefore for an exception to a customary rule to arise, the 
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same requirements for the formation of a customary rule are necessary. From an 
examination of state practice in Chapter 2, it can be stated that no such rule of 
exception has become law.  
 
The argument that international law cannot outlaw a conduct like torture and at the 
same time grant immunity from prosecution is misplaced. This is because immunity is 
a jurisdictional and procedural matter and does not go to the substance of the act; and 
the House of Lords in a later decision in Jones v. Saudi Arabia made this clear.
86
 
Likewise the ICJ in the Arrest Warrant case stated that immunity from jurisdiction and 
individual criminal responsibility are separate issues.
87
  
 
Moreover, the Convention against Torture expressly provides that state parties, who 
have ratified the Convention, are under an obligation under the Convention to exercise 
jurisdiction over torture.
88
 This obligation under the Convention prevails over the 
customary rule of immunities (ratione materiae). Since Spain, UK and Chile are 
parties to the Convention against Torture, Pinochet was not entitled to immunity 
before UK courts for acts of torture. The Pinochet case falls neatly into the 
categorisation of the ICJ in the Arrest Warrant case of instances where immunities of 
senior state officials would be inapplicable, i.e. the UK courts were national courts 
vested with jurisdiction under international law. 
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Despite the ambiguous and variegated nature of the decision of the House of Lords in 
the Pinochet case, the reasoning of the judges represent a paradigm shift in 
international law on Head of state immunity. The extent to which the Pinochet case is 
illustrative of an emergent international rule on Head of state immunity is limited to 
the contractual obligations of the state parties to the Convention against Torture. 
 
 
3.4 JURISPRUDENCE OF US COURTS 
 
The jurisprudence of US courts affirms the general rule that Heads of states are 
generally immune from its jurisdiction. In Saltany v. Reagan,
89
 and in Kilroy v. 
Windsor,
90
 the courts held, respectively, that Margaret Thatcher as the UK Prime 
Minister and Prince Charles as The Prince of Wales and heir apparent to the British 
throne were entitled to Head of state immunity in proceedings alleging violations of 
international law and human rights.  
 
The courts have also recognised a limited immunity ratione materiae for former 
Heads of states and that Head of state immunity is an attribute of sovereignty of a state 
which may be waived by the state. This was decided in In re Grand Jury 
Proceedings,
91
 against Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos, former President of Philippines 
and his wife, for failure to comply with federal grand jury subpoenas and in Paul v. 
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Avril,
92
 for alleged violations of international law against Prosper Avril, as former 
military ruler of Haiti. 
 
Although, the cases subject of the study of jurisprudence from the US are mostly civil 
cases and fall outside the normative framework of the other case studies in the thesis, 
i.e. crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide, these US cases will be 
considered because dominant in US jurisprudence is the practice of filing suggestions 
of immunity, by the State Department, for Heads of states recognised by the US 
executive. This has led to an inconsistent application of Head of state immunity before 
the US courts and is aptly illustrated by US v. Noriega,
93
 Jimenez v. Aristeguieta,
94
 
Lafontant v.Aristide,
95
 Paul v. Avril,
96
  and Tachiona v. Mugabe.
97
  
 
3.4.1 US v. NORIEGA 
On 14 February 1988, an indictment was issued by a federal grand jury in Florida, US 
against General Manuel Antonio Noriega of Panama for alleged participation in a 
cocaine racketeering scheme which involved smuggling cocaine into and out of the 
US.
98
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On 15 December 1989, Noriega declared Panama to be at war with the US which, on 
20 December 1989, sent in troops into Panama to “safeguard American lives, restore 
democracy, preserve the Panama Canal treaties, and seize Noriega to face federal drug 
charges in the US”.99 Noriega sought refuge in the Papal Nunciature and later 
surrendered himself.  
 
Noriega contended that he was entitled to Head of state immunity. His claim to 
immunity was denied by the District Court which stated that for Noriega to claim 
Head of state immunity that he must be recognised as Head of state of Panama either 
under Panama‟s Constitution or by the US.100 The Court went further to state that in 
the provision for an executive arm of government that the Constitution of Panama, in 
Title VI, Article 170, included only a President and Ministers of state. Since Noriega 
was never elected as President under the presidential elections of 7 May 1989, an 
election which, in fact, Noriega had cancelled and the recognition of Eric Delvalle by 
the US rather than Noriega as the leader of Panama, disentitled Noriega from asserting 
Head of state immunity. The Court also stated that the decision of the US executive to 
recognise Delvalle was binding on the judiciary and that this had been authoritatively 
decided in Republic of Panama v. Air Panama.
101
 
 
The Court erred in its reasoning and decision in this case. This is evident from the 
acknowledgment by the Court that Head of state immunity is grounded in customary 
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international law.
102
 The theoretical underpinnings of Head of state immunity, as set 
out in Chapter 1, establish that it is rooted in customary international law and there is 
an obligation on states under customary international law to respect the sovereignty of 
foreign states and the immunity of Heads of foreign states.  
 
International immunities are sovereign rights of states and the District Court was 
wrong in treating the immunity of Heads of states as a privilege which was at the 
discretion of the US to accord by arguing that, 
“more importantly, the United States government has 
never accorded Noriega Head of State status…It is 
therefore not for the courts to deny an immunity which 
our government has seen fit to allow, or allow an 
immunity on new grounds which the government has 
not seen fit to recognize.”103 
 
Assumption of leadership of a country either through constitutional or extra-
constitutional means is not decisive of entitlement to Head of state immunity. Though 
they usually co-exist, de jure leadership and de facto leadership remain separate 
matters and this case is illustrative of the point. Eric Delvalle as the winner of the 1989 
presidential elections in Panama was the de jure leader; whereas Noriega was the de 
facto leader. Noriega was the Commander-in-Chief of the Panamanian Defence Forces 
was in control of the government of Panama having nullified the presidential elections, 
and functioned to all intents and purposes as the Head of state of Panama. Noriega‟s 
non-recognition by the US as the leader of Panama did not change the fact of his 
leadership of Panama. The District Court even acknowledged the fact that Noriega 
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was the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of Panama
104
 and the de facto ruler 
of Panama.
105
 The position of the District Court is also undermined by the fact that the 
US was the only country that recognised Delvalle as the President of Panama.
106
  
 
This thesis has argued in Chapter 1 that the international order is a horizontally 
structured pluralistic order where there is legal equality between all sovereigns and 
states. No state can ascribe to itself the power to disentitle another state of its rights or 
seek to whittle down the obligations of another state in international law. States and 
state structures vary from democratic governments to military governments to 
monarchies and totalitarian governments. A state having a democratic government 
cannot deprive a state having a military government of its entitlements under 
international law. Indeed to do so would amount international lawlessness. Robert 
Mugabe and the Republic of Zimbabwe likewise General Pinochet and the Republic of 
Chile are no more or less entitled to rights and obligations under international law than 
Barack Obama and the US or Nicholas Sarkozy and the Republic of France. Therefore 
it would amount to the acceptance of moral high-handedness in international relations 
to agree with the District Court that, 
“ accepting as true statements of counsel regarding 
Defendant's position of power, to hold that immunity 
from prosecution must be granted “regardless of his 
source of power or nature of rule” would allow 
illegitimate dictators the benefit of their unscrupulous 
and possibly brutal seizures of power. No authority 
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exists for such a novel extension of head of state 
immunity, and the court declines to create one here.”107 
 
Furthermore, it is accepted as a principle of international law that an act of illegality 
cannot remove a valid entitlement or right. This principle is well established in the I 
Congreso del Partido and Kuwait Airways case.
108
 Noriega had declared Panama to be 
at war with the US and as the Head of state of Panama and the Commander-in-Chief 
of its armed forces he was under an obligation in international law to respect the laws 
of war as articulated in the Geneva Conventions. A system of duties is correlative of a 
system of rights; and international law, as a system, cannot seek to impose duties 
while removing rights. It would be an inconsistent application of international law that 
acknowledged the obligations of Heads of states under the Geneva Conventions while 
disregarding valid entitlements of Heads of state under customary international law for 
drug trafficking offences.  
 
The Court in reasoning that Noriega did not come under the “acceptable definition” of 
a Head of state under customary international law relied upon the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons. 
According to the Court,
109
 
“The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons … 
defines “internationally protected person” as “(a) a Head 
of state, including any member of a collegial body 
performing the functions of a Head of state under the 
constitution of the state concerned, a Head of 
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government or a Minister of foreign affairs ...” Noriega 
has not shown that he was either the ceremonial or 
official head of government, and he does not otherwise 
fulfil the definition.” (Emphasis added) 
 
The Court took a narrow interpretation of the provision of the Convention and from a 
textual reading of the provision it is clear that the Convention does not envisage only 
de jure Heads of states. The Convention expressly uses the word “including”, 
therefore showing that it was not a limiting and excluding provision. As such, de facto 
Heads of states would come under the provision of the Convention. Moreover, when it 
is considered that a suggestion of immunity was filed for Prince Charles in the US and 
was sustained in the courts, in his purely ceremonial capacity as the Prince of Wales 
and heir to the British monarchy, the non-recognition of Noriega as Head of state of 
Panama and the decision to refuse him immunity on that ground leaves much to be 
desired. 
 
The Court also reasoned that Head of state immunity would not apply to private acts 
and criminal acts in violation of US laws; and that criminal activities like trafficking in 
narcotics could not be considered as official or governmental acts.
110
 The fact that 
Noriega, as a former Head of state, was entitled to immunity ratione materiae was 
decisive of the matter. Immunity ratione materiae being applicable only to official 
acts or acts carried out in the exercise of official functions means that narcotics 
trafficking, which are private acts, fall outside the scope of acts for which immunity 
may be claimed.   
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3.4.2 JIMENEZ v. ARISTEGUEITA 
In Jimenez v. Aristeguieta, the appellant was alleged to have leveraged his status as the 
dictatorial Head of state of Venezuela to commit crimes motivated by financial 
gain.
111
 Marco Perez Jimenez was a former President of the Republic of Venezuela 
and a request for his extradition from US was filed by Manuel Aristeguieta as Consul 
General of Venezuela in the US courts. Jimenez petitioned the courts for the relief of 
habeas corpus which was denied by the courts. Jimenez had contended that as a 
dictator he was sovereign and so the acts alleged were the sovereign acts of 
Venezuela, and like the concept of immunities in international law, the act of state 
doctrine excluded the Court from exercising jurisdiction over the matter.
112
  
 
The Court correctly reasoned that as a former Head of state the immunity Jimenez was 
entitled to was limited ratione materiae to official acts and not private acts and that the 
crimes committed for financial gain were clearly private acts for which there could be 
no immunity. In coming to this decision the Court relied, among others, on the 
Supreme Court decision in Underhill v. Hernandez where the Supreme Court held that 
“a military commander representing a de facto government” was entitled to immunity, 
albeit ratione materiae.
113
 This buttresses the point that extra-constitutional means or 
illegality in the assumption of power cannot remove rights and duties as well as 
obligations and entitlements under international law. 
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3.4.3 LAFONTANT v. ARISTIDE 
In Lafontant v. Aristide,
114
 the US courts recognised that the immunity of a serving 
Head of state is absolute. In January 1991, Dr. Roger Lafontant, among other persons, 
had attempted an unsuccessful coup d'etat to prevent Haitian president-elect, Jean-
Bertrand Aristide, from taking office. Lafontant was arrested and sentenced to life 
imprisonment in July 1991. It was alleged that Aristide ordered the execution of 
Lafontant, while he was in custody. Thereafter, Aristide was exiled from Haiti to US 
in the aftermath of a successful military coup in September 1991.
115
  
  
The US government insisted on its recognition of Aristide as the lawful Head of state 
of the Haitian Republic while not recognising the factual military government in place 
in Haiti. The widow of Lafontant instituted proceedings against Aristide for extra-
judicial killing of her husband and relied on the US Torture Victims Protection Act 
(TVPA). The defendant claimed that he was entitled to Head of state immunity but the 
plaintiff argued that Aristide was no longer President and so not entitled to an absolute 
immunity.  
 
The Court held that the immunity of a Head of state recognised by US is absolute.
116
 
The Court was of the opinion that Aristide, as the recognised Head of state of Haiti, 
was entitled to immunity ratione personae and the immunity is based on the equality 
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of states and the principles of respect and comity among states.
117
  
 
It is pragmatically difficult to agree with the decision of the Court. Clearly Aristide 
had ceased to be, at least, the de facto ruler of Haiti which was actually being headed 
by a new government which Parliament had ratified. Further to this, Aristide‟s 
continued and prolonged absence from Haiti was such that it could not be doubted that 
he was not in control of Haiti. In view of these, it would be an absurd interpretation of 
law that would ascribe to Aristide the entitlements of a serving Head of state while 
denying those in de facto control of these entitlements. Furthermore, the Court stated 
that immunity was based on sovereign equality as well as respect and comity among 
nations yet in US v. Noriega the court in that case rejected that immunity as it arose in 
that case was based on sovereign equality, respect and comity among nations.
118
 
 
3.4.4 PAUL v. AVRIL 
In Paul v. Avril, the Court held that the immunity to which Prosper Avril was entitled 
as a former military ruler had been waived by Haiti.
119
 This decision is inconsistent 
with the reasoning of US courts which have been inclined to denying recognition and 
Head of state immunity to unconstitutional military governments. If the reasoning of 
US courts in the various cases is taken to a logical end it would mean that Avril was 
not entitled to Head of state immunity, therefore the Republic of Haiti would not have 
waived an immunity which was not available in the first place. 
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3.4.5 TACHIONA v. MUGABE 
In Tachiona v. Mugabe,
120
 a class action was brought by members and supporters of 
the opposition to President Robert Mugabe‟s party and government against the 
President and the Foreign Minister of Zimbabwe under the ATCA, TVPA and 
international human rights law. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had “planned 
and executed a campaign of violence designed to intimidate and suppress its 
burgeoning but peaceful political opposition” and this campaign involved acts of 
murder, torture, terrorism, rape, beatings and destruction of property.
121
 However, the 
US government filed a suggestion of immunity asserting that President Mugabe and 
his Foreign Minister were entitled to Head of state immunity. Also it was stated that 
the fact that Mugabe and his Minister were present in US in a representative capacity 
for the Government of Zimbabwe to the Millennium Summit of the UN entitled them 
to diplomatic immunity under the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the 
UN,
122
 and the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
123
 The Court accepted the 
suggestion of immunity. 
 
The jurisprudence of the US courts shows an inconsistency in the way the rules of 
international law regarding the immunities of Heads of states are applied. The 
application of Head of state immunity is used as a political tool for favouring foreign 
governments. This assertion is buttressed by the analysis of the cases in this section, 
with the exception of Robert Mugabe whose immunity could not be disregarded 
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because, however reprehensible a Head of state Mugabe is considered to be, his 
government and source of authority are constitutional. 
 
 
3.5 FRANCE AND THE CASE AGAINST GADDAFI 
 
The jurisprudence from the French courts is of important consideration in the 
discourse. Following the explosion of an UTA Airlines carrier in 1989 involving the 
death of all passengers and crew on board (which included several persons of French 
nationality), criminal investigation into the explosion implicated six Libyan nationals 
alleged to be members of the Libyan Secret Police. These implicated persons were 
tried in absentia by the Special Court of Assizes of Paris and were convicted and 
sentenced to life imprisonment. 
 
Association SOS-Attentats, an organisation supporting victims of terrorism, as well as 
relatives of victims of the explosion applied for criminal proceedings against 
Mouammar Gaddafi, the Libyan Head of state, before the courts of France.
124
 The 
Ministère Public appealed against the decision of the examining magistrate to open a 
criminal inquiry arguing that Gaddafi was immune from the proceedings as Head of 
state. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and held that although Head of state 
immunity was a rule of customary international law, that under the Rome Statute of 
the ICC, state parties were under a duty to exercise jurisdiction over international 
crimes even where Heads of states were involved. The Court relied on the cases 
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against Pinochet and Noriega as evidence of practice that Heads of states were not 
entitled to immunity for international crimes.
125
 
 
Further appeal was lodged to the Court of Cassation and it was argued by the 
Advocate General before the Court of Cassation that the fact that France had ratified 
the Rome Statute did not mean that it was required to exercise criminal jurisdictions 
over international crimes in all circumstances; that it was necessary to distinguish 
between the possibility of exercising jurisdiction and the duty to exercise 
jurisdiction.
126
  
 
The decision of the Appeal Court had no basis in international law. The Appeal Court 
erred in its interpretation of the Rome Statute. The provisions of the Statute are with 
respect only to the crimes mentioned in the Statute, i.e. genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes and aggression.
127
 The crime of terrorism falls outside the remit 
of the Statute and the Court was wrong to have included the crime of terrorism into the 
clear and express provisions of the Statute.  
 
It is a general principle that a treaty is binding only upon the contracting parties and 
that a treaty cannot create rights or obligations for third parties without the consent of 
such parties. This customary international law principle as contained in the maxim 
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pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt is codified in Article 34 VCLT.
128
 Libya not being 
party to the Rome Statute is not bound by the Statute.
129
 To argue otherwise would 
strike at the very core of the international system.  
 
There is evidence in support of the customary international law status of Article 34 
VCLT. Sir Robert Jennings and Sir Arthur Watts relying on the commentary to the 
draft of the Convention by the ILC state that, 
“„there appears to be almost universal agreement‟ upon 
such a general rule, which is based not only on a general 
concept of the law of contract but also on the 
sovereignty and independence of states.”130 
 
This position is further supported by case law, some of which precede the Convention, 
including the Island of Palmas arbitration,
131
 Certain German Interests in Polish 
Upper Silesia case,
132
 the Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex case,
133
 
the Territorial Jurisdiction of the River Oder Commission case,
134
 the Status of 
Eastern Carelia case,
135
 the Aerial Incident of 27 July 1955 case,
136
 and the North Sea 
Continental Shelf Cases.
137
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The Appeal Court in the Gaddafi case reached its decision without consideration of the 
fact that Pinochet and Noriega were no longer in power by the time of proceedings 
against them.
138
 The decisions in the Pinochet and Noriega cases were not based on 
any general practice recognising the non-applicability of Head of state immunity for 
international crimes.
 
The Pinochet decision was based on the technicalities of the 
Convention against torture while the Noriega decision was based on the non-
recognition of Noriega by the US government.  
 
The specificity of the cases against Pinochet, Noriega and Milosevic were such that 
the French Court of Cassation was aware of the limited extent to which these cases 
could be relied upon. As such, the Court in allowing the appeal and terminating the 
proceedings against Gaddafi held that, 
“International custom precludes Heads of states in office 
from being the subject of proceedings before the 
criminal courts of a foreign state, in the absence of 
specific provisions to the contrary binding on the parties 
concerned. In the current state of international law, 
complicity in a terrorist attack, however serious such a 
crime might be, did not constitute one of the exceptions 
to the principle of the jurisdictional immunity of foreign 
Heads of states in office.”139 
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3.6 SENEGAL AND THE CASE AGAINST HISSÈNE HABRÉ 
 
After Hissène Habré was deposed as the President of the Republic of Chad in 1990 
and while in exile in Senegal, an indictment was issued against him in February 2000 
based on allegations of acts of torture committed in Chad and he was placed under 
house arrest in Senegal. Habré appealed against the indictment on the ground that the 
courts in Senegal had no jurisdiction over the alleged acts since the acts had been 
committed against foreigners abroad.
140
 
 
The Court of Appeal in Dakar quashed the indictment on the basis of want of 
jurisdiction. The Court of Appeal held that there was no provision in Senegalese law 
for the punishment of crimes of humanity and that although the Criminal Code of 
Senegal had been amended in line with the Convention against Torture that it did not 
suffice to found jurisdiction in the matter as the procedural laws of Senegal under the 
Code of Criminal Procedure had to be amended in line with the substantive law so as 
to provide for universal jurisdiction for the acts of torture.
141
  
 
The complainants appealed to the Court of Cassation against the decision but the 
appeal was dismissed. The Court of Cassation held that Article 5(2) of the Convention 
against Torture required parties to take necessary measures to establish jurisdiction 
over acts of torture and that the enforcement of the Convention required parties to take 
legislative measures. Therefore, the presence of the accused person in Senegal was not 
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enough to base the exercise of jurisdiction in the absence of any domestic procedural 
legislation empowering Senegal to exercise jurisdiction.
142
 
 
Not satisfied with the decision of the Senegalese courts, the torture victims from Chad 
lodged a communication against Senegal with the Committee against Torture. It was 
alleged by the complainants that Senegal was in breach of its obligations under 
Articles 5 and 7 of the Convention against Torture and the Committee decided in the 
favour of the complainants agreeing that Senegal had breached its obligations under 
the Convention.
143
  
 
Another group of victims, including three Belgian nationals, alleging torture by Habré 
in Chad brought action against him in Belgium.
144
 The Government of Chad was 
prepared to waive any immunity that Habré could have relied on in the case before the 
Belgian courts and communicated this to Belgium.
145
 In September 2005, a Belgian 
court issued an international arrest warrant against Habré and sought his extradition 
from Senegal. Despite Habré‟s re-arrest in November 2005, the Indicting Chamber of 
the Court of Appeals in Dakar decided that it had no jurisdiction regarding an 
extradition request against a former Head of state. The Senegalese President referred 
the matter to the AU. 
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The AU in January 2006 established a Committee of Eminent African Jurists to 
consider the aspects and implications of the case against Habré and option for his 
trial.
146
 The Committee concluded that Habré was not entitled to immunity and 
decided on an „African option‟ as the solution.147 Under this option, Senegal, Chad or 
any AU member could exercise jurisdiction over the accused person or an ad hoc 
tribunal could be established in any member state to try the accused. Based on the 
recommendations of the Committee of Eminent African Jurists, the AU decided that 
the matter fell within the competence of the Union and mandated Senegal to prosecute 
and ensure the trial of Habré.
148
  
 
While the issue of Head of state immunity did not arise in the arguments canvassed by 
Habré against his indictment before the Senegalese courts, it does not mean that Head 
of state immunity has no place in the Habré case. Indeed, the Committee of Jurists 
appointed by the AU considered the issue and was of the opinion that Habré could not 
rely on Head of state immunity.
149
 Importantly, Chad indicated its amenability to 
waiving the immunity in proceedings in Belgium and this amenability could be 
interpreted to extend to possibly any other criminal proceedings outside Belgium.  
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Senegal became a party to the Convention against Torture upon its entering into effect 
in June 1987 while Chad became a party in June 1995; and the acts of torture alleged 
against Habré occurred in the period of his rule as Head of state of Chad until 1990. 
The fact that Chad became party to the Convention in 1995 after Habré had vacated 
office does not mean that the application of the Convention would be tantamount to 
the application of the law ex post facto.
150
 The application of the prohibition against 
torture under the Convention and the non-applicability of immunities for acts of 
torture are not to be muddled together. It could not have been intended that immunity 
ratione materiae of former Heads of state parties to the Convention would survive the 
coming into effect of the Convention. However, for states not party to the Convention, 
while the prohibition against torture under the Convention applies to them as a rule of 
customary international law, there is no rule of customary international law removing 
immunity ratione materiae. 
 
The fact that Chad was not a party to the Convention against Torture until 1995 does 
not affect the prohibition against torture. This date does not affect the substantive 
prohibition against torture under the Convention as well as under customary 
international law. It merely refers to the effective period when the concerned states 
became in agreement with each other as to the inapplicability of immunity ratione 
materiae for acts of torture. Thus, the effective date of the agreement that immunity 
would not be applicable to acts of torture, as agreed between Senegal and Chad, is 
June 1995. This would have raised a possible difficulty in any proceedings to be 
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commenced against Habré because it would have meant that he would be immune 
from the courts of Senegal. However, this difficulty becomes a non-issue because of 
the position of the Government of Chad that it will waive any immunity to which 
Habré may otherwise have been entitled.  
 
Unfortunately, despite the bold moves of the AU no timetable for the commencement 
of the trial of Habré has been set out. Senegal alleges budget constraints as impeding 
trial of Habré.
151
 In February 2009, Belgium instituted proceedings against Senegal 
before the ICJ claiming that Senegal is in breach of its international obligations by 
failing to prosecute or extradite Habré.
152
   
 
In the absence of a substantive decision by a competent court on the Habré case, 
further analysis would be purely speculative. It is also important to state that the 
decision of the Committee against Torture was against Senegal and its obligations 
under the Convention against Torture; it had nothing to do with the individual criminal 
liability of Habré.
153
 However, in view of the explicit intention of Chad to waive 
immunity in proceedings in a foreign state against Habré, Senegal‟s hesitation to 
initiate criminal proceedings against Habré is questionable.  
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3.7 CONCLUSION 
 
The immunities of Heads of states have been considered in this chapter from the 
dimensions of national courts of the state of origin of Heads of state and national 
courts of foreign states with a view to ascertaining any emergent trend.  
 
The jurisprudence of the courts of various jurisdictions establish customary 
international law of absolute immunity ratione personae for serving Heads of state 
and limited immunity ratione materiae for former Heads of state as well as waiver of 
immunity by the state of origin of the person entitled to the immunity.  
 
The qualification of Head of state immunity, by the US, based on recognition of 
governments, as shown in this chapter, has no place in international law. International 
immunities are sovereign entitlements of states and not mere privileges which are 
accorded by another state. The inconsistent decisions of the US courts based on the 
suggestions of immunity by the State Department are more indicative of „great 
power‟154  prerogatives than of any emergent trend regarding international immunities 
of Heads of state.   
 
Contrary to the opinion of some of judges in the Pinochet case, the illegality of torture 
under the regime of customary international law does not remove the immunity of a 
Head of state. However, the illegality of torture under the regime of the Convention 
against Torture could remove Head of state immunity ratione materiae.  
                                               
154
Gerry Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal 
Order, (Cambridge: University, 2004)  
210 
 
 
Despite its variegated nature, the final decision of the House of Lords in the Pinochet 
case is reflective of an emergent trend on Head of state immunity where acts of torture 
are alleged to have been committed. However, this trend is limited by the contractual 
nature of obligations under the Convention against Torture which are binding upon 
Spain, Chile and the UK.  
 
The inapplicability of immunity ratione materiae to the Pinochet case was not as a 
result that torture not being part of official functions of Heads of state. The 
commission of acts of torture in an official capacity and the applicability of immunity 
ratione materiae are separate considerations.  
 
A discernible trend from this chapter is evident in the implication of the international 
responsibility of states before the ICJ for breach of international obligations to 
disregard immunities of Heads of states for acts of torture. However, this trend is 
limited by the express application of the Convention against Torture where the states 
involved in the proceedings are parties to the Convention and as such are bound by the 
obligations arising under the Convention. 
 
While a substantive prosecution of Habré is yet to commence, it is clear that the 
decision of the AU mandating Senegal to try the matter as well as the position of the 
Government of Chad on waiver of any jurisdictional immunity involved lend support 
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to the position that former Heads of state are not entitled to jurisdictional immunities, 
ratione materiae, for acts of torture. 
 
Moving on from national courts, the next chapter will introduce the discourse of Head 
of state immunity before international courts.                                                     
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CHAPTER 4: HEAD OF STATE IMMUNITY BEFORE 
INTERNATIONAL COURTS ESTABLISHED IN THE WAKE OF 
WORLD WARS I AND II 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The ICJ, in the Arrest Warrant case, included „certain international courts‟ in its 
enumeration of the instances where immunities may not avail senior state officials, 
including Heads of states.
1
 The enumeration of the ICJ of the circumstances where 
Head of state immunity will not be applicable is not self-explanatory. The 
international nature of a court is not enough to disentitle a Head of state from 
immunity available under customary international law. States cannot, by their 
aggregation, achieve what they lack the individual capacity to do, i.e. remove a right 
which a third state possesses without the consent of the third state. It becomes 
imperative to consider what makes an international court come within the 
envisagement of the ICJ in the Arrest Warrant case, i.e. what makes an international 
court „certain‟ as contemplated by the ICJ? 
 
The question of Heads of state immunity before international courts is to be construed 
against the backdrop of the nature of the constitutive instrument establishing an 
                                               
1
 (2002) I.C.J.Reports 3, paragraph 60 
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international court and whether states are bound by the instrument, i.e. the constitutive 
instrument theory.
2
 
 
The different international courts and their constitutive instruments must be analysed 
in the determination of emergent trends on Head of state immunity. The analysis is 
imperative especially when it is considered that international courts, despite their 
seeming proliferation since the end of the Cold War, have been characterised by ad 
hocism.   
 
International criminal accountability has not always featured in the international legal 
system. Efforts at international criminal accountability by the international community 
have largely been dependent on the era in the development of international criminal 
law and the necessary political will of the international community during the era. The 
proper place to start the analysis involved in the consideration of international courts 
or tribunals and efforts at international criminal accountability is after the First World 
War (WWI) and subsequently the efforts after the Second World War (WW II).  
 
This chapter will begin the analysis of international courts and their constitutive 
instruments by considering international courts established after WWI and WWII and 
the extent to which the post world wars efforts at accountability indicate a paradigm 
shift in international law. This chapter will employ the constitutive instrument theory 
                                               
2
  Dapo Akande, International Law Immunities and the International Criminal Court‟, (2004) 98 AJIL 
407, p.417-418; The Appeals Chamber of the ICTY in Prosecutor v. Blaskic, was of the view that 
though immunity applied to proceedings before national courts, it also has been respected and taken 
into account in international proceedings, 106 ILR 609, paragraph 41  
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in its analysis of the applicability of Head of state immunity in the type of 
international courts featured in this chapter. 
 
Furthermore, because a central feature of the international system is the absence of 
machinery for enforcement, including the enforcement of judicial orders and requests, 
it is important that any analysis of international courts also considers judicial 
assistance and co-operation with the international courts. The non-applicability of 
Head of state immunity before an international court can only be achieved where there 
is an obligation on states to co-operate with and assist an international court. Thus, this 
chapter will generally consider the underlying principles of judicial assistance and co-
operation with international courts before proceeding to the obligations of states 
regarding judicial assistance and co-operation under the Treaty of Versailles and the 
Charters of the International Military Tribunals established after World War II.  
 
 
4.2 POST WORLD WAR I: THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES 1919 AND THE 
TRIAL OF THE KAISER 
 
Historically, the idea of establishing international courts to try serious violations of 
international law arose for the first time after WWI. After WWI, an armistice 
agreement was concluded between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany on 
11 November 1918 resulting in cessation of hostilities. Kaiser Wilhelm II abdicated 
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and fled to the Netherlands where he was granted asylum.
3
 After its initial protest over 
the harshness of the terms of the Treaty, Germany finally accepted the terms of the 
Treaty of Versailles on 28 June 1919, formally bringing to an end WWI.
4
 
 
Prior to the Treaty of Versailles, the Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors 
of the War and on the Enforcement of Penalties was established to inquire into and 
report on, inter alia, the degree of responsibility for offences attaching to particular 
members of enemy forces however highly placed and the constitution and procedure 
of a tribunal appropriate for the trial of these offences.
5
 
 
 In its report presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference on 29 March 1919, the 
Commission proposed the establishment of a “high tribunal” which would have 
jurisdiction over charges against enemy authorities irrespective of their position or 
rank, including as Heads of states.
6
 The proposed composition of the high tribunal, the 
law to be applied by the tribunal and its supremacy over national courts show that the 
tribunal envisaged by the Commission was to be international in nature. This 
conclusion is supported by the recommendation of the Commission that the high 
tribunal be “provided by the treaty of peace.”7 
 
According to the Commission, 
                                               
3
 Gary Jonathan Bass, Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals, (New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2002), p.64 
4
 225 C.T.S. 188; H.E. Goemans, War and Punishment: The Causes of War Termination and the First 
World War, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 309. 
5
 „Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference on March 29, 1919,‟ (1920) 14 AJIL 95, p.116 
6
 Ibid., p.121-122 
7
 Ibid., p.123 and p.129 where the Commission talks about the creation of “a high tribunal with an 
international character” for the “trial of persons exercising sovereign rights”. 
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“…in the hierarchy of persons in authority, there is no 
reason why rank, however exalted, should in any 
circumstances protect the holder of it from responsibility 
when that responsibility has been established before a 
properly constituted tribunal. This extends even to the 
case of Heads of states.”8 
 
Upon considering arguments on immunity and inviolability of Heads of states the 
Commission stated, 
“But this privilege, where it is recognised, is one of 
practical expedience in municipal law, and is not 
fundamental. However, even if in some countries, a 
sovereign is exempt from being prosecuted in a national 
court of his own country the position from an 
international point of view is quite different.”9 
 
Immunity does not only exist in municipal law; its place in international law is well 
established. The theoretical underpinning of the concept of immunity is fundamental 
to the international system. Therefore, the Commission was wrong to have considered 
immunity one-dimensionally, i.e. from the perspective of municipal law only.  The 
Commission envisaged that Heads of states would bear individual criminal liability for 
violations of the laws and customs of war as well as laws of humanity in proceedings 
before the proposed high tribunal.  
 
However, the question of the applicability or otherwise of immunities of Heads of 
enemy states for the crimes committed during the war was not determined by whether 
immunity was merely a municipal law principle which was not fundamental from an 
international perspective. The immunity which would have been implicated before 
                                               
8
 Ibid., p.116 
9
 Ibid. 
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proposed tribunal is international immunities and not national immunities. The 
immunities of Heads of enemy states were determined by the nature of the proposed 
tribunal and whether states (including enemy states) were bound by the constitutive 
instrument establishing the tribunal.  
 
Since the tribunal was proposed to be established by an international agreement (treaty 
of peace), the applicability or otherwise of Head of state immunity was determined by 
the very nature of the treaty of peace. Being a contractual agreement, the enemy states 
would have been deemed to have consented to the restriction of their sovereign rights, 
including the non-applicability of Head of state immunity before the tribunal. This 
position is supported by the statement of the Commission that, 
“We have later in our Report proposed the establishment 
of a high tribunal composed of judges drawn from many 
nations, and included the possibility of the trial before 
that tribunal of former Heads of states with the consent 
of that state itself secured by articles in the treaty of 
peace.”10 
 
The inclusion, or otherwise, of a provision for consent of the enemy state in the treaty 
of peace does not change the legal consequence of the signing of a peace treaty by an 
enemy state which provides against the sovereign rights of the enemy state. There is 
no further need to secure the consent of the enemy state by articles in the treaty; it 
would be merely superfluous. The consent of the state is implicit in the signing of the 
treaty. 
 
                                               
10
 Ibid., p.116 
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More than any other country represented at the Commission, the representatives of the 
US opposed the creation of an international tribunal having criminal jurisdiction 
arguing that “there is no precedent, precept, practice or procedure” for this.11 They 
also objected to the proposed tribunal because of its inclusion of Heads of enemy 
states to be tried and punished for violations of the laws and customs of war and of the 
laws of humanity.
12
 
 
The objections of the US were based on its view that the Commission exceeded its 
mandate in extending individual criminal liability to violations of laws of humanity 
and that the Commission wrongly had sought to subject Heads of states to a tribunal 
which had no jurisdiction over them at the time of commission of the alleged 
offences.
13
 The US had maintained that a Head of state exercising sovereign rights is 
responsible only to those who have “confided those rights to him by consent expressed 
or implied.”14 
 
The views of the US rightly represented the position of the law in 1919. However, 
their objection to the creation of the tribunal was devoid of the dynamism of 
international rule-making. It is a rule of customary international law that states could 
come together to create rights and obligations for themselves. The only restriction on 
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 Ibid., p.142 
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 Ibid., p.144 
13
 Ibid., p.144 
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this rule is that states could not create rights and obligations for third parties without 
their consent.
15
 
 
The Treaty of Versailles heralded a new era in international criminal responsibility of 
Heads of states. Of particular importance are Articles 227 and 228 of the Treaty of 
Versailles. Article 227 provides that, 
“The Allied and Associated Powers publicly arraign 
Wilhelm II of Hohenzollern, formerly German Emperor, 
for a supreme offence against international morality and 
the sanctity of treaties. A special tribunal will be 
constituted to try the accused, thereby assuring him the 
guarantees essential to the right of defence. It will be 
composed of five judges, one appointed by each of the 
following Powers: namely, the United States of 
America, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan…The 
Allied and Associated Powers will address a request to 
the Government of the Netherlands for the surrender to 
them of the ex-Emperor in order that he may be put on 
trial.”16 
 
Article 228 further provides that, 
“The German Government recognises the right of the 
Allied and Associated Powers to bring before military 
tribunals persons accused of having committed acts in 
violation of the laws and customs of war. Such persons 
shall, if found guilty, be sentenced to punishments laid 
down by law. This provision will apply notwithstanding 
any proceedings or prosecution before a tribunal in 
Germany or in the territory of her allies.  
The German Government shall hand over to the Allied 
and Associated Powers, or to such one of them as shall 
so request, all persons accused of having committed an 
act in violation of the laws and customs of war, who are 
specified either by name or by the rank, office or 
                                               
15
 VCLT, Article 34 
16
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employment which they held under the German 
authorities.”17 
 
It is clear from the Treaty of Versailles that the Allied and Associated Powers intended 
to set up a tribunal to try the German Head of state for violations against international 
morality, the sanctity of treaties and the laws and customs of war. The tribunal 
envisaged under the Treaty was such that the international immunities of Heads of 
states would have no bearing in proceedings before the tribunal.  
 
Despite providing for the trial of Kaiser Wilhelm II by the tribunal of the Allied and 
Associated Powers, no proceedings of accountability were brought against the Kaiser.  
Bass, while commenting on the politics of war trials, mentions that there was a 
preference in some quarters for the summary execution of the Kaiser as against 
dealing with him through legal and normative standards.
18
 The inability to muster the 
necessary political will to execute Article 227 of the Treaty as well as the refusal by 
the Netherlands to surrender the Kaiser to the Allied Powers coupled with the fact that 
in 1919 there were no existing legal normative framework, outside the provisions of 
the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 dealing with war crimes,
19
 to judge the acts 
of the Kaiser meant that Kaiser Wilhelm II was not tried for his acts.  
 
Despite the provision of the Hague Conventions, the Kaiser was not to be tried for the 
commission of any war crimes, but rather he was to be tried for “a supreme offence 
                                               
17
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against international morality and the sanctity of treaties”. It is important to recognise 
that the only possible acts of the Kaiser which the tribunal proposed by the Allied and 
Associated Powers under the Treaty could have asserted jurisdiction over were acts in 
violation of the laws and customs of war as existing under the Hague Conventions.
20
  
 
No tribunal was established under the Treaty of Versailles due to a waning in political 
will on the part of the Allied and Associated Powers which was essentially brought 
about by the opposition of the US to the prospect of a war crimes trial.
21
 Germany 
proposed to try the lists of persons accused of violations of the laws and customs of 
war by the Allies before the German Supreme Court at Leipzig and this was accepted 
by the Allies in February 1920.
22
 The Leipzig trials which followed were anticlimactic 
because of disappearance of some suspects, acquittal of many accused persons, and 
the paltry punishment meted to convicted persons.
23
 In a cynical commentary about 
the efforts after WWI and the proposal for the trial of the Kaiser, Telford Taylor 
opines that the efforts could be summed up in the following words, “the mountain 
laboured and brought forth a mouse.”24 
 
However, Article 227 of the Treaty of Versailles represented a paradigm shift in 
international law because prior to 1919, there had been no efforts to set up tribunals 
for the trial of Heads of states for war crimes. In fact, a policy of exile of Heads of 
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states rather than trial for war crimes was preferred prior to 1919.
25
 In modern times, it 
has become customary to hold war crimes trials either through domestic courts or by 
establishing international court or tribunals. The trend which began with Article 227 of 
the Treaty of Versailles, but which it did not quite achieve, has been made manifest by 
the later trials of Heads of states, as will be seen in later parts of the chapter and 
subsequent chapters. 
 
The terms of the Treaty of Versailles have been criticized for its harshness.
26
 However 
harsh or imposed the terms of the Treaty of Versailles may be, it is in effect a 
contractual agreement between Germany and the Allied and Associated Powers. 
Therefore, the provision for the trial of the Kaiser which invariably implies the non-
application of the immunity of the Kaiser is an agreement between the parties to the 
Treaty. Having said this, the extent to which the Treaty of Versailles is indicative of a 
trend of non-applicability of Head of state immunity before international courts is 
limited to the nature of the Treaty as a contractual agreement. This is especially so 
when it is considered that the Heads of state of other countries other than Germany 
would not have been liable to trial in the tribunal proposed under the Treaty.  
 
Another peace treaty (Treaty of Sèvres) was signed in 1920, after WWI, between the 
Allied Powers and the Ottoman Empire.
27
 The Treaty of Sèvres provided for 
proceedings of accountability against persons from the Ottoman Empire (Turkey) 
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 Op.cit., pp.37-53 
26
 F.S. Marston, The Peace Conference of 1919: Organisation and Procedure, (London: OUP, 1944),  
p.192 
27
 [1920] U.K.T.S. 11 
223 
 
accused of the violations of the laws and customs of war after World War I. Article 
226 of the Treaty of Sèvres stated that Turkey recognised the right of the Allied 
Powers to try and punish persons responsible for the genocidal acts in Armenia. 
Further to this, Article 230 of the Treaty of Sèvres provided that, 
“The Turkish Government undertakes to hand over to 
the Allied Powers the persons whose surrender may be 
required by the latter as being responsible for the 
massacres committed during the continuance of the state 
of war on territory which formed part of the Turkish 
Empire on August 1, 1914.  
The Allied Powers reserve to themselves the right to 
designate the tribunal which shall try the persons so 
accused, and the Turkish Government undertakes to 
recognise such tribunal.  
In the event of the League of Nations having created in 
sufficient time a tribunal competent to deal with the said 
massacres, the Allied Powers reserve to themselves the 
right to bring the accused persons mentioned above 
before such tribunal, and the Turkish Government 
undertakes equally to recognise such tribunal.” 
 
Articles 226 and 230 of the Treaty of Sèvres did not expressly include the Turkish 
Head of state. However, it is arguable that the inclusion of the Head of state is implied 
in the provisions. Turkey had recognised the right of the Allied Powers to try and 
punish those responsible for the acts and had undertaken to surrender those persons to 
the Allied Powers. However, the Treaty of Sèvres was not ratified by the Ottoman 
Parliament and as a result the Treaty did not come into force.  
 
A later treaty was signed at Lausanne in 1923 between the Allies and the Ottoman 
Empire.
28
 The Treaty of Lausanne was ratified and it established the peace between 
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the warring parties. The Treaty of Sèvres did not survive the Treaty of Lausanne, 
which superseded the earlier treaty. The Treaty of Lausanne did not contain equivalent 
provisions to Article 226 and 230 of the Treaty of Sèvres. To secure the ratification of 
the Treaty of Lausanne by Turkey, the Allied Powers offered an amnesty for all 
offences committed by the Turkish between 1914 and 1922 under the Declaration of 
Amnesty.
29
  
 
Despite the agitations for the trial of senior state officials in 1919 and the 
commendable efforts seen in the wake of WWI, it was not until the end of another 
world war almost a quarter of a century later that the aspirations and ideals of the post 
WWI era would materialise. 
 
 
4.3 POST WORLD WAR II: THE CHARTERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
MILITARY TRIBUNALS  
 
It was against the backdrop of the statement of the Allied Powers that the cessation of 
hostilities against the Axis powers was to be on the basis of an unconditional surrender 
that Germany and Japan surrendered to the Allied Powers in May and August 1945, 
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respectively, bringing an end to WWII.
30
 An agreement (London Agreement) was 
reached on 8 August 1945 which provided for the prosecution and punishment of 
major war criminals in the European battle theatre of WWII.
31
 The Agreement 
envisaged the establishment of an international military tribunal to fulfil its objectives 
as well as those of the Moscow Joint Four-Nation Declaration. To this end, the 
International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg was established.
32
  
 
The Allied Powers, in a Declaration at Potsdam in July 1945 were determined to 
prosecute the Japanese for war crimes.
33
  Japan signed the Instrument of Surrender on 
2 September 1945 whereby it undertook to carry out the provisions of the Potsdam 
Declaration and the orders of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers.
34
 The 
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in the Pacific set out a Charter for the 
establishment of the IMT for the Far East (IMTFE) on 19 January 1946.
35
  
 
Article 7 of the Charter of the IMT at Nuremberg provides that, 
“The official position of defendants, whether Heads of 
state or responsible officials in government departments, 
shall not be considered as freeing them from 
responsibility or mitigating punishment.”36 
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Article 6 of the Charter of the IMTFE provided that, 
“Neither the official position, at any time, of an accused, 
nor the fact that an accused acted pursuant to order of 
his government or of a superior shall, of itself, be 
sufficient to free such accused from responsibility for 
any crime with which he is charged, but such 
circumstances may be considered in mitigation of 
punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so 
requires.”37   
 
The Allies having emerged victorious called the shots and determined how to deal 
with their enemies as well as how the course of international legal history was to be 
made.
38
 The fact that the IMTs were to try only citizens of the defeated countries has 
been one of the biggest criticisms and weaknesses of the trials at Nuremberg and 
Tokyo.
39
  
 
Having stated earlier that the source of the non-applicability of Head of state immunity 
under the Treaty of Versailles emanated from the contractual nature of the Treaty, it is 
important to consider the source of the non-applicability of Head of state immunity 
under the Charters of the Nuremberg IMT and the IMTFE.  
 
The non-applicability of Head of state immunity before the Nuremberg IMT and 
IMTFE under their Charters (Articles 7 and 6, respectively) arose from the consent of 
Germany and Japan. Whereas the consent of Japan is express in the Instrument of 
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Surrender signed by Japan,
40
 the consent of Germany is implicit in the unconditional 
surrender of Germany and the fact of occupation by the Allies. Any misgivings about 
the jurisdiction of the IMT over the German Head of state is diminished by the fact 
that the Allied Powers had warned that German officers and Nazi party members 
responsible for atrocities committed would be judged and punished.
41
 By surrendering 
unconditionally, Germany implicitly consented to the possibility of judging and 
punishing its state officials, including Head of state, by the IMT. In its judgment, the 
Nuremberg IMT stated that the Charter of the Tribunal being the source of its 
authority was, 
“…the exercise of the sovereign legislative power by the 
countries to which the German Reich unconditionally 
surrendered; and the undoubted right of these countries 
to legislate for the occupied territories has been 
recognised by the civilised world.”42 
 
Fox also opines that, 
“…with respect to the International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg, the consent of Germany would seem to 
dispense with the need for such a plea, for the Tribunal 
was established by the occupying powers exercising 
territorial jurisdiction, as the German Reich (as the 
former territorial state) had unconditionally 
surrendered.”43 
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In the judgment of the Nuremberg IMT, the Tribunal relied on Articles 227 and 228 of 
the Treaty of Versailles as precedents for the trial of German senior state officials 
including the Head of state irrespective of their international immunities.
44
 The 
Tribunal also mentioned that The Allied Powers had a right which was recognised 
under Article 228 of the Treaty of Versailles to prosecute persons accused of 
committing war crimes. While this may not be a right that existed under customary 
international law at the time, it was a right that was provided for and existed under 
conventional law as evident in the Treaty. 
 
It was submitted on behalf of the defendants before the Nuremberg Tribunal that the 
actions of individuals fell outside the remit of international law which concerns itself 
only with the actions of sovereign states.
45
 It was further argued that where the alleged 
acts are committed on behalf of the state (acts of state), that the individuals that 
performed the acts are not personally responsible since they were protected by the 
sovereignty of the state for which they acted. The Tribunal rejected this submission, 
pronouncing that, 
“Crimes against international law are committed by 
men, not abstract entities, and only by punishing 
individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions 
of international law be enforced…The principle in 
international law, which under certain circumstances, 
protects the representatives of a state, cannot be applied 
to acts which are condemned as criminal by 
international law. The authors of these acts cannot 
shelter themselves behind their official position in order 
to be freed from punishment in appropriate 
proceedings…He who violates the laws of war cannot 
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obtain immunity while acting in pursuance of the 
authority of the state if the state in authorising action 
moves outside its competence under international 
law.”46 (Emphasis added) 
 
The above judgment shows an awareness that Head of state immunity is inapplicable 
only in appropriate proceedings. For proceedings to be appropriate, they must be 
before the national courts of states of origin or states whereby the source of the 
obligation to derogate from immunity is conventional law and is binding on the parties 
involved in the proceedings.
47
 Also proceedings are appropriate if before international 
courts whose constitutive instrument effectively removes Head of state immunity and 
is binding on the parties involved.  
 
In Re Hirohita and Others, the IMTFE expressed its “unqualified adherence” to the 
opinions of the Nuremberg IMT because their Charters are essentially identical.
48
 The 
IMTFE held that, 
“There are no special rules that limit the responsibility 
for aggressive war, no matter how high or low the rank 
or status of the person promoting or taking part in 
it…”49 
 
Despite holding so, the Emperor of Japan did not face proceedings of accountability. 
The Prosecutor of the IMTFE had excluded the Emperor from the indictment of war 
criminals in Japan because of the political choice of the Allied Powers.
50
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It is interesting that the Charter of the IMTFE is the only instrument that recognises 
the possibility of considering official positions, including as Head of states, in the 
mitigation of punishment if it was so required in the interests of justice.
51
 While 
political consideration of the Allied Powers in Far East may have been the reason for 
the consideration of official positions, including as Head of states, in the assessment of 
punishment, it is submitted that to discountenance official position in the 
determination of the jurisdiction of an international court only to countenance official 
position in the assessment of punishment is flawed. This is because this approach runs 
counter to logic and is tantamount to the employment of different standards for the 
assessment of official conduct.  
 
It is an accepted principle in international law that immunity is a procedural matter 
which goes to the jurisdiction of a court and not to the substantive case and that 
immunity has nothing to do with criminal responsibility.
52
 Therefore to rely on official 
position, including as Head of state, in the assessment of punishment (which reflects 
the extent of criminal liability attaching to an act) runs counter to legal wisdom. This 
view is supported by the ILC in its Commentary to Article 7 of the Draft Code of 
Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind to the effect that, 
“The absence of any procedural immunity with respect 
to prosecution or punishment in appropriate judicial 
proceedings is an essential corollary of the absence of 
                                                                                                                                       
“…the Prosecution also made it clear that the Emperor would not be 
indicted…His immunity was, no doubt, decided upon in the best 
interests of all the Allied Powers.” 
51
 Supra 35, Article 6; and ILC Commentary to Article 7 of the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace 
and Security of Mankind 1996, (1996) Volume II YILC 15  
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any substantive immunity or defence. It would be 
paradoxical to prevent an individual from invoking his 
official position to avoid responsibility for a crime only 
to permit him to invoke this same consideration to avoid 
the consequence of this responsibility.”53 
 
The non-applicability of Head of state immunity at Nuremberg and in Tokyo was 
ground-breaking because it heralded a departure from the customary international rule. 
Also unlike previous provisions in the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, the trials at 
Nuremberg and Tokyo successfully implemented the provision in the respective 
Charters of the IMTs. However, to acknowledge the ground-breaking nature of the 
trials and to argue that the trials established generally that Heads of states could not 
rely on immunities in international proceedings involve separate issues.  
 
The relativity, determined by the Charters of the Tribunals, of the non-applicability of 
Head of state immunity to the trials at Nuremberg and Tokyo should be borne in mind. 
Where an international court is established under an agreement, a provision for non-
applicability of Head of state immunity before such international court can only be a 
term of the agreement which is binding upon the parties to the agreement.  
 
The contractual nature of agreements has been argued in the earlier section of this 
chapter to be a limitation to which Article 227 of the Treaty of Versailles is indicative 
of a new international law on Head of state immunity. However, where there is a 
supra-national organisation in a vertically structured international order, as will be 
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fully analysed in the next chapter, the non-applicability of the Head of state immunity 
extends beyond contractual law and the consent of parties.  
 
The Control Council of the Allied Powers, which was the principal legislative 
authority for Germany, on 20 December 1945, enacted Control Council Law No. 10 
for the „Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes against Peace and 
Crimes against Humanity‟ and provision was made for the establishment of national 
tribunals in Germany under the provisions of the Law.
54
 Article II, Section 4(a) of 
Control Council Law No. 10 provides, in pari materiae with Article 7 of the Charter 
of the Nuremberg IMT, against immunities of Heads of states or other Government 
official in proceedings arising before the tribunal established under Law No. 10.
55
 
 
The trials held by the tribunals established under Control Council Law No. 10 were 
peculiar. They differed from the trials by the IMT at Nuremberg in the sense that they 
were not trials held by an international tribunal. They also differed from trials held by 
national courts sitting over officials of foreign states, as was the case in the Pinochet 
trials in the UK. With the end of the WWII and the occupation of Germany by the 
Allied Powers, the Allied Control Council had taken over as the supreme legislative 
authority of Germany and as such established the tribunals under German national law 
(as made by the Control Council).  
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The source of the authority of the tribunals established under Law No. 10 regarding 
the non-applicability of immunities of Heads of states and senior German state 
officials before the tribunals established under the Law is two-fold. Firstly, there is the 
consent of Germany as contained in the unconditional surrender of Germany to the 
Allied Powers, which is essentially the same source of authority for the IMT. 
Secondly, there is the Law of military occupation as contained in Article 43 of the 
Hague Convention, as discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis.  
 
The principles of international law emanating from the Nuremberg IMT and the 
IMTFE are decidedly to the effect that Head of state immunity does not apply in 
proceedings before the IMTs only. Unfortunately, Hitler committed suicide before he 
could be brought before the Tribunal but it is clear from the prevailing sentiments at 
the time that had Hitler been alive he would have been made to face the Tribunal at 
Nuremberg for his acts. Although Emperor Hirohita was not indicted, two former 
Prime Ministers namely Tojo Hideki and Hirota Koki were indicted in the proceedings 
for crimes against the peace and were found guilty of conspiracy to wage aggressive 
war and were hanged.
56
  
 
In the aftermath of the trials by the IMTs after WWII, the UN General Assembly 
unanimously affirmed the Principles of International Law Recognised in the Charter of 
the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal.
57
 Principle III of 
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Principles of International Law Recognised in the Charter of The Nuremberg Tribunal 
and in the Judgment of the Tribunal states that, 
“The fact that an author of an act which constitutes a 
crime under international criminal law has acted in his 
capacity as Head of state or government does not release 
him from his responsibility under international law.”58 
 
As such, a trend of irrelevance of the official status of accused persons, even as Heads 
of states to criminal responsibility was initiated. This trend is established in the 
Genocide Convention 1948,
59
 the International Law Commission‟s Draft Code of 
Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind,
60
 the International Convention on 
the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid 1973,
61
 the Statutes of the 
ICTY and ICTR,
62
 and also the Rome Statute of the ICC.
63
 
 
 
4.4 JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE AND CO-OPERATION WITH 
INTERNATIONAL COURTS  
 
In national courts, the process of investigation of crimes, which includes gathering and 
giving of evidence, power to compel witnesses and evidence, arrest as well as enforce 
decisions and orders of the courts is not as problematic as in international courts. This 
is because international courts lack the enforcement machinery and capabilities of 
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50 
62
 ICTY Statute reprinted in (1993) 32 I.L.M. 1192;  ICTR Statute reprinted in (1994) 33 I.L.M. 1602 
63
 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, Article 27 
235 
 
states. The non-applicability of Head of state immunity before international courts 
would be of no effect where there are no means of securing the assistance and co-
operation of states.  
 
Furthermore, not all aspects of criminal proceedings can be conducted within the 
territory and jurisdiction of a state. In view of this, to facilitate criminal proceedings 
states enter into multilateral and bilateral agreements on international judicial 
assistance and co-operation. On the regional level, there are various multilateral 
instruments facilitating judicial co-operation like the Council of Europe (European 
Convention on Extradition 1957,
64
 and European Convention on Mutual Assistance in 
Criminal Matters 1959),
65
 the Commonwealth (Scheme Relating to Mutual Assistance 
in Criminal Matters within the Commonwealth 1986)
66
 and the Organisation of 
American States (Inter-American Convention on Extradition 1991 and the Inter-
American Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters 1992).
67
 
 
There are no equivalent agreements between states and international courts and neither 
is there in existence a rule of customary international law providing for judicial 
assistance and co-operation between states and international courts. The fact that 
international courts lack the machinery for the enforcement of warrants, orders and 
decisions as well as the vital importance of judicial assistance and co-operation in any 
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proceedings especially international proceedings make it imperative that the 
constitutive instruments of international courts make provision to this effect.
68
  
 
To avoid incapacitation of international courts as well as to ensure effective discharge 
of their objectives and functioning, it is important that states co-operate with and assist 
these courts.
69
 The absence of international enforcement machinery makes 
international courts dependent on the co-operation and assistance of states.
70
  
 
There are essentially two approaches to co-operation and judicial assistance.
71
 Firstly, 
there is the horizontal approach to co-operation whereby courts operate within a 
pluralistic international order made up of equal sovereigns. This approach follows the 
traditional means of judicial co-operation between states as evidenced in contractual 
agreements on extradition and mutual assistance. As such, the basis of the obligation 
of co-operation and assistance would be the contractual agreement entered into as an 
expression of state sovereignty. Secondly, the vertical approach envisages an 
international court to operate on a supranational level as an agency, permanent or ad 
hoc, of a supranational entity which in itself transcends state sovereignty. Such a 
supranational entity would be, for instance, the UN organisation and the source of 
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obligation of co-operation and assistance would emanate from the constitutive 
instrument of the supranational organisation. 
 
The nature of co-operation and judicial assistance between states and international 
courts is dependent on the constitutive instrument of the court.
72
 Where the obligation 
emanates from a contractual agreement, failure to co-operate could be treated as a 
breach of contract with the attendant consequences inherent in general contractual law. 
While, under the vertical theory of co-operation, the consequences of failure of a state 
to co-operate would depend on the supra-national organisation.  
 
4.4.1 JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE AND CO-OPERATION UNDER THE TREATY 
OF VERSAILLES 
The Treaty of Versailles was between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany 
and as a result the duty to render judicial assistance and co-operation to the tribunal on 
the part of states and the right to request judicial assistance and co-operation from 
states on the part of the tribunal is to be resolved by the Law of Treaties. By Articles 
34 and 35 of the VCLT, a treaty cannot create obligations or rights for third states 
without their consent and obligations for third states under a treaty may only arise 
where third states expressly accept such obligations in writing.
73
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The obligation to co-operate with and provide assistance to the tribunal proposed 
under the Treaty of Versailles redounded on Germany as well as the states forming the 
Allied and Associated Powers including France, the British empire, Russia, the US, 
etc because as parties to the Treaty they were bound by it. Article 228 of the Treaty 
expressly mentions the obligation on the part of Germany to co-operate with the 
Tribunal and render assistance as needed by the Tribunal. States not party to the 
Treaty of Versailles are not under an obligation to co-operate with or assist the 
tribunal in its functioning, and as such there could be no legal consequences for failure 
of third states to co-operate with the tribunal. Indeed, the Netherlands‟ refusal to hand 
over the Kaiser to the Allied and Associated Powers for trial is illustrative of the point. 
 
4.4.2 JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE AND CO-OPERATION UNDER THE 
CHARTERS OF THE IMTs 
Unlike the Treaty of Versailles where there was a contractual agreement between the 
Allies and the defeated power, which provided for the establishment of an 
international court and the obligation of co-operation with the court, there was no such 
contractual agreement after WWII. It is implicit in the surrender of Germany and 
explicit in that of Japan that they consented to the establishment of the Nuremberg 
IMT and the IMTFE, respectively, and the concomitant obligation to render judicial 
assistance and co-operation to the IMTs.
74
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With regard to the states which were part of the Allied Powers, the London Agreement 
was reached between the Allied Powers whereby it was agreed that the parties to the 
Agreement would take the necessary steps to assist the IMT in the investigative and 
trial processes.
75
 As for states which were not part of the Allied Powers and the 
London Agreement, they were not obligated to render judicial assistance and co-
operation to the IMT.  
 
However, the recital to the London Agreement mentions that the Allied Powers in the 
conclusion of the Agreement were to act not just on behalf of themselves but also to 
act “in the interests of all the United Nations and by their representatives duly 
authorized thereto”.76 Article 5 of the Agreement also provided for members of the 
UN who wished to adhere to the Agreement by giving notice through diplomatic 
channels of such adherence.
77
 Therefore, states which were not part of the Allied 
Powers but which had authorised the Allied Powers to conclude the Agreement in 
their interests or had adhered to the London Agreement (pursuant to Article 5) had an 
obligation to render judicial assistance and co-operation to the Nuremberg IMT. 
 
The Allied Control Council Law No. 10 provided for the establishment of parallel 
tribunals within the jurisdictions of the various Allied occupying powers. It was 
envisaged that the jurisdiction of a tribunal established pursuant to the Law, for 
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instance the US Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, was to operate aside from the IMT.
78
 
Article I of Law No. 10 made the London Agreement of 8 August 1945 an integral 
part of Law No. 10 and provided that adherence envisaged under Article 5 of the 
Agreement shall not entitle the adhering state to participation or interference in the 
operation of Law No. 10. Further to this, Article III of Law No. 10 provides 
extensively for the obligations of Zone Commanders in their respective Zones, and 
these obligations necessarily include judicial assistance and co-operation to the 
tribunals established under Law No. 10.
79
 In view of these provisions, the obligation 
of states to render judicial assistance and co-operation to the Control Council Law No. 
10 established tribunals essentially was the same as their obligation towards the 
Nuremberg IMT. 
 
The obligation of states towards the IMTFE is somewhat different. While it has been 
argued that Japan, like Germany was under an obligation to assist and co-operate with 
the Tribunal, it is important to recall that the IMTFE was established by General 
Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers. However, the 
Governments of Great Britain, the US and the USSR which constituted the Allied 
Powers were all involved in the Potsdam Declaration of July 1945,
80
 and the Moscow 
Conference of Foreign Ministers of December 1945 (establishing the Far Eastern 
Commission and the Allied Council of Japan)
81
 which gave impetus to the 
establishment of the IMTFE. As such, the Allied Powers were under an obligation to 
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assist and co-operate with the Tribunal. There is no similar provision to Article 5 of 
the London Agreement and states which are not part of the Allied Powers are not 
under any obligation, under contractual law or customary international law, to 
judicially assist and co-operate with the IMTFE. 
 
 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
 
The post World Wars era presents a mixed bag of discernible trends and precedents. 
The principles enunciated at Nuremberg and Tokyo on individual criminal 
responsibility have been enshrined in international legal instruments and have been 
upheld by case law of national courts. The trials after the World Wars show the 
viability of war crimes trials in international proceedings for accountability. Likewise, 
the trial at Tokyo, arguably, is precedent for the view that while Head of state 
immunity may not absolve accused persons from responsibility for international 
crimes, the fact of official position as Head of state may be taken into consideration in 
the mitigation of punishment. The legal wisdom of this reasoning is doubted because it 
only serves to further complicate an already complex area of law. However, legal 
wisdom and political wisdom do not necessarily occupy the same conceptual space. 
 
This chapter has shown that the constitutive instruments of the Tribunals, i.e. the 
Treaty of Versailles and the Charters of the IMTs, are the basis for the non-
applicability of Head of state immunity as well as the obligation of co-operation and 
judicial assistance with the tribunals envisaged under the instruments.  
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This chapter has also shown that it was for political and practical reasons that the 
Heads of states in the post World Wars era were not brought to trial before the 
international courts established and not because of immunity (the Netherlands refused 
to surrender Kaiser Wilhelm, the Allied Powers decided to exclude Emperor Hirohito 
from the indictment of accused persons before the IMT in the Far East and Hitler 
committed suicide).  
 
However, the non-applicability of Head of state immunity under the Treaty of 
Versailles and the Charters of the IMTs is limited to the tribunals envisaged under 
these instruments. While these practices attest to a new international law on Head of 
state immunity, it is necessarily limited to the tribunals envisaged under the Treaty of 
Versailles and the Charters of the IMTs.  
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CHAPTER 5: HEAD OF STATE IMMUNITY BEFORE 
INTERNATIONAL COURTS ESTABLISHED BY THE UNITED 
NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Prior to the establishment of the ICC in 1998, there was a marked absence of any 
international criminal adjudicatory mechanism and the UN Security Council, in the 
exercise of its powers with respect to international peace and security, resorted to the 
establishment of ad hoc international criminal tribunals to address violations of 
international humanitarian law.  
 
Despite the laudable efforts in the wake of the WWII to entrench international 
criminal accountability of Heads of states, there was a waning in international criminal 
jurisprudence in this regard. Between the years after the IMTs and the establishment 
of the ad hoc tribunals in the early to mid-1990s, no international criminal tribunals 
were established. The fact of the non-establishment of international criminal tribunals 
before the 1990s cannot be attributed to an absence of violations of international 
humanitarian law and human rights. Rather this was as a result of the Cold War and 
the resulting deadlock within the Security Council.  
 
The establishment of ad hoc international criminal tribunals by the Security Council in 
1993 and 1994 has re-vivified the idea of entrenching a culture of accountability of 
244 
 
state officials, including Heads of states, for international crimes. So far, the Security 
Council has established only two international criminal tribunals and any analysis of 
the tribunals, as well as jurisprudence arising from both tribunals, apply mutatis 
mutandis to each other. 
 
This chapter will analyse the ad hoc international criminal tribunals established by the 
Security Council to ascertain the extent to which the practice and jurisprudence of 
these tribunals are indicative of a new trend on Head of state immunity. Following the 
thematic structure of this thesis, the analysis will be against the backdrop of the 
constitutive instrument theory. The analysis in this chapter will not be complete 
without a consideration of the obligation of states to co-operate with and assist the ad 
hoc tribunals.  
 
As stated in Chapter 3, questions of legality of an adjudicatory body seeking to 
exercise jurisdiction over Heads of states necessarily implicate Head of state 
immunity. The analysis in this chapter necessitates the consideration of whether a 
political body can validly establish subsidiary organs which can exercise judicial 
functions as well as the issue of whether there are limits to the powers of the Security 
Council. If the Security Council lacks the power to establish judicial tribunals, this 
would mean that the judicial tribunals were invalidly established and could not validly 
exercise jurisdiction over Heads of states. 
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5.2 THE ICTY AND THE ICTR IN PERSPECTIVE 
 
Both the ICTY and the ICTR were established by the Security Council following the 
outbreak of ethnic hostilities. In May 1993, the Council passed Resolution 827 
formally establishing the ICTY to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations 
of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia 
between 1 January 1991 and a date to be determined by the Council upon the 
restoration of peace.
1
 In the following year, the Council passed Resolution 955,
2
 
wherein it decided, after receiving the request of the Government of Rwanda, to 
establish an international tribunal to prosecute persons responsible for genocide and 
other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of 
Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for similar acts, between 1 January 1994 
and 31 December 1994. 
 
The Council in making its decision to establish these Tribunals acted under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter after it had made a determination, under Article 39 of the 
Charter, that the situations in the Balkans and in Rwanda constituted a threat to 
international peace and security. 
 
The establishment of the ICTY and the ICTR as ad hoc tribunals, in the absence of a 
permanent international criminal court at the time, was given impetus by the end of the 
Cold War and the end of the deadlock in the Security Council which led to increased 
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accord and action by the Council in a way that was novel to the Council and to the 
international community.
3
  
 
The decision of the Security Council to establish the ad hoc tribunals in the Former 
Yugoslavia and in Rwanda was controversial. Lacking judicial powers, it was 
perceived that the Council did not have the power under the UN Charter to establish a 
judicial body. This controversy came up before the Trial Chamber of the ICTY in 
Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic.
4
  
 
In the Tadic case, the Defence filed a preliminary motion objecting to the trial on the 
basis that the ICTY lacked jurisdiction to conduct the trial.
5
 The Defence challenged 
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal on the ground that the Security Council could not 
establish a judicial body and had acted beyond its powers under the Charter by 
establishing the ICTY and adopting its Statute. It was also argued that the Tribunal 
was not established by law and could not try the accused. It is imperative to the 
discourse in this thesis that these jurisdictional challenges to the ICTY are considered 
because they are fundamental to the existence, jurisdiction and legitimacy of both the 
ICTY and the ICTR and as such impact on the issue of Head of state immunity before 
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the Tribunals and the wider question of whether there is a new international law on 
Head of state immunity. 
 
 
5.3 THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF JUDICIAL 
BODIES 
 
To ensure the functioning of the UN organisation, certain principal organs were 
formed including the Security Council, General Assembly and ICJ.
6
 These organs 
carry out various functions, and have been erroneously and crudely likened to the 
executive, legislative and judicial arms of government found within national 
government structures.
7
 
 
The UN Charter includes the maintenance of international peace and security among 
the purposes of the organisation.
8
 The mandate to fulfil this primary purpose is 
conferred on the Security Council by UN members.
9
 The Security Council enjoys very 
broad powers under the Charter and its discretion in the fulfilment of its obligation 
with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security is equally very 
broad. The extensive nature of the power and discretion of the Council can be deduced 
from Article 39 of the Charter which empowers the Council to make a determination 
that there has occurred a threat to or breach of the peace or an act of aggression and 
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also empowers the Council to decide the measures to take to maintain or restore 
international peace and security.
10
  
 
Despite its description as an “institutional chameleon”,11 the Council is a political 
body and as such it must be considered whether a political body can validly establish 
subsidiary organs which can exercise judicial functions.  
 
Harper argues that determinations of a threat to or breach of the peace or act of 
aggression are “political questions” involving “political realities” as against normative 
legal issues.
12
  As such, the Council is well posed as a political body to deal with 
matters in the realm of politics. This thesis shall not concern itself with the validity or 
propriety of the Security Council making legal determinations, rather the important 
issue that comes up for consideration within the scope of the thesis is whether the 
Council can validly establish judicial bodies which can apply normative legal rules in 
the determination of the matters arising before the bodies. 
 
The determination of an existence of a state of affairs under Article 39 of the UN 
Charter involves political considerations and fall within the competence of the 
Security Council, as a political body. However, in the Tadic case, the Defence argued 
that it was not envisaged under the UN Charter that the Council could, while acting 
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under Chapter VII, establish a judicial body and that a political organ like the Council 
could not validly establish an independent and impartial judicial body.
13
  
 
The primary responsibility of the Security Council under the Charter is expressed in 
Article 24 to be the “maintenance of international peace and security”.14  The powers 
of the Council are determined by its primary responsibility. As stated earlier, the 
responsibility of maintaining international peace and security is extensive and the 
Council is equally given extensive discretion and powers to carry out this 
responsibility. This prompts the question whether there are limits to the powers of the 
Council. If there are limits to the powers of the Council and they are such that affect 
the legality of the establishment of the ICTY(R) then this would have consequences 
for Head of state immunity before these Tribunals. 
 
It may be attractive and even somewhat tempting to argue that the Security Council 
enjoys unfettered powers in the fulfilment of its primary responsibility. However, this 
would result in an oversimplification of the matter and such a view would be 
expressed without the contextual benefit of the UN Charter.  
 
The UN Charter expressly provides in Article 24(2) that in the discharge of its duties 
that the Council shall act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN.
15
 
This, without doubt, is a limitation on the powers of the Council. While the powers of 
the Council may be extensive, they must be exercised within the framework of the 
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purposes and principles of the UN. Where the Council acts outside the purposes and 
principles of the UN, then the Council must be deemed to have acted ultra vires its 
powers. This begs the question- what are the purposes and principles of the UN?  
 
The purposes of the UN include the maintenance of international peace and security, 
the development of friendly relations among nations and strengthening of universal 
peace, the achievement of international co-operation in solving international problems, 
and the harmonisation of actions of nations in the attainment of these ends.
16
 The 
principles of the UN include sovereign equality, good faith towards international 
obligations, peaceful settlement of disputes, and the refrainment from the threat or use 
of force in international relations.
17
  
 
The identifiable purposes and principles of the UN provide substantive limits to the 
powers of the Council. In view of the purposes and principles of the UN, it is clear that 
the establishment of an ad hoc international criminal tribunal like the ICTY and the 
ICTR is not beyond the powers of the Council but rather furthers the purposes and 
principles of the Charter. Suffice it to re-state that the Council had made a 
determination that the situations in the Balkans and Rwanda were threats to 
international peace and security in those regions.
18
  
 
The powers of the Security Council, under the Charter, are exercisable not just within 
the substantive boundaries of the Charter but also under general international law 
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 Ibid., Article 2 
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including existing peremptory norms of international law (jus cogens) and human 
rights.
19
 For instance, the Council will be acting ultra vires its powers if in the 
fulfilment of its responsibility towards international peace and security it authorises 
the commission of acts of torture by state officials.
20
 It cannot remotely be maintained 
that the Council, by the establishment of the ICTY(R) acted in violation of any jus 
cogens norm or human rights.  
 
In view of the fact that the establishment of the ICTY furthers the purposes and 
principles of the UN as well as the fact that by the establishment of the Tribunals that 
the Council did not act in violation of general international law, it becomes difficult to 
see how the Council acted beyond its powers under the Charter, as contended by the 
Defence in the Tadic case.
21
 
 
Having established that the Council did not act ultra vires its powers under the Charter 
by establishing an international criminal tribunal under Chapter VII of the Charter, it 
is necessary to consider what the Council can legally do under Chapter VII of the 
Charter.  
 
Traditionally the actions of the Council under Chapter VII after it has made a 
determination of the existence of a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act 
                                               
19
 Dapo Akande, „The International Court of Justice and the Security Council: Is there Room for 
Judicial Control of Decision of the Political Organs of the United Nations‟, (1997) 46 ICLQ 309, at 
pp.314-325; see also Derek W. Bowett, „The Impact of Security Council Decisions on Dispute 
Settlement Procedures‟, (1995) 5 EJIL 89, p.92-93 and Andreas Paulus, „Article 29‟, in Bruno Simma, 
etal (edited), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 2
nd
 edition, Vol. II, (Oxford: 
University Press, 2002), p.541 
20
 The prohibition against torture is generally accepted as a jus cogens norm, see Chapter 2 of thesis. 
21
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of aggression, have involved either economic sanctions or non-military action,
22
 and 
military enforcement action,
23
 with a view towards the maintenance or restoration of 
international peace and security. However the end of the Cold war brought about a 
more cohesive Security Council and an increasing awareness of a culture of 
accountability especially for international crimes. This inspired the Council to break 
out of its mould to utilise, in a novel way, its powers under Chapter VII of the Charter. 
The novel utilisation of Chapter VII powers of the Council is no more evident than in 
the establishment of the ICTY and the ICTR. 
 
The departure from the traditional uses of Chapter VII powers of the Council, evident 
in the establishment of the ICTY and the ICTR, must be considered with a view to 
ascertaining whether this departure is inconsistent with Chapter VII of the Charter. 
This goes to answering the question put forward by the Defence in the Tadic case, i.e. 
whether the Council as political organ could validly establish a judicial body.  
 
In the formation of the UN organisation, it was envisaged that the ICJ would be its 
principal judicial organ.
24
 The jurisdiction of the ICJ does not extend to criminal 
matters and only states can be parties to disputes before the ICJ.
25
 As such, the 
Council was not usurping the competence of the ICJ, a competence that the Court did 
not have in the first place. Furthermore, the absence, at the time, of a permanent 
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international criminal court to address impunity was such that warranted the 
establishment of international tribunals on an ad hoc basis.  
 
5.3.1 THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SUBSIDIARY ORGANS UNDER THE UN 
CHARTER  
Article 29 of the Charter expressly empowers the Security Council, 
 “to establish such subsidiary organs as it deems 
necessary for the performance of its 
functions.”(Emphasis added) 
 
From a textual reading of the provision of Article 29, it is clear, firstly, that the 
Council has the power to establish a subsidiary organ. Secondly, the subsidiary organ 
need not be of the same nature as the Council, i.e. a political organ, so long as the 
nature of the subsidiary organ is such that makes the organ necessary for the 
performance of the functions of the Council.  
 
The functioning of the ICTY and the ICTR is consistent with the functions of the 
Council which is the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security. 
This is because the Tribunals are instrumental in addressing impunity, safe-guarding 
the rights and freedoms of individuals and, ultimately, they assist in the achievement 
of peace in transitional societies. The Nuremberg and Far East trials after WWII 
underscore the importance of prosecutions for the violations of international 
humanitarian law in societies transiting from war to peace. 
 
254 
 
Furthermore, Article 7(2) of the Charter contains a broad provision that “subsidiary 
organs as may be found necessary may be established in accordance with the present 
Charter.” The provision gives the enumerated organs of the UN in Article 7(1), 
including the Security Council, the power to establish subsidiary organs. Whereas 
Article 7(2) generally provides for the establishment of subsidiary organs, the 
authority in Article 29 is specific to the Security Council.
26
   
 
Sarooshi argues that by Article 29, the Council can only establish subsidiary organs to 
perform the functions of the Council while Article 7(2) does not import any 
“functional limitation” as regards the type of subsidiary organ that may be 
established.
27
 Sarooshi‟s view is that the authority in Article 7(2) is more extensive 
than that in Article 29 because of a perceived „functional limitation‟ in Article 29. This 
is because while Article 29 specifically applies to the Security Council and states that 
the subsidiary organ to be established by the Council must be deemed to be necessary 
for the performance of its functions, Article 7(2) only mentions that the establishment 
of the organ is to be in accordance with the Charter.  According to him, “subsidiary 
organs may be established under Article 7(2) to perform functions which the Council 
cannot itself perform.”28  
 
It is submitted that the words employed in the drafting of the provisions as well as the 
practical effect of the purport of the provisions do not support Sarooshi‟s contention. 
                                               
26
 See Article 22, supra 6, which is specific to the General Assembly. 
27
 Danesh Sarooshi, The United Nations and the Development of Collective Security: The Delegation by 
the UN Security Council of its Chapter VII Powers, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), p.92-93 
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255 
 
There is nothing in the wording of Article 29 that limits a subsidiary organ established 
by the Security Council to the particular functions of the Council. Under Article 29, 
the functions of the subsidiary organ are not limited to the functions of the Council so 
long as the functions of the subsidiary organ are necessary for the performance of the 
Council‟s own functions. It would be unnecessary for the Council to establish a 
subsidiary organ of the same nature as the Council. The provision empowers the 
Council to establish organs which exercise complementary functions to that of the 
Council. Any interpretation to the contrary would be incompatible with the express 
provisions of Article 29.
29
 Furthermore, there is a necessity requirement by Article 
7(2) in the establishment of subsidiary organs, i.e. the contemplated subsidiary organ 
must be one which “may be found necessary” by the principal organ. This, in effect, is 
a „functional limitation‟ in Article 7(2). 
 
It is difficult to accept Sarooshi‟s argument that the Council did not establish the 
ICTY(R) under the authority contained in Article 29 of the UN Charter because by 
establishing the Tribunals, the Council was not delegating the performance of its own 
functions to the Tribunals.
30
 Moreover, the Secretary General‟s Report pursuant to 
Paragraph 2 of Resolution 808 which sets the legal basis for the establishment of the 
                                               
29
 Paulus, supra 19, p.541. Paulus analyses the ICJ approach to the authority under the Charter to 
establish subsidiary organs, in the Effect of the Awards of Compensation made by the UN 
Administrative Tribunal case and in the Application for Review of Judgment No.158 of the UN 
Administrative Tribunal, in (1954) I.C.J. Reports 47 and (1973) I.C.J. Reports 166, respectively. He 
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organ, like the Security Council, possesses implied or express substantive competence to establish a 
subsidiary organ like the ICTY. 
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ICTY mentions that the ICTY was established as a subsidiary organ under Article 29 
of the Charter.
31
 
 
It would also be a misinterpretation of the Charter to argue that the general authority to 
establish a subsidiary organ in Article 7(2) of the Charter extends to the achievement 
of the purposes and principles of the UN while the specific authority in Article 29 is 
applicable only with regard to the functions of the Security Council. Article 7(2) 
merely states that subsidiary organs may be established in accordance with the 
Charter.  It goes without saying that the establishment by the Council of an organ 
under Article 29 must also be in accordance with the Charter. Any subsidiary organ 
established, whether under Article 7(2) or Article 29, must be towards the 
achievement of the purposes and principles of the Charter. The practical effect of both 
provisions is that Article 29 is specific only with regard to its application to the 
Security Council and not in any other way.  
 
The authority to establish a subsidiary organ under Articles 7(2) and 29 are 
complementary and the combined effect of both provisions is that the Security Council 
may establish a judicial body as a subsidiary organ to enable it achieve the fulfilment 
of its primary responsibility and this must be done in accordance with the Charter.  
 
The Council‟s primary responsibility, its functions and competence are with regard to 
the maintenance and restoration of international peace and security. Therefore, 
although the Council is a political body possessing no judicial functions, it can 
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establish judicial bodies like the ICTY and ICTR where it considers such Tribunals 
necessary for the restoration or maintenance of international peace and security.
32
 The 
ICJ in its Advisory Opinion in the Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of 
the UN stated that, 
“Under international law, the Organisation must be 
deemed to have those powers which, though not 
expressly provided in the Charter, are conferred upon it 
by necessary implication as being essential to the 
performance of its duties.”33  
 
In the Effect of the Awards of Compensation made by the UN Administrative Tribunal 
case,
34
 the ICJ found that in the determination of the legal power of the General 
Assembly to establish a tribunal competent to render judgments binding on the UN 
that it was necessary to consider whether the Assembly had the power to establish the 
tribunal under the Charter. The Court was of the opinion that it was inevitable that 
there would be disputes between the UN organisation and its staff as to contractual 
rights and duties, and as such the General Assembly had the power and the legal 
capacity to establish the Administrative Tribunal to settle disputes between the 
organisation and its staff.
35
  
 
The ICJ also maintained this view in its Advisory Opinion on the Application for 
Review of Judgment No.158 of the UN Administrative Tribunal.
36
 In this case, the 
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Court was of the opinion that the purpose of the general authority and the specific 
authority, under the Charter, to establish subsidiary organs is to facilitate the effective 
functioning as well as the achievement of the purposes of the UN. The Court stated 
that, 
“Accordingly, to place a restrictive interpretation on the 
power of the General Assembly to establish subsidiary 
organs would run contrary to the clear intention of the 
Charter. Article 22, indeed, specifically leaves it to the 
General Assembly to appreciate the need for any 
particular organ, and the sole restriction placed by that 
Article on the General Assembly‟s power to establish 
subsidiary organs is that they should be “necessary for 
the performance of its functions.”37 
 
The general authority in Article 7(2) of the Charter must, therefore, be read subject to 
the specific authority in Article 22 (with regard to the General Assembly) and in 
Article 29 (with regard to the Security Council). This view is supported by the 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Hackworth in the Effect of the Awards of Compensation 
made by the UN Administrative Tribunal,
38
 who argued that, 
“The statement “in accordance with the present Charter” 
[under Article 7(2)] is given definite expression in 
Articles 22 and 29 by which the General Assembly and 
the Security Council, respectively, are authorised to 
establish subsidiary organs…It must be concluded, 
therefore, that when the General Assembly approved the 
Statute creating the Administrative Tribunal it did so in 
the exercise of its authority under Article 22. Nowhere 
else in the Charter is any such authorisation to be found. 
And nowhere else in the Charter can there be found any 
authorisation, express or implied, for the establishment 
by the General Assembly of any other kind of organ be 
it judicial, quasi judicial or non-judicial.”39 
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Therefore, it is submitted that in the decision to establish the ICTY and the ICTR as 
subsidiary organs, the Security Council acted under Article 29 of the Charter.  
 
The source of the authority of the Council to establish a subsidiary organ like the 
ICTY and the ICTR is different from the substantive competence of the Council to 
establish the Tribunals. The powers to be given to a subsidiary organ must be such that 
the principal organ possesses expressly or impliedly. To this end, a principal organ can 
establish a subsidiary organ to perform functions which the principal organ can or 
cannot perform by itself, so long as the functions of the subsidiary fall within the 
competence of the principal organ. The source of the substantive competence, express 
or implied, must be found within the general competence of the Council. Bowett 
argues that, 
“[A] Resolution which contemplates a subsidiary organ 
with a given function has to find its constitutional basis 
first and foremost in the article justifying the function- 
and not in an article giving general power to establish 
subsidiary organs.”40 
 
According to Sarooshi, 
“The principal organ must itself possess either the 
express or implied powers which it seeks to delegate to 
its subsidiary…this does not preclude a principal organ 
from possessing an implied power to establish a 
subsidiary organ to exercise functions which it does not 
itself possess. In such a case, the power to establish such 
a subsidiary organ may even be implied from the general 
competence of the principal to operate in the particular 
area…”41 
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The general competence of the Council is found in Article 24 of the UN Charter. 
Article 24 in outlining the functions and powers of the Council gives it primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The substantive 
competence of the Council to establish the ICTY and the ICTR, as means for the 
restoration of international peace and security can be implied from Article 24 of the 
Charter. Therefore the constitutional basis for the establishment of the ICTY and the 
ICTR is Article 24 of the Charter. 
 
5.3.2 JUDICIAL REVIEW OF SECURITY COUNCIL DECISIONS AND 
OTHER MATTERS ARISING IN THE TADIC CASE 
In the Tadic case, the Defence argued that Chapter VII of the UN Charter does not 
authorise the Security Council to create a judicial body as a measure to address a 
threat to international peace and security and that as such, the Council had exceeded 
its powers.
42
 The consideration of this argument necessarily involves the review of 
decisions of the Council. 
 
The Prosecutor had argued before the Trial Chamber that the ICTY lacked the 
authority to review its establishment by the Council and that this review necessarily 
involved political questions which were non-justiciable. Despite the conservative 
approach of the Trial Chamber that the Tribunal lacked the power to review Council 
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decisions,
43
 the Trial Chamber still went on to justify the establishment of the 
Tribunal, which invariably was a review of the decision of the Council to establish the 
Tribunal.  
 
The Appeal Chamber did not feel so constrained in the matter. The Appeal Chamber 
stated that it is inherent in the jurisdiction of a judicial tribunal to determine its own 
jurisdiction.
44
  
 
The round-about approach of the Trial Chamber was not necessary since the challenge 
to the jurisdiction of the ICTY involved an interpretation of the functions and powers 
of the Security Council under the UN Charter. The Charter is a treaty and the ICTY, as 
a judicial body, is competent to answer questions involving the interpretation of a 
legal instrument like the Charter. Although the Council is a political body which is 
influenced by political considerations, the decision to establish an international 
tribunal as a means to restore or maintain international peace and security (irrespective 
of whatever political considerations that might have influenced the decision) is one 
that involves a legal question which the Tribunal could not have rightly absolved itself 
from.
45
 The legal question involved is centred on the interpretation of the provisions of 
the Charter, particularly Article 24 and Chapter VII. 
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It was further contended by the Defence that the Council had been inconsistent in the 
creation of international tribunals because it had not taken the same steps it took with 
regards to the former Yugoslavia in the case of other countries where violations of 
international humanitarian law had occurred in the course of armed conflict.
46
  
 
The inconsistency of the Council in the creation of international criminal tribunals in 
other instances where violations of international humanitarian law had occurred is 
merely factual. It does not go the legality of the establishment of the ICTY or its 
jurisdiction. The Council is a political body; its decisions and actions are determined 
by political considerations which make consistency and uniformity in the practice of 
the Council an unattainable ideal. The practical effect of the contention of the Defence 
can be likened to the challenge of the jurisdiction of a court by an accused person 
simply because criminal proceedings were not instituted against other persons who 
had committed the same crime as the accused. 
 
The Defence also challenged the ability of international tribunals to promote 
international peace and security.
47
 The question of the ability of international criminal 
tribunals to promote international peace and stability is one that lies within the broad 
discretion of the Security Council to make. Under Article 29 of the Charter, the 
                                                                                                                                       
of things it could not be otherwise. The Court, however, cannot 
attribute a political character to a request which invites it to 
undertake an essentially judicial task, namely, the interpretation of a 
treaty provision.” 
46
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decision of the Council to establish a subsidiary organ and the necessity of the 
subsidiary organ to be established are within the broad discretion of the Council.  
 
The ICJ in the Review of Judgment case recognised that the object of Articles 7(2) and 
22 of the Charter is to actuate the accomplishment of the purposes of the UN and its 
effective functioning.
48
 The ICJ stated that it would be antithetical to the intention of 
the Charter to restrictively interpret the power of the General Assembly under Article 
22.
49
 This is no truer for the General Assembly than it is for the Security Council. 
Therefore, the power of the Council to establish the ICTY as its subsidiary organ 
which would contribute to ending the commission of war crimes as well as the 
restoration of peace in that region, should not be restrictively interpreted.  
 
The decision by the Council to establish the Tribunal and the suitability of this 
decision as a means of restoring or maintaining international peace and security fall 
within the broad discretion of the Council. Elsewhere, the Council had stated its 
conviction that in the particular circumstances of the former Yugoslavia that the 
establishment of the ICTY would contribute to the restoration and maintenance of 
peace.
50
 These determinations are clearly political determinations which the Council is 
well suited to make. The suitability of the Tribunal as a means for the restoration or 
maintenance of international peace and security is a „matter of strict political 
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appreciation‟ one that is not reviewable by the Tribunal because there are no legal 
standards to adjudge the decision.
51
  
 
More importantly, Article 39 of the Charter leaves the choice of measures in the 
restoration or maintenance of international peace and security, including the non-
exhaustive provision of Article 41 and the provision of Article 42, open to the 
Council.
52
 Likewise any necessary assessment of the measures to be taken in the 
restoration or maintenance of international peace and security is left to the Council.  
 
In Prosecutor v. Joseph Kanyabashi,
53
 the Defence challenged the competence of the 
Council to establish the ICTR by contending that the conflict in Rwanda was not a 
threat to international peace and security. The Trial Chamber held that, 
“Although bound by the provisions in Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter and in particular Article 39 of the Charter, 
the Security Council has a wide margin of discretion in 
deciding when and where there exists a threat to 
international peace and security. By their very nature, 
however, such discretionary assessments are not 
justiciable since they involve the consideration of a 
number of social, political and circumstantial factors 
which cannot be weighed and balanced objectively by 
this Trial Chamber.”54 
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The fact that the conflict in Rwanda was internal did not mean that international peace 
and security were unaffected, especially in view of the resulting displacement of 
persons and the refugee situation. Moreover, the Council is not constrained in 
determining the existence of a threat to international peace and security by the internal 
or international nature of a conflict.  
 
It was also contended by Kanyabashi that international peace and security had already 
been re-established by the time the Council established the ICTR and that the 
establishment of an ad hoc tribunal was never a measure contemplated by Article 41 
of the Charter.
55
  
 
By Article 24 of the Charter, the decision that there is a threat to international peace 
and likewise the decision that international peace and security has been restored is the 
sole preserve of the Council.  Since the Council had not made the decision that 
international peace and security had been restored in Rwanda but rather chose to 
establish the ICTR as a measure to restore peace, it would be tantamount to the 
usurpation of the responsibility of the Council as well as the pre-emption of a decision 
of the Council to decide that international peace had been restored in Rwanda when 
the Council had made no decision to that effect. 
 
The contention that the establishment of an ad hoc tribunal was never a measure 
contemplated by Article 41 of the Charter is misplaced. While Article 41 does not 
mention the establishment of judicial bodies as part of the non-military measures, it 
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does not exclude the establishment of such bodies.
56
 This is because the range of 
actions under Article 41, including complete or partial interruption of economic 
relations and of both transportation and communication means as well as the 
severance of diplomatic relations, are only illustrative of the types of non-military 
actions that may be employed. The list was not intended to be a closed list that is 
exhaustive of the actions that may be taken under Article 41 and the use of the word 
„include‟ in the drafting of the provision supports this view.    
 
5.3.2.1 ARE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS ESTABLISHED BY THE 
SECURITY COUNCIL ESTABLISHED BY LAW? 
Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
provides that, 
“In the determination of any criminal charge against 
him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, 
everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by 
a competent, independent and impartial tribunal 
established by law”.57 
 
This prompts the question of whether the ICTY was established by law, a question 
which was raised by Defence in the Tadic case.
58
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The fact is that the ICTY was established by a Resolution of the Security Council. If 
the establishment of the Tribunal does not meet the requirement of Article 14 of the 
ICCPR then this will have grave implications for the Tribunal and the trials of Heads 
of state. This is because one of the limits of the Council in the exercise of its functions 
is that it must comply with general international law including human rights norms; 
and the requirement that an accused person is tried by a court that is established by 
law is a fundamental human right.  
 
The ICTY Appeals Chamber was of the opinion that the internationally accepted 
standard that the right of an individual to have a criminal charge against him 
determined by a tribunal established by law applied more to national settings where 
there is a legislature and clear division of powers and functions between the various 
arms of government than in proceedings before an international court. The Chamber 
also considered that the „established by law‟ requirement means that the establishing 
body, where not a Parliament, has the power to take binding decisions and also that 
establishment of the Tribunal must be in accordance with the rule of law.
59
 
 
The approach to the issue from the perspective that the „established by law‟ 
requirement is applicable to national legal systems which have legislatures is 
misconceived. The political structure of states is such that not every national setting 
operates a system of government where there is a legislature with clear division of 
powers and functions amongst the various arms of government. Judicial tribunals 
established under military governments are not established by law emanating from 
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legislatures. This does not mean that such tribunals are invalid for not meeting the 
international requirement of establishment by law.  
 
Unlike the ICCPR, European Convention on Human Rights and the American 
Convention on Human Rights, the phrase „established by law‟ is absent from the 
African Charter on Human and People‟s Rights concerning the rights of accused 
persons.
60
 Article 7(1) of the African Charter provides that, 
“Every individual shall have the right to have his cause 
heard. This comprises: ....(d) the right to be tried within 
a reasonable time by an impartial court or tribunal.”61 
 
The requirement that a tribunal deciding the criminal liability of individuals is to be 
established by law is better considered from the perspective of whether the tribunal is 
duly established. A tribunal is duly established where the establishing body possesses 
the authority and power necessary for its establishment. This approach does away with 
the tenuous distinction of the existence of legislatures at the national level and its non-
existence at the international level. In essence, a judicial tribunal either at the national 
or international level is established by law if the formal requisites for its due 
establishment have been complied with by a body possessing the authority and power 
to establish the tribunal.  
 
As such, in a state under democratic government the formal requisite for the 
establishment of a judicial tribunal would involve the acts of the legislature and 
executive arms of government. In a state under a military government the due 
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establishment of a tribunal would proceed from an order or edict of the military 
government. Likewise the due establishment of an international tribunal like the ICTY 
would proceed from the Resolution of the Security Council which has met the 
procedural requirement in the voting process. While for an international court 
established by treaty like the ICC, the due establishment of the Court would be 
through the conclusion and ratification of a multilateral treaty by the contracting 
states. 
 
The Secretary-General, in his Report leading up to the establishment of the ICTY, 
averted his mind to the fundamental nature of human rights in the functioning of the 
Tribunal, especially Article 14(1) of the ICCPR.
62
 The ICTY Appeals Chamber in 
considering whether the ICTY was established by law also mentioned the fair trial 
guarantees contained in the Statute of the Tribunal and the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence before the Tribunal.
63
 However, the fact of the acknowledgement of the 
importance of fair trial as a human right standard in the establishment of the ICTY and 
also the fact that the Statute of the ICTY and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
contain provisions entrenching fair trial and human rights standards does not address 
the important issue of whether the ICTY was established by law.
64
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The Appeal Chamber should have resolved the issue on the strength of the authority of 
the Security Council under the UN Charter to establish a judicial body as a subsidiary 
organ as a measure for the restoration or maintenance of international peace and 
security as well as the compliance of Resolution 827 with the formal requisites for 
passing a resolution.
65
  
 
It has been established, in this chapter, that the Council had the authority to establish 
the ICTY, and Resolution 827 establishing the Tribunal was adopted without a vote by 
general agreement of the 15 members of the Council.
66
 In view of these, the ICTY met 
the formal requisites for its establishment from the appropriate authority and therefore 
was duly established. 
 
This section has established that the Security Council can establish a judicial body, 
that by the establishment of the ICTY and the ICTR the Council did not act in excess 
of its powers;  and that the fact that such a tribunal is established under a resolution of 
the Council does not mean that the tribunal is not validly established. Having 
established the foregoing, it becomes apposite to consider whether there is Head of 
state immunity before these tribunals which will determine the inquiry into whether 
there is a new international law on immunity emerging from the jurisprudence of the 
ICTY/ICTR. 
                                               
65
 See UN Charter, supra 6, Article 27 on the voting procedure of the Council. 
66
 See William Schabas, The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda 
and Sierra Leone, (Cambridge: CUP, 2006), p.4 
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5.4 HEAD OF STATE IMMUNITY BEFORE THE ICTY AND THE ICTR 
The Statutes of the ICTY and the ICTR provide that, 
“The official position of any accused person, whether as 
Head of state or government or as a responsible 
government official, shall not relieve that person of 
criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment”.67 
The ICTY and ICTR Statutes must be interpreted against the backdrop of the decision 
of the Security Council to establish the Tribunals under Chapter VII of the Charter as a 
measure to restore international peace and security in the concerned regions.
68
 A 
consideration of the implications of the decision by the Council to act under Chapter 
VII is imperative to ascertain the applicability or otherwise of immunities of Heads of 
states before the Tribunals and the obligation of states to co-operate with the 
Tribunals. 
Chapter VII of the Charter provides that the Council may take a range of non-military 
and military actions under Articles 41 and 42 after it has made the necessary 
determination under Article 39. As stated earlier, the list of actions specified under 
Chapter VII is not a closed one and by Article 25, UN members are bound by the 
decisions of the Council, having agreed to “accept and carry out the decisions of the 
Security Council”.69 This means that by the instrumentality of Article 25, UN 
members consent to submit their sovereign prerogatives to the decisions of the 
                                               
67
 Article 7(2) of the ICTY Statute reprinted in (1993) 32 I.L.M. 1192; Article 6(2) of the ICTR Statute, 
reprinted in (1994) 33 I.L.M. 1602 
68
 S/RES/827 (1993) and S/RES/955 (1994) 
69
 Supra 6 
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Security Council taken under Chapter VII. Having so consented, members recognise 
that, by Article 103 of the Charter, their obligations under the Charter prevail over 
other international obligations.
70
  
By the combined effect of Articles 25 and 103 of the Charter, the obligation of states 
towards the Council supersedes the obligation of states under customary international 
law to respect the immunities of Heads of states as well as the prerogative to assert 
these immunities before the international tribunals established by the Council under 
Chapter VII.
71
  
The ICTY indicted Slobodan Milosevic, when he was a serving President of the 
FRY.
72
 Unfortunately, the untimely death of Milosevic put an end to his trial. 
However in the preliminary motions before the Trial Chamber Milosevic had argued 
that the ICTY is an illegal body because the Council lacked the power to establish 
such a Tribunal and also contended that he was not amenable to the jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal because of his former status as President of the FRY.
73
  
The Trial Chamber addressed Milosevic‟s objections by reference to the Tadic case 
and following the decision of the Appeals Chamber in Tadic, the Trial Chamber 
                                               
70
 Ibid., Article 103 provides that, 
“In the event of a conflict between the obligations of Members of 
the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations 
under any other international agreement, their obligations under the 
present Charter shall prevail.” 
71
 See Report of the Secretary-General, supra  31, paragraph 23 where it was recognised that a decision 
to establish the ICTY under Chapter VII would mean that “…all states would be under a binding 
obligation to take whatever action is required to carry out a decision taken as an enforcement measure 
under Chapter VII.” 
72
 Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic etal, Case No. IT-99-37, indictment available at www.un.org/icty  
73
 Prosecutor v. Milosevic (Trial Chamber Decision on Preliminary Motions, Decision of 8 November 
2001), paragraphs 26-34, available at www.un.org/icty. See also André Klip and Göran Sluiter (edited), 
Annotated Leading Cases of International Criminal Tribunals, Volume VIII: The International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 2001-2002, (Antwerp-Oxford: Intersentia, 2005), pp.20-21 
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concluded that the establishment of the ICTY was within the powers of the Council 
under Chapter VII (Article 41) to restore or maintain international peace and 
security.
74
 
With regard to the issue of the former status of Milosevic as President and the question 
of immunities of Heads of states before the ICTY, the Trial Chamber stated that 
Article 7(2) of the Statute of the ICTY is reflective of customary international law and 
is supported by the legacy of the IMTs for Nuremberg and the Far East, various 
international instruments as well as the Pinochet case and the conviction of the former 
Prime Minister of Rwanda by the ICTR.
75
  
There is no express pronouncement by the Appeals Chamber in the Milosevic case on 
the issue of Head of state immunity. The Appeals Chamber had stated in another case 
that,
 76
 
“It may be the case (it is unnecessary to decide here) 
that, between states, such a functional immunity exists 
against prosecution for those acts, but it would be 
incorrect to suggest that such an immunity exists in 
international criminal courts.
 
The Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg denied 
such an immunity to “Heads of state or responsible 
officials in government departments”, as does this 
Tribunal‟s Statute.” 
The cursory consideration of the issue by the Trial Chamber is fraught with 
assumptions rather than adequate analysis. The Trial Chamber assumed the customary 
law status of Article 7(2) of the ICTY Statute, a tendency that is not peculiar to the 
                                               
74
 Ibid., Paragraphs 5-7 
75
 Ibid., Paragraphs 26-33 
76
 See Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic, Case No IT-98-33-A, Appeal Chamber Decision of 1 July 2003, 
Paragraph 26 
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Tribunal but is common with commentators.
77
 A weakness with this approach is that 
of generalisation without proper analysis of the issue. 
 Articles 7(2) and 6(2) of the Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR, respectively, provide for 
the criminal responsibility of Heads of states in circumstances where the immunities 
ordinarily available to such persons have been effectively removed. Likewise, the 
provisions of Article 7 of the Charter of the IMT at Nuremberg, Article 6 of the 
Charter of the IMT for the Far East and various international treaties including the 
Rome Statute of the ICC provide for the criminal responsibility of Heads of states in 
circumstances where there has been effective removal of immunities.
78
 
It is submitted that the nature of the constitutive instruments of the ICTY and ICTR, as 
a Chapter VII decision of the UN Security Council, as well as the combined effect of 
Articles 25 and 103 of the UN Charter effectively remove the Head of state immunity 
of UN members before the ICTY and the ICTR. The general membership of states in 
the UN makes Articles 7(2) and 6(2) of the Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR, 
respectively, binding upon all states. The conventional law contained in the provisions 
assume customary international law status as a result. However recognition of the 
customary law status of the criminal responsibility of Heads of states irrespective of 
their official position does not mean that Head of state immunity is inapplicable for 
international crimes. Recourse is had to the statement of the ICJ in the Arrest Warrant 
                                               
77
 See for instance, Yusuf Aksar, Implementing International Humanitarian Law: From the Ad Hoc 
Tribunal to a Permanent International Criminal Court, (London: Routledge Press, 2004), p.94 
78
 For analysis of immunities before the IMTs, see Chapter 4 of thesis; for analysis of criminal liability 
of Heads of states under international treaties, see Chapters 2 and 3 of thesis; and for analysis of 
immunities before the ICC, see Chapter 6. 
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case that immunities may not bar criminal proceedings before certain international 
criminal courts.
 79
   
The ability of the Security Council to remove Head of state immunity before the 
international tribunals established under Chapter VII is inherent in the powers of the 
Council under the Charter and the express provisions of Articles 25 and 103 of the 
Charter. Therefore, the non-applicability of Head of state immunity before the ICTY 
and ICTR is as a result of the constitutive instrument theory. 
Reliance by the Trial Chamber on the Pinochet decision as a basis for its decision that 
Milosevic was not immune from the jurisdiction of the ICTY is diminished by the 
difference in the basis of jurisdiction of the Tribunal and that of the House of Lords. 
The jurisdiction of the Tribunal over Milosevic arose under Resolution 827 and the 
UN Charter while the jurisdiction of the House of Lords over Pinochet arose under the 
Convention against Torture and the Criminal Justice Act.
80
 Moreover, the nature of the 
ICTY and the House of Lords differ- the former is an international court while the 
latter is a national court. The ICTY and the ICTR share the same jurisdictional basis, 
i.e. Security Council Resolution under Chapter VII, and as such the Trial Chamber‟s 
reliance on the decision of the ICTR concerning the former Prime Minister of 
Rwanda, Kambanda was more appropriate.  
The ICTR indicted Jean Kambanda, who was the Prime Minister of the Republic of 
Rwanda for his involvement in the genocide and crimes against humanity which 
                                               
79
 (2002) ICJ Reports 3, paragraph 61 
80
 See Chapter 3 of thesis 
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occurred in Rwanda in 1994.
81
 Kambanda did not challenge the jurisdiction of the 
ICTR over him and pleaded guilty to the charges against him and was sentenced to life 
imprisonment.
82
 The ICTR did not consider the issue of Head of state immunity which 
was not raised by the Defence possibly because of the Tribunal‟s acceptance of the 
overriding powers of the Council acting to restore or maintain international peace and 
security.
83
 Nevertheless, the decisions of both the Trial and Appeal Chambers of the 
ICTR in the Kambanda case support the view that Heads of states do not enjoy 
immunities for crimes before international courts established by the Security Council 
acting under Chapter VII.  
The jurisprudence of the ICTY shows detailed analysis of Resolution 827 and the 
powers of the Council under the Charter in relation to the legitimacy of the Tribunal. 
One would have expected that the Chambers of the ICTY would have also applied this 
approach by defending the jurisdiction of the Tribunal over Milosevic from the 
perspective of the nature of Resolution 827, the powers of the Council under Chapter 
VII and the binding nature of decisions of the Council under the Charter.  
 
                                               
81
 The Prosecutor v. Jean Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23-DP; indictment available at 
www.un.org/ictr  
82
 Trial Chamber Judgment and Sentence of 4 September 1998 (Case No. ICTR-97-23-T), upheld by 
Appeal Chamber Judgment of 19 October 2000 (Case No. ICTR-97-23-A), both available at 
www.un.org/ictr. See also André Klip and Göran Sluiter (edited), Annotated Leading Cases of 
International Criminal Tribunals, Volume VI: The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 2000-
2001, (Antwerp - Oxford: Intersentia, 2003), p.659 
83
 Being a jurisdictional issue, the Tribunal could raise the issue suo motu. 
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5.5 JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE AND CO-OPERATION WITH THE ICTY AND 
THE ICTR 
As stated in the previous chapter, the non-existence of an enforcement mechanism to 
implement judicial orders of international courts necessitates the co-operation of states 
with international courts. The Security Council, well aware of the problem that the 
ICTY and the ICTR might face with regard to the implementation of its requests and 
orders, expressly decided under Chapter VII that, 
“…all states shall co-operate fully with the International 
Tribunal and its organs in accordance with the present 
resolution and the Statute of the Tribunal and that 
consequently all states shall take any measures 
necessary under their domestic law to implement the 
provisions of the present resolution and the Statute, 
including the obligations of states to comply with 
requests for assistance or orders issued by a Trial 
Chamber under Article 29 of the Statute.”84 
In similar fashion, Articles 29 and 28 of the Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR, 
respectively, provide for the co-operation of states with the Tribunals in the 
investigation and prosecution of accused persons and states‟ compliance with requests 
for assistance or orders issued by the Tribunals.
85  
Like the issue of immunity, judicial assistance and co-operation with the ICTY and 
ICTR is dependent on the constitutive instrument of the Tribunals and the extent to 
which states are bound by the instrument.  
                                               
84
 S/RES/827 (1993), Paragraph 4; S/RES/955 (1994), Paragraph 2. Resolution 955 contains an 
additional request that states are to keep the Secretary-General informed about the measures taken 
under their domestic laws to implement the provisions of the Resolution and the Statute. 
85
 Supra 67 
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The obligation of states to co-operate with the ICTY and the ICTR is rooted in the 
Charter as well as in general international law. It has already been established earlier 
in this chapter that by Article 25 of the Charter that states are bound to comply with 
decisions of the Security Council. Furthermore by Article 103, the obligations of states 
under the UN Charter prevail over other conflicting international obligations. The 
combined effect of Articles 25 and 103 of the Charter include the obligation of states 
to co-operate with, as well as assist, the ICTY and ICTR especially in view of the fact 
that co-operation and assistance would be geared towards the restoration or 
maintenance of international peace and security.  
Under general international law, a state may not rely on its domestic law as reason for 
non-compliance with an international obligation. Therefore, the fact that the domestic 
law of a state prohibits compliance with an international obligation or that a state has 
not taken the necessary measures under its domestic laws to implement its 
international obligations will not avail the state of non-compliance with its 
international obligations.
86
  
Despite the express stipulation by the Council that states are under an obligation to 
render assistance and co-operation to the ICTY and ICTR, some states have failed to 
comply with this obligation.
87
 The matter came to the fore in Prosecutor v. Tihomir 
Blaskic (Decision on the objection of the Republic of Croatia to the issuance of 
                                               
86
 See Prosecutor v. Tadic (Deferral) 101 ILR 1 and the decision of the President of the Tribunal in 
Prosecutor v. Blaskic (Application to vary conditions of detention), 108 ILR 69, Paragraphs 7-9, cited in 
Greenwood, supra 71, p.107, note 38 
87
 Address of Antonio Cassese, President of the ICTY, to the UN General Assembly, 4 November 1997, 
see Press Release of the General Assembly GA/9345 of 4 November 1997 
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subpoenae duces tecum).
88
 In this case, Croatia challenged the capacity of the ICTY to 
issue subpoenae duces tecum to states under Article 54 of the Rules of Procedure of 
the Tribunal. The Prosecution argued that the ICTY has implied and inherent powers 
which are necessary for the effective performance of its functions and that these 
powers include the power to require the production of evidence.
89
 Croatia contended 
that compulsion is not a feature of international law and that where this is intended 
that the constitutive instrument of a Tribunal seeking to exercise powers of 
compulsion must expressly make a provision to that effect.
90
 
The Statute of the ICTY and Resolution 827 expressly provide that states are under an 
obligation to comply with requests or orders for assistance from the Tribunal. As such, 
the argument of Croatia lacks merit. Croatia had also contended that it was the 
intention of the Council that only individuals, to the exclusion of states, could be 
subjects of orders of the Tribunal.
91
 It is difficult to dispute that the Council intended 
that states should be subject to orders of the ICTY and a reading of the provisions of 
Article 29 of the Statute of the ICTY and Paragraph 4 of Resolution 827 does not 
support any argument to the contrary.
92
 Moreover, the Council firmly re-stated its 
intention that states should co-operate with the ICTY in Resolution 1031.
93
 
                                               
88
 Case No IT-95-14-T, 110 ILR 607. See also Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana & 2 ors, Case No. 
ICTR-99-52-T, in André Klip and Göran Sluiter (edited), Annotated Leading Cases of International 
Criminal Tribunals: The ICTR 2003, Volume XII (Antwerp-Oxford: Intersentia, 2007) p.363 
89
 Ibid., Paragraph 24 of Decision of Trial Chamber II, p.624 
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 Ibid. 
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 Ibid., Paragraph 48, p.632-633 
92
 See Appeal Chamber Judgment, of 29 October 1997, Judgment on the Request of the Republic of 
Croatia for Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997, Case IT-95-14-AR, 110 ILR 
607, Paragraph 26, p.698-700. The Trial Chamber had argued that the exercise of jurisdiction over 
states was incidental to the functioning of the Tribunal, see Paragraph 49 of Trial Chamber II Decision 
of 18 July 1997, ibid., p.633. The Appeal Chamber cautioned that the use of the term jurisdiction in 
relation to the incidental or ancilliary powers of the Tribunal over states is misleading because the 
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States which are not members of the UN may expressly accept in writing the 
obligation of co-operation and assistance with the international tribunals established 
by the Security Council. This is in line with the general principle of treaty law as 
contained in Article 35 of the VCLT.
94
 However, the general membership of the UN 
moots this point.  
Another thorny issue raised in the Blaskic case was the inability of the ICTY to 
impose penalty for failure to comply as evident in the meaning of the term 
„subpoenae‟.95 However, the Appeal Chamber acknowledged the inability of the 
Tribunal to impose a penalty or sanction on states and concluded that the term only 
referred to the ability of the Tribunal to issue a compulsory order for the production of 
evidence which imposes penalty for non-compliance for individuals acting in their 
private capacity.
96
 Therefore, while the Tribunal possesses the power to issue a 
binding order to states to produce documents, the Tribunal lacks the power to impose 
penalties on states for non-compliance. The power to impose penalties for non-
                                                                                                                                       
Tribunal has no jurisdiction over states although it possesses certain powers over states in relation to 
judicial co-operation and assistance, see Appeal Chamber Judgment, paragraph 28, ibid., p.701   
93
 S/RES/1031 (1995), Paragraph 4 
94
 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. Switzerland passed a law in 1995, when it was not yet a member of the UN, 
implementing the Statute of the ICTY, see 
http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Member_States_Cooperation/implementation_legislation_
switzerland_1995_en.pdf, (Last accessed 16/08/2011). See also paragraph 26 of the Appeal Chamber 
Judgment in the Blaskic case, op.cit., pp.698-700. 
95
 The term „subpoenae‟ exists only in the English version of Rule 54 of the Rules of Procedure and not 
in the French text (both texts are official); see Greenwood, supra 71, p.108 
96
 Supra 92, Appeal Chamber Judgment, Paragraph 21, pp.695-696. However, the Appeal Chamber 
decided that the Tribunal did not have the power to issue a subpoenae to state officials acting in their 
official capacity, because of their functional immunity, ibid., Paragraph 38, pp.707-708. 
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compliance with orders of the ICTY, and likewise the ICTR, is vested in the Security 
Council.
97
  
Finally, it is important to note that Croatia did not dispute that states have an 
obligation to co-operate with the ICTY; its challenge was addressed at the “coercive 
authority” of the ICTY over states.98 The Blaskic (subpoenae) case is illustrative of an 
international trend whereby the Security Council may impose the obligation of judicial 
assistance and co-operation upon states with regard to international tribunals 
established by the Council. The obligation portends far-reaching implications for the 
trials of Heads of states, who do not enjoy immunities, before such tribunals. 
 
 
5.6 CONCLUSION 
 
The power of the Security Council has necessitated the establishment of bodies to 
assume judicial roles as well as governmental roles.
99
 The Council is not a judicial 
body and so is not capable of exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. However, 
this chapter has shown that non-judicial organs of the UN like the Security Council 
may establish judicial bodies which are necessary for the performance of the functions 
of the Council. The legal authority and the substantive competence for the 
establishment of international tribunals by the Council have to be found in the UN 
Charter which sets out the functions and powers of the Council in accordance with the 
purposes and principles of the Charter.  
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 Greenwood, op.cit., pp.108-109 
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 Op.cit., Trial Chamber II Decision, Paragraph 71, p.643. 
99
 The Council established bodies with administrative authority over Kosovo and East Timor. 
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The establishment of international tribunals by the Council presents a novel and 
contemporary facet in the discourse on Head of state immunity in international law. 
The decisions of the ICTY in the Tadic, Milosevic and Blaskic cases as well as the 
decision of the ICTR in the Kambanda case are evidence of a trend in the 1990s of the 
establishment of international criminal tribunals by the Security Council, before which 
the Head of state immunity would be inapplicable and to which states are bound to 
render assistance and co-operation.  
The end of the cold war enabled the Security Council to rise to the role envisaged that 
the Council would play at the drafting of the UN Charter. While the establishment of 
the ad hoc international criminal tribunals, like the ICTY and the ICTR, is a 
discernible trend in the practice of the Security Council since the 1990s, it is arguable 
that the establishment of international tribunals was envisaged at the inception of the 
organisation in 1945. The UN Charter provides in Article 91 that the ICJ is the 
principal judicial organ of the UN, even though the ICJ was at the time, and remained 
for many decades after, the only judicial organ of the UN. The Charter did not mention 
that the ICJ was to be the only judicial organ of the UN. When this interpretation is 
made against the backdrop of the authority of the Security Council and the General 
Assembly to establish subsidiary organs (Articles 7, 22 and 29) and the non-
exhaustive nature of the range of actions open to the Council under Article 41, then 
the power to establish the ICTY and the ICTR come as no surprise. Rather, the length 
of time it has taken the Council to take such a course of action is surprising. 
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CHAPTER 6: HEAD OF STATE IMMUNITY BEFORE THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
International practice shows that international criminal tribunals may be established as 
the belligerent right of a victor, over a vanquished, as well as by the UN Security 
Council.
1
 Additionally, an international criminal tribunal can be established by a 
multilateral treaty between states, for instance the International Criminal Court (ICC). 
The decision to establish the ICC was taken at the UN Conference of Plenipotentiaries 
on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court in 1998. The product of this 
Conference was the Rome Statute of the ICC which is the constitutive instrument of 
the ICC. The Rome Statute entered into force on 1 July 2002, upon ratification by 
sixty states.    
  
The establishment of the ICC represents a paradigm shift from ad hocism to 
permanence in the enforcement of norms of international humanitarian law and 
international criminal law through the exercise of criminal jurisdiction. Against the 
backdrop of the limitations of the jurisdiction of the ICTY and the ICTR,
2
 the ICC was 
very much anticipated and its purpose seems almost messianic- to bring about the end 
of impunity through international accountability for perpetrators of grave crimes.
3
 
                                               
1
 See Chapters 4 and 5 of thesis. 
2
 The jurisdiction of the ICTY(R) was specific to the territories of the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda 
and efforts are underway for the Tribunals to wind up operations, see S/RES/1503 (2003) 
3
 Rome Statute, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, Preamble 
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Laudable as the purpose of the Court is, the jurisdiction of the ICC over perpetrators 
of grave crimes, including Heads of states, is limited.  
 
This chapter, in contributing to the analysis in the thesis of emergent trends on Head 
of state immunity and whether there is a new international law on Head of state 
immunity, will consider the jurisdiction of the ICC and immunities of states parties as 
well as states not parties to the Rome Statute.  
 
The referral of the Darfur and Libya situations by the Security Council raises very 
important issues which will also be considered in this chapter, particularly the 
jurisdiction of ICC over states not parties to the Rome Statute and whether the Council 
can change the position of a state regarding a treaty from non-contractual to 
contractual, i.e. can the Council make a state a party to a treaty, against its consent? 
Other important issues arising include the duty of states to co-operate with the ICC, 
where there has been a referral of a situation to the ICC by the Security Council acting 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter as well as the effect of Chapter VII on the 
referral of the Darfur and Libya situations to the ICC. These issues will be analysed 
against the backdrop of the constitutive instrument theory, underlying the thesis as a 
whole. 
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6.2 THE ICC IN PERSPECTIVE 
 
The Rome Statute of the ICC was adopted on 17 July 1998 by 120 states and 
established the ICC as a permanent international criminal institution that is 
complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.
4
  
 
The jurisdiction of the Court, ratione materiae, extends to the crime of genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression.
5
 Article 11 provides 
that the jurisdiction of the Court, ratione temporis, applies only with respect to crimes 
committed after 1998, i.e. after the entry into force of the Statute establishing the 
Court. It is further provided that with regard to states becoming parties to the Statute 
after its entry into force, the Court may exercise jurisdiction only with respect to 
crimes committed after the entry into force of the Statute for that state, unless a 
declaration has been made under Article 12.
6
 
 
By Article 13, the jurisdiction of the ICC may arise firstly, where there has been a 
referral to the Prosecutor of the Court by a state party in accordance with Article 14. 
Secondly, where there has been a referral to the Prosecutor by the Security Council 
                                               
4
 Ibid., Article 1 
5
 Ibid., Article 5 
6
 Ibid., Article 12(3) provides that, 
“If the acceptance of a state which is not a Party to this Statute is 
required under paragraph 2, that state may, by declaration lodged 
with the Registrar, accept the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court 
with respect to the crime in question. The accepting state shall co-
operate with the Court, without any delay or exception, in 
accordance with Part 9.” 
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acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter; and thirdly where the Prosecutor has 
initiated investigation in accordance with Article 15.  
 
Therefore, with the entry into force of the Rome Statute, where one or more of the 
crimes listed in Article 5 occurs, the ICC, subject to the declaration in Article 12, may 
be seised of jurisdiction to try accused persons where a state party or the Security 
Council refers a situation to the Court or where the Prosecutor, on his own accord, 
initiates investigations subject to the authorization of the Pre-Trial Chamber. 
 
There have been three (3) referrals made by states parties to the Prosecutor of the 
Court. Uganda,
7
 The Democratic Republic of Congo,
8
 and the Central African 
Republic,
9
 have referred the investigation of situations regarding crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the ICC committed within their territories since 1 July 2002. These 
referrals have implicated mostly rebel leaders and not Heads of states.  
 
However, more prominent and somewhat more interesting, is the decision of the 
Security Council on 31 March 2005 and 26 February 2011 to refer the situations in 
Darfur and Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, respectively, to the Court. The prominence of the 
referral of these situations results from the involvement of the Security Council acting 
                                               
7
 Uganda was the first state party to the Rome Statute to refer a situation to the Court. It referred the 
situation concerning the Lord‟s Resistance Army to the Prosecutor of the ICC on 29 January 2004, ICC 
Press Releases (2004), ICC-20040129-44 
8
 On 19 April 2004, the Democratic Republic of Congo referred the situation of crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the ICC committed in its territory since 1 July 2002 to the Prosecutor of the Court, ICC 
Press Releases (2004), ICC-OTP-20040419-50 
9
 The Government of the Central African Republic, on 07 January 2005, referred the situation of crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the Court committed anywhere on its territory since 1 July 2002, ICC Press 
Releases (2005), ICC-OTP-20050107-86 
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under its Chapter VII powers and the implication of the immunities of incumbent 
Heads of states. When it is considered that Sudan and Libya are not parties to the 
Rome Statute, this makes their referral particularly interesting. 
 
In addition, the Prosecutor of the ICC was granted authorisation on 31 March 2010 by 
the Pre-Trial Chamber to open investigation into the post-presidential election 
violence in Kenya in 2007. This follows from a decision by the Presidency of the 
Court, on 6 November 2009, assigning the situation in the Republic of Kenya to the 
Pre-Trial Chamber II.
10
  
 
The jurisdiction ratione temporis of the ICC is not retrospective and takes effect from 
the date the Statute of the Court entered into force which was on 1 July 2002. As such, 
the incidents in the Balkans and in Rwanda are excluded from the jurisdiction of the 
ICC. Moreover, the ICTY and the ICTR had been established by the Security Council 
to address those situations. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of the ICC is subject to that 
of national systems and only comes into effect where the national courts are unwilling 
or unable to carry out the investigations and prosecutions.
11
 For instance, the Cour de 
Cassation of the Central African Republic in April 2006 had declared that the 
country‟s national judicial system was unable to carry out the necessary investigation 
and prosecution of the crimes alleged to have been committed within the country‟s 
territory.
12
 
                                               
10
 ICC Press Releases (2009), ICC-CPI-20091106-PR473 
11
 Rome Statute, supra 3, Article 17 
12
 ICC Press Release, on 22 May 2007 announcing its decision to open investigation in the Central 
African Republic, ICC-OTP-20070522-220 
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6.3 HEAD OF STATE IMMUNITY BEFORE THE ICC 
 
The Rome Statute, like previous international instruments before it including the 
Statutes of the IMTs and the Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR, clearly provides against 
the relevance of official capacity of Heads of states. Article 27(1) of the Rome Statute 
states that, 
“This Statute shall apply to all persons without any 
distinction based on official capacity. In particular, 
official capacity as a Head of state or government, a 
member government or parliament, an elected 
representative or a government official shall in no case 
exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this 
Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground 
for reduction of sentence.”  
 
Provisions, like Article 27(1), making the fact of official capacity of persons including 
Heads of states or government irrelevant to the question of criminal responsibility, 
without more, cannot remove the immunities of state officials under customary 
international law.
13
 Such provisions must be interpreted subject to the theory that the 
effect of the constitutive instrument establishing a Court before which the provision is 
applicable must be binding upon those the provision is directed at. 
 
While the provision of Article 27(1) is not novel,
14
 Article 27(2) of the Statute is 
seemingly novel in its provision that, 
                                               
13
 This does not mean that a treaty cannot vary custom for parties, see the North Sea Continental Shelf 
cases (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany/ Netherlands), 1969 
I.C.J. Reports 3, Paragraph 25, p.24 
14
 See Report of the Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War, (1920) 14 AJIL 95, 
pp.116-117; Charter of IMT at Nuremberg (Article 7) and Charter of IMTFE (Article 6) both  reprinted 
in Guénaël Mettraux (edited), Perspectives on the Nuremberg Trial, (Oxford: OUP, 2008), p.736, 
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“Immunities or special procedural rules which may 
attach to the official capacity of a person, whether under 
national or international law, shall not bar the Court 
from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person.” 
 
The practical effect of Article 27(2) is that the jurisdiction of the ICC over an accused 
person is not precluded where an act was committed in an official capacity. This effect 
is not new because the IMTs, the ICTY and ICTR possessed jurisdiction over accused 
persons who had acted in their official capacities, despite the non-inclusion of similar 
provisions to Article 27(2) in their constitutive instruments.  
 
Furthermore, Article 27(2) is applicable to both international and national law 
immunities of officials of state parties. The fact that international criminal tribunals 
are dependent on states for judicial co-operation and assistance in the form of arrest 
and surrender of accused persons makes it important that the Rome Statute includes a 
provision for state parties to waive the national immunities which are applicable to 
their officials.
15
 
 
The different laws of states provide differently for the immunities that are available to 
officials under national laws.
16
 These exist and operate differently from international 
law immunities; national law immunities are available only at the national level and 
not before international courts. National immunities also apply to a different class of 
persons and unlike international law immunities they are not based on any theory of 
                                                                                                                                       
Appendix 4 and p.7 respectively; Article 7(2)ICTY and Article 6(2)ICTR Statutes, reprinted in (1993) 
32 I.L.M. 1192 and (1994) 33 I.L.M. 1602, respectively. 
15
 Dapo Akande,‟ International Law Immunities and the International Criminal Court‟, (2004) 98 AJIL 
407, p.420 
16
 See Chapter 3 of thesis. 
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representative capacity but are based solely on the effectiveness of governmental 
officials in their duties.
17
 As such, state parties cannot rely on the immunities available 
to their officials under their peculiar national laws to evade the jurisdiction of the ICC. 
 
This thesis is concerned with international law immunities and it is re-iterated that the 
question of the immunities of Heads of states for international crimes is dependent on 
the nature of the constitutive instrument establishing an international court and the 
extent to which states are bound by the instrument. By Article 34 VCLT, the Rome 
Statute is applicable to and binding only upon states parties; it cannot create 
obligations or rights for states not parties to the Statute.
18
 Therefore, a consideration of 
the immunities of Heads of states before the ICC would involve firstly, state parties 
and secondly, states not party to the Rome Statute. 
 
Subject to the constitutive instrument theory, immunities are removed where it is 
provided that official capacity does not exclude criminal responsibility. Therefore, the 
effect of the substantive provisions of Article 27(1) and (2) is the removal of 
immunities of Heads of states and other state officials of parties to the Rome Statute. 
By ratifying the Rome Statute, states parties have agreed that the immunities enjoyed 
by their officials, including Heads of state will not bar the ICC from exercising 
jurisdiction over such persons. There is a good faith requirement (pacta sunt servanda) 
                                               
17
 See Chapter 1 of thesis. 
18
 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 
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on states parties that their contractual agreement within the framework of the Rome 
Statute are kept.
19
 
 
That the establishment of the ICC was meant to put an end to impunity is not enough 
to assume that Head of state immunity is not applicable before the ICC. Neither is the 
express inclusion by the ICJ in the Arrest Warrant case, of the ICC as an example of 
„certain‟ international tribunals before which international immunities are not 
applicable enough to address the issue of the non-applicability of immunities before 
the ICC. The ICJ cannot confer on the ICC a jurisdiction which it does not have. 
Moreover, the immunities of Heads of states not party to the Rome Statute remain 
unaffected by the provisions of Article 27(1). The immunities of Heads of states not 
party to the Statute exist under, and are governed by, customary international law and 
as such, they enjoy absolute immunity even where international crimes are alleged to 
have been committed. Therefore, the ICC must be distinguished from the ICTY and 
ICTR as international courts before which Head of state immunity would not apply. 
 
The Rome Statute, in recognising that the immunities of states not parties to the 
Statute remain unaffected by Article 27, qualifies the non-applicability of the 
immunities of state parties by the immunities of non-parties.
20
 As such, Article 27 is to 
be read subject to Article 98(1) which provides that, 
                                               
19
 See VCLT, ibid., The Preamble of which notes the universal recognition of the principles of free 
consent and of good faith and the pacta sunt servanda rule in treaty-making. In addition, Article 26 
provides that, 
“Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be 
performed by them in good faith.”   
20
 Hazel Fox, The Law of State Immunity, (Oxford : OUP, 2002), p.432 
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“The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender 
or assistance which would require the requested state to 
act inconsistently with its obligations under international 
law with respect to the state or diplomatic immunity of a 
person or property of a third state, unless the Court can 
first obtain the co-operation of that third state for the 
waiver of the immunity.” 
 
It is against this background that the referrals by the Security Council of the situations 
in Darfur and Libya should be examined. In line with Article 13(b) of the Rome 
Statute and acting under Resolution 1593, the Council, on 31 March 2005, decided to 
refer the situation in Darfur, Sudan since 1 July 2002 to the Prosecutor of the Court for 
investigation and prosecution.
21
 Likewise, the Security Council by virtue of Article 
13(b) decided in Resolution 1970 to refer the situation in Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 
since 15 February 2011 to the Prosecutor for investigation and prosecution.
22
  
 
Importantly, Sudan and Libya are not parties to the Rome Statute and Resolutions 
1593 and 1970 have raised important issues particularly the effect of the Resolutions 
on the immunities of the Head of state of Sudan and Libya, respectively as well as the 
obligations of Sudan, Libya, parties and non-parties to the Rome Statute to co-operate 
with the ICC.  
 
 
 
 
                                               
21
 S/RES/1593(2005) 
22
 S/RES/1970 (2011) 
293 
 
6.4 THE ROAD TO SECURTY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 1593 AND 1970 
 
DARFUR 
The humanitarian crisis, the widespread human rights violations and attacks on 
civilians in Darfur precipitated by the protests and attacks on the Government of 
Sudan, in 2003, for failure to protect the black African Sudanese from attacks of the 
nomadic Arabs (Janjaweed militia) and the economic marginalisation of the black 
African Sudanese prompted the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, to pass Resolution 1556 in July 2004.
23
 The Council, under Article 39 of the 
Charter, had determined that the situation in Darfur was a threat to international peace 
and security as well as stability in the Darfur region.
24
 Resolution 1556 listed the 
conditions to be fulfilled by the Government of Sudan and particularly stated in 
operative paragraph 6 the Council‟s intention to consider further action under Article 
41 of the UN Charter in the event of non-compliance by the Government of Sudan.  
 
The seriousness and urgency of the humanitarian crisis in Darfur was such that the 
Council intended that non-compliance by the Government of Sudan with Resolution 
1556 would necessitate the consideration of enforcement action under Article 41. The 
Council‟s expression of its intention of possible action under Article 41 is very 
important; and the referral by the Council of the Darfur situation must be considered 
against the backdrop that the referral in itself is an action taken under Article 41for the 
maintenance of peace and security in the region. It is not a mere referral but an action 
                                               
23
 S/RES/1556 (2004) 
24
 Ibid. 
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taken to restore international peace and security in the Darfur region. As such, the 
issues of Head of state immunity and the obligation of states to co-operate with the 
ICC must be considered in the light of the Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 
 
Following the failure of the Government of Sudan to fully meet its obligations under 
Resolution 1556, the Council passed Resolution 1564 on 18 September 2004.
25
 The 
Council, in Resolution 1564, requested the UN Secretary-General to establish an 
international commission of inquiry to investigate the reports of violations of 
international humanitarian law and human rights law in Darfur to determine whether 
or not acts of genocide have occurred and to identify the perpetrators of such 
violations with a view to ensuring that those responsible are held accountable.
26
 
  
The Commission submitted its Report of findings to the Secretary-General on 25 
January 2005.
27
 The Commission found that the Government of Sudan and the 
Janjaweed militia were responsible for violations of international humanitarian law 
and human rights law amounting to crimes against humanity and war crimes.
28
 The 
Commission strongly recommended the referral of the situation in Darfur to the ICC, 
and also recommended that states exercise universal jurisdiction over the perpetrators 
so as to “help break the cycle of impunity”.29   
                                               
25
 S/RES/1564 (2004) 
26
 Ibid., Paragraph 12 
27
 The Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the UN Secretary-General 
Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564 of 18 September 2004, available at 
http://www.un.org/News/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf, (Last accessed 16/08/2011) 
28
 Ibid., p.3 
29
 Ibid., p.5-6. The Commission‟s recommendation for the exercise of universal jurisdiction by states is 
misconceived especially in view of the fact that universal jurisdiction is yet to be mainstreamed into 
general international law as a basis for the exercise of jurisdiction.   
295 
 
 
Acting on the Report of the Commission, the Council passed Resolution 1593 on 31
st
 
March 2005.
30
 In the Resolution, the Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, 
expressly decided to refer the situation in Darfur to the ICC. The action of Council can 
be seen as an atypical measure under the Council‟s enforcement mandate in Article 41 
of the Charter, not involving the use of force.
31
 
 
In June 2005, the Prosecutor of the ICC announced the decision to open investigation 
into the situation in Darfur, stating that the investigation will focus on individuals who 
bear the greatest criminal responsibility for the crimes committed in the Darfur 
region.
32
 In July 2008, the Prosecutor applied to the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC for 
an arrest warrant to be issued against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir, the President of 
Sudan. 
 
LIBYA 
Following the pro-democratic uprising in the Arab states which started in early 2011 
in Tunisia, then spread to Algeria, Egypt, Libya and Syria in early 2011, the 
Government of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya embarked on a brutal campaign to quash 
the civilian unrest in the state. On 26 February 2011, the Security Council 
unanimously decided, in Resolution 1970, to refer the situation in Libya Arab 
                                               
30
 S/RES/1593 (2005) 
31
 Benedetto Conforti, The Law and Practice of the United Nations, 2
nd
 revised edition, (The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International, 2000), p.206 
32
 ICC Press Releases (2005), ICC-OTP-0606-104 
296 
 
Jamahiriya since 15 February 2011 to the ICC Prosecutor for investigation and 
possible prosecution.
33
  
 
Similar to its decision in Resolution 1593, the Council‟s referral of Libya to the ICC 
was done under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and was a measure under Article 41 of 
the Charter. Unlike Resolution 1593, there was no determination of a threat to 
international peace and security in Resolution 1970. 
 
The non-determination of a threat to international peace and security under Article 39 
of the Charter does not mean that the referral in Resolution 1970 is not an action 
necessary for the restoration of international peace and security. The fact that the 
Council, in Resolution 1970, had expressly invoked Chapter VII and stated that it was 
taking measures under Article 41 must mean that the determination under Article 39 is 
implicit in the Resolution. Moreover, the Council had expressly stated in the Preamble 
to Resolution 1970 that it was mindful of its primary responsibility for international 
peace and security. If the situation in Libya were not a threat to international peace 
and security, there would be no need to restore international peace and security in that 
region. Furthermore, there is no rule that states that the Council must expressly make 
the Article 39 determination before action under Charter VII. Moreover, the 
determination by the Council in Resolution 1973 that the situation in Libya continues 
to constitute a threat to international peace and security supports this view because the 
                                               
33
 S/RES/1970 (2011), Operative Paragraph 4 
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use of the word „continues‟ in the Resolution presupposes the existence of a threat to 
international peace and security.
34
  
 
The ICC Prosecutor decided to open investigation into the Libya situation on 3 March 
2011. On 16 May 2011, the Prosecutor requested the issuance of warrants of arrest 
against Mouammer Gaddafi, his son Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi who is the de facto Prime 
Minister of Libya and successor to Mouammer Gaddafi, and Abdullah Al-Senussi the 
Libyan Head of Military Intelligence for crimes against humanity. On 27 June 2011, 
the Pre-Trial Chamber I granted the request and issued the warrants of arrest. 
 
 
6.5 LEGAL BASIS OF ICC JURISDICTION OVER THE DARFUR AND 
LIBYA SITUATIONS AND THE NON-APPLICABILITY OF HEAD OF 
STATE IMMUNITY OF AL-BASHIR AND GADDAFI 
 
It is stated at the onset of this section, that the recent death of Gaddafi on 20 October 
2011, does not rob the arguments contained herein of their legal validity. Having been 
captured by the rebels in Libya, there was a possibility that the Libyan National 
Transitional Council would have surrendered Gaddafi to the ICC to face his trial but 
the unfortunate killing of Gaddafi robbed the ICC and international discourse of the 
opportunity of robust arguments and discussions on the issue of Head of state 
immunity.   
 
                                               
34
 S/RES/1973 (2011) 
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Sudan and Libya are not parties to the Rome Statute. A priori, they are not bound by 
the Statute, i.e. Article 27 of the Rome Statute is ineffectual against Al-Bashir and 
Gaddafi. By Article 34 VCLT, the Rome Statute and the jurisdiction of the ICC 
operate with respect to parties to the Rome Statute. This would mean that the rights 
and obligations of Sudan and Libya under customary international law are not affected 
by the provisions of the Rome Statute.  
 
The immunities of Sudan and Libya in international law are not governed by treaty 
law under the Rome Statute but rather exist as customary international law which 
recognises the absolute immunity of Heads of states (ratione personae) even for 
international crimes. As such the immunities of Sudan and Libya, which extend to Al-
Bashir and Gaddafi under international law, remain.  
 
However, the matter does not end here and the argument above has to be assessed in 
the light of the effect of a referral by the Security Council on the jurisdiction of the 
ICC. Having said that the ICC does not have jurisdiction over states not parties to its 
Statute does not mean that the ICC can only exercise jurisdiction over nationals of 
state parties.
35
 
 
                                               
35
 The predominant view from the US, which is not party to the Rome Statute is that the ICC can only 
exercise jurisdiction over nationals of states parties, see David J. Scheffer, „Developments in 
International Law: Foreword‟, (1999) 93 AJIL 1, pp.18-20; Madeline Morris, „High Crimes and 
Misconceptions: The ICC and Non-Party States‟, (2001) 64 Law and Contemporary Problems 13, 
pp.13-14. Thus, the US has entered into bilateral immunity agreements with states to ensure that US 
nationals are not subject to the jurisdiction of the ICC. See Dominic McGoldrick, „Political and Legal 
Responses to the International Criminal Court‟, in Dominic McGoldrick, Peter Rowe and Eric Donnelly 
(edited), The Permanent International Criminal Court: Legal and Policy Issues, (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2004) 389, pp.423-433; Dapo Akande, „The Jurisdiction of the ICC over Nationals of Non-
Parties: Legal Basis and Limits‟, (2003) 1 JICJ 618-650.  
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The ICC may exercise jurisdiction over nationals of states not parties to the Rome 
Statute where the national commits any of the crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Court in the territory of a state party. Article 12(2)(a) of the Rome Statute of the ICC 
provides that, 
“In the case of Article 13, paragraph (a) or (c), the Court 
may exercise its jurisdiction if one or more of the 
following states are parties to this Statute or have 
accepted the jurisdiction of the Court in accordance with 
paragraph 3:  
(a)     The state on the territory of which the conduct in 
question occurred or, if the crime was committed on 
board a vessel or aircraft, the state of registration of that 
vessel or aircraft;  
(b)     The state of which the person accused of the crime 
is a national.” 
 
The above provision clearly provides, by the use of the phrase „one or more’, that the 
ICC may lawfully exercise jurisdiction over nationals of a state that is not party to its 
Statute where such persons have committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the 
Court on the territory of a state party or on board a vessel or aircraft registered to a 
state party. Article 12 does not require a state to be party to the Rome Statute or to 
have accepted the jurisdiction of the ICC before its national who has committed a 
crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC in the territory of a state party can be tried by 
the ICC. It is a recognized principle in law that individuals are subject to the laws 
(substantive and procedural criminal laws) applicable in foreign territories including 
those which are concomitant of treaty obligations. 
36
 
                                               
36
 See Philippe Kirsch, The Rome Conference on the International Criminal Court: A 
Comment, (November/December 1998) ASIL Newsletter 1; See also Michael P. Scharf, „The 
ICC‟s Jurisdiction over Nationals of Non-Party States:  A Critique of the US Position‟, 
(2001) 64 Law and Contemporary Problems 67, p.98-116; Gennady M. Danilenko, „ICC 
Statute and Third States‟, in Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta and John R.W.D. Jones 
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It is also possible for the Court to exercise jurisdiction over a national of a state not 
party to the Rome Statute where the Security Council refers a situation involving such 
a party to the ICC, in line with Article 13(b) of the Statute.
37
 By Article 13(b) of the 
Statute, the Council acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter may refer a situation 
to the ICC. Nothing in the wording of Article 13(b) lends itself to the interpretation 
that the referral of a situation must be with respect to a state party to the Rome Statute- 
it would be odd to interpret the provision as such. 
 
The Security Council being seised of the situation in Darfur decided to refer the 
situation to the ICC, as envisaged under Article 13(b). Likewise, the Council decided 
to refer the situation in Libya to the ICC. Resolution 1593 provides that the Security 
Council, 
“Determining that the situation in Sudan continues to 
constitute a threat to international peace and security, 
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
Nations, 
1. Decides to refer the situation in Darfur since 1 July 2002 
to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court; 
2. Decides that the Government of Sudan and all other 
parties to the conflict in Sudan shall co-operate fully 
with and provide any necessary assistance to the Court 
and the Prosecutor pursuant to this Resolution, while 
recognizing that states not party to the Rome Statute 
have no obligation under the Statute, urges all states and 
concerned regional and international organizations to 
co-operate fully.” 
                                                                                                                                       
(edited), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, 
(Oxford: University Press, 2002) 1871, 1891-1897; Jordan J. Paust, The Reach of ICC 
Jurisdiction over Non-Signatory Nationals‟, (2000) 33 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational 
Law 1 
37
 Dan Sarooshi, „The Peace and Justice Paradox: The International Criminal Court and the United 
Nations Security Council‟, in McGoldrick, et al(edited), supra 35, p.95, at pp.96-98 
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In Resolution 1970 the Council stated that it was, 
“Mindful of its primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security under 
the Charter of the United Nations, 
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
Nations, and taking measures under its Article 41,… 
4. Decides to refer the situation in the Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya since 15 February 2011 to the Prosecutor of 
the International Criminal Court; 
5. Decides that the Libyan authorities shall co-operate 
fully with and provide any necessary assistance to the 
Court and the Prosecutor pursuant to this resolution and, 
while recognizing that states not party to the Rome 
Statute have no obligation under the Statute, urges all 
states and concerned regional and other international 
organizations to co-operate fully with the Court and the 
Prosecutor.” 
 
The Security Council‟s decision to refer the matter to the ICC was irrespective of the 
non-contractual status of Sudan and Libya vis-à-vis the ICC. This status was irrelevant 
to the decision of the Council having expressly determined, in the case of Sudan, and 
implicitly determined, in the case of Libya, that the situations constituted a threat to 
international peace and security. 
 
The legal basis for the jurisdiction of the ICC over a matter and the legal basis of the 
non-applicability of immunities before the ICC are separate. After all, jurisdiction 
does not mean an absence of immunity.
38
  The legal basis for the referral of the Darfur 
and Libya situations to the ICC, hence the jurisdiction of the ICC over the situations, 
is not in issue- Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute clearly provides for this possibility. 
                                               
38
 Arrest Warrant case, (2002) ICJ Reports 3, Paragraph 59 
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However, what seems unclear is the actual legal basis for the non-applicability of the 
immunities of Al-Bashir and Gaddafi before the ICC.  
 
On 14 July 2008, the Prosecutor of the ICC applied to the Pre-Trial Chamber 
requesting it to issue a warrant of arrest of Al-Bashir for his alleged involvement in the 
commission of crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes against 
members of the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa groups in Darfur from March 2003 to July 
2008.
39
 On 4 March 2009, the Pre-Trial Chamber decided to issue a warrant of arrest 
in respect of crimes against humanity and war crimes, rejecting the application in 
respect of the crime of genocide.
40
 The Pre-Trial Chamber also directed the Registrar 
of the Court to prepare a request for co-operation seeking the arrest and surrender of 
Al-Bashir and to transmit it to the competent Sudanese authorities and to all states 
parties to the Rome Statute as well as to the Security Council members not parties to 
the Rome Statute.
41
  
 
The ICC being conferred with jurisdiction by virtue of Resolution 1593 could, 
unquestionably, exercise jurisdiction over ordinary persons responsible for the 
international crimes in Darfur. However, the jurisdiction of the Court over Al-Bashir 
as the Head of state of a non-contracting party to the Rome Statute whose alleged 
                                               
39
 “Prosecutors‟ Application under Article 58”, public redacted version ICC-02/05-157-AnxA, filed on 
12 September 2009. 
40
 In The Case of The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir (“Omar Al-Bashir”), „Decision on 
the Prosecution‟s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir‟, Public 
Redacted Version, No: ICC-02/05-01/09 available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc639096.pdf 
, (accessed 16/08/2011); [Hereinafter Al-Bashir Arrest Warrant Application]. For the warrant of arrest, 
see In The Case of The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir (“Omar Al-Bashir”), „Warrant of 
Arrest of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir‟, Public Document, No: ICC-02-05-01/09, available at 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc639078.pdf, (accessed 16/08/2011) 
41
 US, China and Russia are not parties to the Rome Statute 
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actions were not committed in the territory of a state party requires closer analysis. 
Resolution 1593 is silent on the issue of Head of state immunity. The issue of whether 
Al-Bashir‟s absolute immunity under customary international law survives Resolution 
1593 is of paramount importance in this context. The levity with which the issue was 
treated by the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC in the application for the arrest warrant of 
Al-Bashir is regrettable.  
 
The Pre-Trial Chamber held that the current position of Al-Bashir as Head of state of 
Sudan, a non-contracting party to the Rome Statute, has no effect on the jurisdiction of 
the ICC. The Chamber based its decision on four considerations.
42
 Firstly, the 
objective of the Rome Statute in ending impunity as contained in the Preamble of the 
Statute. Secondly, the express provisions of Article 27 of the Rome Statute. Thirdly, 
the applicability of other sources of international law as contained in Article 21 of the 
Statute, is subject to there being a lacuna in the Rome Statute, the Elements of Crimes 
and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence before the Court and that a lacuna cannot be 
filled by the application of the Articles 31 and 32 of the Convention on the Law of 
Treaties. And fourthly, the acceptance of the Security Council by the referral of the 
Darfur situation  that the investigation and prosecution arising as a result would be 
done within the framework of the Rome Statute, the Elements of Crimes and the Rules 
as a whole. These four considerations will be dealt with seriatim. 
 
                                               
42
Al-Bashir Arrest Warrant Application, op.cit, Paragraphs 41-45 
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The legal effect of a preamble of a treaty is merely exhortatory. It is not legally 
binding, not even on the parties to a treaty.
43
 The reliance of the Pre-Trial Chamber on 
the aims and objectives of the Rome Statute to end impunity as contained in the 
Preamble of the Statute is flawed and precipitates the unfortunate reasoning of the 
Chamber on the non-applicability of the Head of state immunity for Al-Bashir before 
the ICC.  
 
In response to the second consideration of the Pre-Trial Chamber in its Decision, 
Article 27 (1) and (2) apply only with respect to parties to the Rome Statute. It cannot 
found the decision of the Chamber that the current position of Al-Bashir as Head of 
state of Sudan, a non-contracting party to the Rome Statute, has no effect on the 
jurisdiction of the ICC, without a consideration of the legal effect of Resolution 1593. 
 
Thirdly, and rather oddly, the Pre-Trial Chamber seemed to imply that other sources of 
international law are inapplicable before the Court except where there is a lacuna in 
the Rome Statute, the Elements of the Crime and the Rules of the Court and such 
lacuna is not cured by Article 31 and 32 VCLT. This is outside the contemplation of 
the Statute of the Court. In fact, Article 21 of the Rome Statute expressly provides 
that, 
“1. The Court shall apply:  
(a)     In the first place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes 
and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence;  
(b)     In the second place, where appropriate, applicable 
treaties and the principles and rules of international law, 
                                               
43
 Sarah Williams and Lena Sherif, „The Arrest Warrant for President Al-Bashir: Immunities of 
Incumbent Heads of State and the International Criminal Court‟, (2009) 14 Journal of Conflict and 
Security Law 71, p.82 
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including the established principles of the international 
law of armed conflict;  
(c)     Failing that, general principles of law derived by 
the Court from national laws of legal systems of the 
world including, as appropriate, the national laws of 
states that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the 
crime, provided that those principles are not inconsistent 
with this Statute and with international law and 
internationally recognized norms and standards. 
2.         The Court may apply principles and rules of law 
as interpreted in its previous decisions.” 
 
There is nothing in the wording of the Statute which makes other sources of 
international law inapplicable before the Court or applicable in the conditions spelt out 
by the Pre-Trial Chamber. Indeed, it is an odd interpretation of the law to state that 
customary international law does not apply before an international court.
44
 This is at 
variance with the generally accepted practice in international law whereby 
international courts have relied on other sources of international law like customary 
international law.
45
  
 
The Pre-Trial Chamber based its Decision on an implied acceptance by the Security 
Council that the investigation and prosecution arising from the referral would be done 
within the framework of the Rome Statute, the Elements of the Crime and the Rules of 
                                               
44
 Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ, 59 Stat. 1055,  requires the ICJ to apply the following in its 
decisions: 
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing 
rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;  
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;  
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;  
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the 
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as 
subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law. 
45
 For example, the ICJ relied upon customary international law in its decision in the North Sea 
Continental Shelf Cases, supra 13;  Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua 
(Nicaragua v. US), (1986) I.C.J. Reports 107. 
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the Court. The conduct of the investigation and prosecution against Al-Bashir by the 
ICC within the framework of its Statute and Rules does not effectively address the 
issue of Head of state immunity of Al-Bashir as President of Sudan (a non-party to the 
Rome Statute) and its non-applicability before the ICC. A consideration of the issue 
outside Resolution 1593 and its practical effect on Sudan and the immunities of Sudan 
officials before the ICC as well as before national authorities will be inadequate. 
 
The Pre-Trial Chamber again failed to rise to the occasion by availing itself of the 
opportunity to elucidate on the issue of Head of state immunity before the ICC where 
there has been a referral under Article 13(b) of its Statute.
46
 It was merely stated that, 
“...The Chamber also notes that, consistent with its 
findings in the Al-Bashir case, the official position of an 
individual, whether he or she is a national of a state 
party or of a state which is not party to the Statute, has 
no effect on the court‟s jurisdiction.”47  
 
It is submitted that the view of the Chamber is not supported by general international 
law. The nature of the ICC‟s constitutive instrument as a treaty is such that is 
governed by the Article 34 of the Convention on Law of Treaties. As such, the 
jurisdiction of the ICC is only effectual against nationals of states who have given 
their consent to the jurisdiction of the ICC, either under the Rome Statute or some 
                                               
46
 Situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya : Decision on the Prosecution’s Application Brought 
Pursuant to  Article 58 as to Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and 
Abdullah Al-Senussi, Case No: ICC-01/11, public redacted version, 27 June 2011, available at 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1101337.pdf (accessed 16/08/2011); [Hereinafter Gaddafi Arrest 
Warrant Application] 
47
 Ibid., Paragraph 9 
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other binding instrument.
48
 In the absence of basis for consent of states, the ICC has 
no jurisdiction over nationals of states not party to its Statute.   
 
Unlike Gaddafi, the official position of Al-Bashir as Head of state of Sudan was not in 
question. Gaddafi had adamantly rejected his official position as Head of state of 
Libya.
49
 The Pre-Trial Chamber in the Gaddafi Arrest Warrant Application in finding 
that Gaddafi was the Head of state of Libya relied on the Decree on Revolutionary 
Legitimacy which states that the “legitimacy of the Leader of the Revolution stems 
from his being the leader of this great revolution.”50 The Chamber stated that, 
“Although Muammar Gaddafi claims not to have any 
position and not to be the President of Libya, he is 
recognised inter alia as the “ultimate authority or ruler”, 
“political head of the government in Libya”, or 
“ideological and spiritual head of the movement”.”51 
 
Despite his claims and title to the contrary, Gaddafi was the de facto Head of state of 
Libya because he was in absolute control of the machinery of state and exercised 
control over the territory, media and telecommunications, military and security forces, 
and finances of Libya. He was the internationally recognised Libyan Head of state and 
had repressed opposition to himself or to his regime.
52
 He exercised absolute political 
and administrative control of Libya and Saif al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah al-Senussi 
who oversaw the economy and military, respectively were subject to the control of 
                                               
48
 This point will be considered in detail later in this chapter. 
49
 Gaddafi had stated in a speech delivered in Tripoli on 25 February 2011 that, 
“I‟m among the people, among the masses, even though Mu‟ammar 
al-Qadhafi isn‟t a President, King or Head of state and he doesn‟t 
have any constitutional or administrative powers.” 
      See Gaddafi Arrest Warrant Application, supra 46, Paragraph 15 
50
 Ibid., Paragraph 16  
51
 Ibid., Paragraph 72 
52
 Ibid., Paragraphs 19-20 
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Muammar Gaddafi.
53
 In view of all these, it is difficult to come to a conclusion other 
than that Gaddafi was the Head of state of Libya. 
 
It is to be re-iterated that the fact that the ICC has jurisdiction over the Darfur and 
Libyan situations does not of itself dispense with the immunity of Al-Bashir and 
Gaddafi. The question of jurisdiction of the ICC over Al-Bashir and Gaddafi, and 
necessarily the immunities of Al-Bashir and Gaddafi, proceeds from two bases- firstly 
the Rome Statute of the ICC and secondly, Resolutions 1593 and1970.  
 
It has been commented that the Rome Statute and Resolution 1593 do not mention the 
issue of immunities of Heads of states of non-parties where there has been a referral 
by the ICC.
54
 However, Resolutions 1593 and 1970 having referred the Darfur and 
Libyan situations to the ICC, it would have been superfluous for the Resolutions to 
have included a provision against the applicability of Head of state immunity because 
the Rome Statute provides in Article 27(1) and (2) that the official capacity as Head of 
state is irrelevant to criminal responsibility and that international law or national law 
immunities shall not be a bar to the Court‟s jurisdiction. Article 27 being applicable 
only to states parties, it becomes pertinent to consider whether the immunity of Al-
Bashir and Gaddafi is extant in proceedings before the ICC, and if not whether the 
Security Council can change this state of affairs or can make Sudan and Libya parties 
to the Rome Statute.   
 
                                               
53
 Ibid., Paragraphs 72, 73 and 83 
54
 Williams and Sherif, supra 43, p.79-80. Resolution 1970 is also silent on Head of state immunity. 
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The argument against the non-applicability of the immunity of Al-Bashir and Gaddafi 
before the ICC is hinged on Resolutions 1593 and 1970 and, ultimately, Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter.  
 
The Security Council had determined severally that there was threat to international 
peace and stability in the Darfur region and this determination paved way for its 
enforcement mandate; a mandate which the Council was mindful of in Resolution 
1970 on the Libya situation. It has been argued earlier in this thesis that the 
enforcement powers of the Council under Chapter VII of the Charter is not limited to 
military action but includes economic and other pacifist means of restoring 
international peace and stability. 
55
  
 
By Article 25 of the UN Charter, the effect of the decision by the Security Council to 
refer the Darfur and Libya situations to the ICC is that all member states of the UN are 
bound by the decision. Sudan and Libya, being members of the UN, are bound by the 
decision and as such the immunity of Al-Bashir and Gaddafi before the ICC must be 
deemed to have been effectively removed by the Council. The trials of Milosevic by 
the ICTY and Kambanda by the ICTR clearly show that the Council can circumvent 
the immunity of states and their officials.
56
   
 
Despite the fact that Sudan and Libya are not parties to the Rome Statute, Sudan and 
Libya are members of the UN, having joined the organisation in 1956 and 1955, 
                                               
55
 Chapter 5 of thesis 
56
 Dapo Akande, “The Bashir Indictment: Are Serving Heads of State Immune from ICC Prosecution?”, 
(2008) Oxford Transitional Justice Research Working Paper Series pp.2-3 
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respectively.
57
 By virtue of their membership of the UN, Sudan and Libya are bound 
by the UN Charter. They have accepted that the purpose of the UN is to maintain 
international peace and security; a purpose which involves taking effective collective 
measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace.
58
 They have also 
accepted to fulfil, in good faith, the obligations assumed in accordance with the UN 
Charter.
59
 Very importantly, Sudan and Libya have agreed to accept and carry out the 
decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the Charter. Membership of the 
UN is not obligatory of states; it is open to states which accept the obligations 
contained in the Charter.
60
 
 
It is against the backdrop of these acceptances by Sudan and Libya, the nature of 
Resolutions 1593 and 1970 as Chapter VII Resolutions, and Article 25 of the Charter 
that it is submitted that Sudan and Libya are bound by the decision of the Security 
Council to refer the Darfur and Libya situations to the ICC (constitutive instrument 
theory). Sudan and Libya are therefore bound by the jurisdiction of the ICC which 
operates under the constitutional framework of the Rome Statute. Article 1 of the 
Rome Statute of the ICC provides that “… The jurisdiction and functioning of the 
Court shall be governed by the provisions of this Statute.” 
 
By referring the situations to the ICC, the Security Council had accepted the Rome 
Statute as the constitutive and operative instrument of the Court. It was not open to the 
                                               
57
 However, in 1969 Libya informed the UN that it had changed its name to the Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya. See http://www.un.org/en/members/growth.shtml, (accessed 16/08/2011).  
58
 UN Charter, 59 Stat. 1031, Article 1 
59
 Ibid., Article 2 
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Council to decide otherwise. The UN and indeed the Security Council recognise the 
sovereign capacity of states to enter into a multilateral treaty establishing a judicial 
body to be governed by the constitutive multilateral agreement. The Council could not 
have decided to refer the Darfur and Libya situations to the ICC under a different legal 
framework, when the Council‟s decision to refer the situations arose under the 
constitutive legal framework of the ICC (Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute). 
Moreover, the Council made copious reference to the Rome Statute in the Resolutions 
1593 and 1970, and as such the Council had accepted that the jurisdiction of the ICC 
over the Darfur and Libya situations could only be exercised in line with the Rome 
Statute.
61
  
 
Thus, Sudan and Libya are bound by the Rome Statute of the ICC as the constitutive 
and operative instrument of the Court, including Article 27 of the Rome Statute. This 
means that the immunity enjoyed by Al-Bashir and Gaddafi would be inapplicable in 
proceedings before the Court. 
 
Having established that Sudan and Libya are bound by the Rome Statute, this does not 
mean that Sudan and Libya are parties to the Statute. To maintain such an argument 
                                               
61
 See Dapo Akande, „The Legal Nature of Security Council Referrals to the ICC and its Impact on Al-
Bashir‟s Immunities‟, (2009) 7 JICJ 333, p.340-341 where he argues that,  
“A decision by the Security Council that the Court may act implies 
a decision that it act within its Statute. This implication arises 
unless the Security Council were to provide otherwise. And if the 
Security Council were to provide that the Court should act 
otherwise than in accordance with its Statute, it is doubtful that the 
Court would be competent to do so, in spite of the Security Council 
decision.”  
He further argues that the ICC is not bound by Security Council Resolutions and not being a member of 
the UN, the provision of Article 103 of the UN Charter is not applicable to the Court, ibid., n.29 
312 
 
would tend towards artificiality. The extensive powers of the Security Council cannot 
make Sudan and Libya parties to the Rome Statute. To argue otherwise would be to 
subvert the foundational basis of the international order. The Council can impose 
certain treaty obligations upon UN members. Thus, by the combined effect of Article 
25 of the UN Charter and Resolutions 1593 and 1970, Sudan and Libya are in a 
similar position to parties to the Rome Statute.
62
  
 
On 6 July 2009, the Prosecutor appealed against the decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber 
in the Al-Bashir Arrest Warrant Application. The Appeals Chamber, on 3 February 
2010, unanimously reversed the decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber to the extent that 
the Pre-Trial Chamber erred in law when it applied a wrong standard of proof at the 
arrest warrant stage of the proceedings by its decision against issuing a warrant of 
arrest with respect to the charge of genocide against Al-Bashir.
63
 The Appeals 
Chamber in remanding the case back to the Pre-Trial Chamber directed that a new 
decision on the issuance of the arrest warrant with respect to the crime of genocide 
should be reached, using the correct standard of proof.
64
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 Akande, ibid., p.342. However, this is only with regard to the jurisdiction of the ICC and obligation to 
co-operate with the Court, it does not mean that other obligations of state parties, e.g. funding, redound 
on Sudan and Libya. 
63
In The Case of The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir (“Omar Al-Bashir”), „Judgment on 
the appeal of the Prosecutor against the “Decision on the Prosecution‟s Application for a Warrant of 
Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir‟, Public Document, No: ICC-02/05-01/09 OA, available 
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 The Pre-Trial Chamber had rejected the application of the Prosecutor in relation to the charge of 
genocide on the basis that the existence of genocidal intent was “only one of several reasonable 
conclusions available on the materials provided by the Prosecution.” The Appeals Chamber, however, 
was of the view that requiring the existence of genocidal intent to be the only reasonable conclusion 
resulted in requiring the Prosecutor to disprove any other reasonable conclusions and to eliminate any 
reasonable doubt thereof.  The standard of proof applied by the Pre-Trial Chamber had the practical 
effect of imposing a more stringent and burdensome standard as required for the arrest warrant stage of 
the proceedings as stipulated under Article 58(1)(a) of the Rome Statute. See Paragraph 33 of the 
Judgment of the Appeals Chamber, ibid. 
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On 12 July 2010, the Pre-Trial Chamber decided to issue a warrant of arrest against 
Al-Bashir for charges of genocide by killing,
65
 causing serious bodily or mental 
harm
66
 and deliberately inflicting on target groups conditions of life calculated to 
bring about the group‟s physical destruction.67 The Chamber also directed the 
Registrar of the Court to prepare a supplementary request for co-operation seeking the 
arrest and surrender of Al-Bashir for charges contained in both warrants of arrests and 
for transmission of the supplementary request to Sudan, all states parties and all 
Security Council members not states parties to the Rome Statute and those that were 
not members of the Council on 4 March 2009. 
 
On 27 June 2011, the Pre-Trial Chamber found there were reasonable grounds to issue 
arrest warrants for Muammar Gaddafi and his co-accused for crimes against humanity 
and made its decision to that effect.
68
 It also decided that the Registrar shall prepare a 
request for co-operation seeking the arrest and surrender of Gaddafi and his co-
accused which shall be transmitted to the competent Libyan authorities, all states 
parties to the Rome Statute, all of Libya‟s neighbouring states, and to the Security 
Council members not parties to the Rome Statute.
69
 The Chamber also directed the 
Registrar to prepare and transmit to any other state any additional request for the arrest 
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 Rome Statute, supra 3, Article 6(a) 
66
 Ibid., Article 6(b) 
67
 Ibid., Article 6(c) 
68
 Gaddafi Arrest Warrant Application, supra 46 
69
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and surrender necessary to effect the arrest and surrender of Gaddafi and his co-
accused.
70
 
 
The question arises whether the decision to issue a supplementary warrant of arrest for 
charges of genocide against Al-Bashir has an effect of the international immunities of 
Al-Bashir before the Court. This will best be considered in the obligation of states to 
provide judicial assistance and co-operation to the ICC. 
 
 
6.6 JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE AND CO-OPERATION WITH THE ICC: 
RESOLVING ARTICLE 98 OF THE ROME STATUTE WITH 
RESOLUTIONS 1593 AND 1970 
 
There is a general obligation to co-operate with the ICC in the investigation and 
prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court. This obligation is limited 
only to state parties of the Rome Statute. 
71
 The Court may report failure of a state 
party to co-operate with the ICC to the Assembly of states or to the Security Council, 
where the Council referred a matter to the Court.
72
 The failure of a state party in its 
obligation to co-operate with the ICC can be interpreted by the Assembly of state 
parties to the Rome Statute as a material breach of the Rome Statute entitling the states 
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71
 Rome Statute, supra 3, Article 86; Claus Kreβ and Kimberly Prost, „Article 86: General Obligation to 
Co-operate‟, in Otto Triffterer (edited), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court: Observers’Notes, Article by Article, 2nd edition, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008), p.1513-1514 
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 Rome Statute, ibid., Article 87(7). See recent Report by the Pre-Trial Chamber to the Security 
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parties, by virtue of Article 60 VCLT, by unanimous agreement to suspend the 
operation of the Rome Statute in whole or in part or to terminate it in the relations 
between themselves and the defaulting state or as between all the parties.  
 
However, strong policy reasons including the development of a system of 
accountability in international criminal law make this choice of action very unlikely. 
The likely consequences of the failure by a state party to co-operate with the Court 
would more likely be demand for compliance with the request and possibly strained 
relations with the Assembly of states.
73
 Where the ICC reports failure of a state party 
to co-operate to the Council, it is open to the Council to decide upon a range of actions 
under the UN Charter to enforce its decisions. 
 
States not parties to the Rome Statute are not obligated to co-operate with the ICC 
unless a basis exists for the assumption of the obligation.
74
 Article 87 (5) of the Rome 
Statute provides that, 
“a. The Court may invite any state not party to this 
Statute to provide assistance under this Part on the basis 
of an ad hoc arrangement, an agreement with such state 
or any other appropriate basis. 
b. Where a state not party to this Statute, which has 
entered into an ad hoc arrangement or an agreement 
with the Court, fails to co-operate with requests pursuant 
to any such arrangement or agreement, the Court may so 
inform the Assembly of states parties or, where the 
Security Council referred the matter to the Court, the 
Security Council.”  
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74
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Article 87(5)(a) envisages three different situations where the ICC can request states 
not parties to its Statute to assist the Court. Firstly, the assistance and co-operation of 
non-contracting parties may be requested on a case-by-case basis where ad hoc 
arrangements exist to that effect. Secondly, a request may proceed from the Court on a 
general basis where such an agreement has been concluded between a non-contracting 
party and the Court. And finally on any other appropriate basis, which would include 
where the Council has referred a situation to the Court. 
 
These situations under Paragraph 87(a) are mutually exclusive. There cannot be ad 
hoc arrangements when there is already in existence a general agreement to assist and 
co-operate with the Court. Likewise, in an appropriate case, for e.g. where the 
Council, acting under Chapter VII, has referred a situation to the ICC there will be no 
need for ad hoc arrangements or general agreements by non- contracting parties to co-
operate with the Court. The obligation of a non-contracting party to co-operate with 
the Court, where there has been a referral by the Council, will proceed not under the 
Rome Statute but under some other rule of international law.
75
  
 
This interpretation of Article 87(5)(a) is strengthened by the disjunctive use of the 
word “or”. Had the framers of the Statute wanted the situations to be mutually 
inclusive they would have used the conjunctive word „and‟, instead. Furthermore, 
there is support for this view of Article 87(5)(a) in Article 87(5)(b).  
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By Article 87(5)(b), on the one hand, where there has been failure by a non-
contracting party to co-operate with the Court in instances covered by the first two 
situations under Article 87(5)(a), i.e. where there exists an ad hoc arrangement or an 
agreement to co-operate with the Court, the Court is to inform the Assembly of states 
parties. On the other hand, where there has been a referral by the Security Council, 
failure by non-contracting parties to co-operate with the Court will necessitate a report 
to the Council. Therefore, by Article 87(5), the ICC expressly recognises the 
obligation of states not parties to its Statute to assist and co-operate with the Court 
where there has been a Council referral. 
 
The practical effect of Article 87(5)(b), is unclear except in the situation where the 
Council is informed of the failure of a non-contracting party to the Rome Statute to co-
operate with the ICC, where the jurisdiction of the ICC arose as a result of a referral 
by the Council. In this situation, the range of decisions and actions open to the Council 
are provided for under the UN Charter. Where a non-contracting party has entered into 
an ad hoc arrangement or an agreement to co-operate with the Court, failure to do so 
would merely necessitate information to the Assembly of states parties to the Rome 
Statute. The choice of actions open to the Assembly of state parties would be 
determined by the non-contractual status of the party vis-à-vis the ICC. 
 
Co-operation of states parties with the ICC is predicated upon the ability of the Court 
to secure the co-operation of third states for the waiver of their immunity. An analysis 
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of the obligation to co-operate with the ICC is incomplete without an examination of 
Article 98 of the Rome Statute.  
 
By Article 98 the Court may not make a request where to do so would result in state 
parties violating their international obligations regarding the international immunities 
of officials of third states.  A priori, Sudan and Libya not being parties to the Rome 
Statute are third states within the meaning of Article 98.
76
 Therefore, the Court is 
obliged not to request that states parties surrender Al-Bashir and Gaddafi since this 
would result in the violation of the immunities of Al-Bashir and Sudan as well as 
Gaddafi and Libya under customary international law. 
 
However, the effect of the decision of the Council to refer the Darfur and Libya 
situations to the ICC and the obligations of Sudan and Libya under Resolutions 1593 
and 1970, respectively, to co-operate fully with the Court is that Sudan and Libya are 
deemed to be in a similar position with parties to the Rome State and as such, there is 
no need for the requirement of the waiver of Sudan and Libya‟s immunities under 
Article 98.  
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 The description „third state‟ as used in this provision is unclear whether it refers to another state or a 
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Having argued so, this does not make the attitude of the Pre-Trial Chamber, in 
directing requests for co-operation for the arrest and surrender of Al-Bashir and 
Gaddafi from states parties without considering the provisions of Article 98 of the 
Rome Statute and the issue of immunity of Al-Bashir and Gaddafi before national 
authorities, any less objectionable. The Court was seised of jurisdiction to determine if 
it had the jurisdiction to make a request under Article 98 without having obtained the 
co-operation of Sudan by the waiver of immunity, yet the Court ignored the 
opportunity. 
 
The essence of Article 98 of the Statute is the recognition by the Court that despite the 
non-applicability of immunities of Heads of states before its proceedings that Heads of 
states, nonetheless, enjoy immunities vis-à-vis national authorities. The Court is under 
a legal obligation not to proceed with a request for arrest and surrender from state 
parties where such a request would require the requested state to act inconsistently 
with its obligations under international law with respect to the state or diplomatic 
immunity of a person or property of a third state, unless the Court has obtained the co-
operation of the third state by a waiver of the immunity.  
 
It has been argued that the failure by the Court to address the issue of the conflicting 
obligations of states parties that may arise as a result of the Court‟s request for arrest 
and surrender of Al-Bashir may be a breach by the Court of its obligations under 
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Article 98.
77
 This argument may be extended, pari passu, to the request for the arrest 
and surrender of Gaddafi. This view seems extreme when it is considered that the 
practical effect of Resolutions 1593 and 1970 bringing the Darfur and Libya situations 
within the jurisdiction of the ICC and its constitutional framework would also mean 
that the immunities available to Al-Bashir and Gaddafi are effectively removed before 
the ICC as well as before national authorities. As such, there is no requirement for the 
ICC to obtain the co-operation of Sudan and Libya by the waiver of immunity under 
Article 98 before the ICC can proceed with a request for surrender of Al-Bashir and 
Gaddafi from states parties. Furthermore, there is support for the argument that there is 
no requirement for the ICC to obtain the co-operation of Sudan and Libya by the 
waiver of its immunity when the wordings of Article 98, Resolutions 1593 and 1970 
are considered.  
 
Article 98 expressly provides that, 
“The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender 
or assistance which would require the requested state to 
act inconsistently with its obligations under international 
law with respect to the state or diplomatic immunity of a 
person or property of a third state, unless the Court can 
first obtain the co-operation of that third state for the 
waiver of the immunity.” (Emphasis added) 
 
Resolution 1593 provides that,  
“…the Government of Sudan and all other parties to the 
conflict in Sudan shall co-operate fully with and provide 
any necessary assistance to the Court and the Prosecutor 
pursuant to this Resolution, while recognizing that states 
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not party to the Rome Statute have no obligation under 
the Statute, urges all states and concerned regional and 
international organizations to co-operate fully.”78 
(Emphasis added) 
 
Likewise, Resolution 1970 provides that, 
“…the Libyan authorities shall co-operate fully with and 
provide any necessary assistance to the Court and the 
Prosecutor pursuant to this resolution and, while 
recognizing that States not party to the Rome Statute 
have no obligation under the Statute, urges all States and 
concerned regional and other international organizations 
to co-operate fully with the Court and the Prosecutor.”79 
(Emphasis added) 
 
The obligations of Sudan and Libya to co-operate fully with the Court, under 
Resolutions 1593 and 1970, must necessarily and implicitly include the co-operation 
of Sudan and Libya for the waiver of immunity under Article 98. As a result, the ICC 
must be deemed to have obtained the co-operation of Sudan and Libya for the waiver 
of the immunity. 
 
In situations like Darfur and Libya, where the Council had expressly or implicitly 
determined that there was a threat to international peace and security necessitating its 
Chapter VII enforcement powers, the Council may avail itself of pacifist and/or non-
pacifist choice of action to maintain international peace and security, subject to its 
better discretion and judgment. The referral of the Darfur and Libya situations in 
Resolutions 1593 and 1970 was a means to restore international peace and security in 
that region. Therefore, failure of Sudan and Libya to render judicial assistance and co-
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operation to the ICC would be disruptive of efforts restoring international peace and 
security and, very likely, a threat to international peace and security. Moreover, Sudan 
and Libya as UN members have contractually bound themselves to decisions of the 
Security Council. 
 
For ease of analysis of obligation of judicial assistance and co-operation under 
Resolutions 1593 and 1970, the provision of the Resolutions shall be considered as 
regards state parties, the Governments of Sudan and Libya, as well as states not parties 
to the Rome Statute.  
 
Firstly, the obligation of state parties to the Rome Statute to co-operate with the ICC is 
clearly provided for in Article 86 of the Rome Statute. It is also implicit in the 
Resolutions 1593 and 1970, and as such the re-statement in these Resolutions would 
be superfluous. 
 
Secondly, there is the decision in Resolution 1593 that the Government of Sudan and 
other parties to the conflict shall co-operate fully with and provide assistance to the 
Court, and the decision in Resolution 1970 that the Libyan authorities shall co-operate 
fully with and assist the ICC. The language of the Resolutions, by the use of the word 
„shall‟, makes mandatory the obligation of assistance and co-operation with the ICC 
by Sudan as well as parties to the conflict in Sudan and by the Libyan authorities. 
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Thirdly, there is the recognition by the Council that states not party to the Rome 
Statute have no obligation under the Statute. This recognition is in line with Article 34 
VCLT. The recognition of the Council with regard to the obligation of states not party 
to the Rome Statute was with respect to the Rome Statute and no more.
80
 Being a 
cardinal principle of interpretation that words are to be given their ordinary meaning, 
it would be wrong to rely on that recognition as a premise for arguing, generally, that 
states not party to the Rome Statute have no obligation to co-operate with the Court 
under Resolution 1593.
81
 The obligation on states not parties to the Statute lies outside 
the Statute. 
 
The Council, in adopting Resolution 1593 and 1970, acted under Chapter VII in 
deciding to refer the Darfur and Libya situations to the ICC as a means to restore 
international peace and security, it would be defeatist of the very essence of Chapter 
VII of the Charter for states not party to the Rome Statute, who are nonetheless UN 
members, not to be under an obligation to co-operate fully with the Court. The ICJ, in 
its (South West Africa) Advisory Opinion, stated that it would be inconsistent to 
maintain that where the Security Council has acted under its powers to maintain 
international peace and security on behalf of all member states that those member 
                                               
80
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states would be free to act in disregard of the action taken to maintain international 
peace and security.
82
 
 
The basis of the obligation for states not parties to the Rome Statute is not the Rome 
Statute but rather the UN Charter. This argument is strengthened by the fact that the 
referral to the ICC, as a measure necessary for the restoration of international peace 
and security, would be futile in the absence of an obligation of all states to co-operate 
with the Court. By the general membership of the UN, states not parties to the Rome 
Statute are nevertheless bound by Article 25 of the UN Charter. Therefore, 
theoretically as well as practically, the distinction that can be made between the 
obligations of co-operation of state parties to the Rome Statute, the Government of 
Sudan, the Libyan authorities and other states not party to the Rome Statute with 
regard to the referral of the Darfur and Libya situations to the ICC is minimal. The 
interpretation of the „urging‟ of states not party to the Rome Statute and its legal effect 
must be done against the backdrop of the UN Charter, especially Article 25 and 
Chapter VII. In fact, no distinction can be made between the obligation of states to co-
operate with the ICC where the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the 
Charter has referred a matter to the Court and the obligation of states to co-operate 
with the ICTY and the ICTR.
83
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The arguments set out above seem contrary to the language of Resolutions 1593 and 
1970 which in recognizing that states not party to the Statute do not have an obligation 
under the Statute, „urges‟ all states to co-operate fully with the ICC. It has been argued 
that Resolution 1593 only imposed “explicit obligations on one non-party”, i.e. Sudan, 
and that the Resolution does not contain any explicit obligation for other states to co-
operate with the ICC outside urging states and concerned regional and international 
organizations to co-operate with the Court.
84
 According to Akande, 
“An urging to co-operate is manifestly not intended to 
create an obligation to do so. The word „urges‟ suggests 
nothing more than a recommendation or exhortation to 
take certain action. That there is no obligation on non-
parties to co-operate with the ICC is made clear by the 
Security Council „recognizing that states not party to the 
Rome Statute have no obligation under the Statute‟.”85 
 
However, it is maintained that the arguments are not contrary to Resolutions 1593 and 
1970. The Resolutions merely re-state an accepted principle of international law, i.e. 
pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt that a treaty may not impose obligations on non-
parties without its consent. It has not been argued in this chapter that states not parties 
to the Rome Statute have any obligation under the Statute. The argument canvassed in 
the chapter is that although states not party to the Rome Statute do not have an 
obligation under the Statute, they have an obligation under UN Charter to co-operate 
fully with the ICC with respect to the Darfur and Libyan referrals. To this end, the 
legal effect of the „urge‟ upon states not party to the Rome Statute to co-operate with 
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the ICC is that their obligation to assist and co-operate with the ICC is same as those 
of Sudan, Libya and state parties to the Rome Statute which are already determined by 
the Resolutions. 
 
Without a doubt, the obligations of Sudan and Libya were explicitly provided in 
Resolutions 1593 and 1970. However, the obligations on other states not parties to the 
Rome Statute though implicit in the Resolutions as a Chapter VII measure for 
maintenance of international peace and security is explicit under Article 25 of the UN 
Charter. Therefore, Akande rightly argues that the „urging‟ was not intended to create 
an obligation. The clear legal basis for the obligation on other non-contracting parties 
is Article 25 of the UN Charter. The exhortatory nature of the urging is, therefore, 
taken for granted and cannot be taken to mean more especially in view that the 
Council in urging co-operation with the ICC did not confine its urging to non-
contracting parties but expressly “urges all states and concerned regional and other 
international organizations to co-operate fully.”  
 
There was no need for the Council to urge states that are parties to the Rome Statute to 
co-operate with the ICC because their obligation to co-operate is clearly subsistent. 
Likewise, there was no need for the Council to urge Sudan and Libya to co-operate 
because the Council had established their obligation to co-operate with the Court. 
With the obligation of other non-contracting parties to co-operate with the Court 
having been established in this chapter, it makes the „urging‟ completely redundant.  
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The use of exhortatory language rather than mandatory language in Resolutions 1593 
and 1970 does not mean that there is no imposition of an obligation on all states to co-
operate with the ICC. In fact, the ICJ has had occasion to specifically address this 
issue. According to the Court, 
“It has also been contended that the relevant Security 
Council resolutions are couched in exhortatory rather 
than mandatory language and that therefore, they do not 
purport to impose any legal duty on any state nor to 
affect legally any right of any state. The language of a 
resolution of the Security Council should be carefully 
analysed before a conclusion can be made as to its 
binding effect. In view of the nature of the powers under 
Article 25, the question whether they have been in fact 
exercised is to be determined in each case, having regard 
to the terms of the resolution to be interpreted, the 
discussions leading up to it, the Charter provisions 
invoked and, in general, all circumstances that might 
assist in determining the legal consequences of the 
resolution of the Security Council.”86 
 
By virtue of general membership in the UN organisation, it is submitted that all states 
have an obligation under Article 25 of the Charter to co-operate fully with the ICC. 
This follows from the decision of the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of 
the Charter, to refer the Darfur and Libya situations to the ICC as a means to restore 
international peace and security in those regions. The obligation to ensure the 
maintenance of international peace and security is not limited to only states parties to 
the Rome Statute. Moreover, the ICJ in the (South West Africa) Advisory Opinion 
stated as follows, 
“Thus when the Security Council adopts a decision 
under Article 25 in accordance with the Charter, it is for 
member states to comply with that decision, including 
those members of the Security Council which voted 
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against it and those Members of the United Nations who 
are not members of the Council. To hold otherwise 
would be to deprive this principal organ of its essential 
functions and powers under the Charter.”87 
 
The view has been expressed, by Professor Gaeta, that states parties to the Rome 
Statute are not under obligation to comply with the request of the ICC for the arrest 
and surrender of Al-Bashir because the request is “patently at odds” with Article 98.88 
The commentator argues that the enforcement of the warrant of arrest by any state 
with the exception of Sudan would violate the immunities, ratione personae, for 
incumbent Heads of states. According to her, 
“The ICC has not obtained from the Government of 
Sudan any waiver of the immunities of President Al-
Bashir; hence, it is not empowered by the Statute to 
proceed with a request for surrender. The steps taken by 
the ICC in this respect are ultra vires and at odds with 
Article 98(1). Therefore, states parties to the Statute are 
not obliged to execute the ICC request for surrender of 
President Al-Bashir, and can lawfully decide not to 
comply with it.… under the ICC Statute a referral by the 
Security Council is simply a mechanism designed to 
trigger the jurisdiction of the ICC, admittedly also with 
respect to crimes committed in the territory or by 
nationals of states not parties to the ICC Statute. It is 
nothing more than that. In other words, while the ICTY 
or the ICTR are subsidiary organs of the Security 
Council and constitute, in themselves, a measure to 
restore peace and security under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, the same is not true for the ICC… The 
obligations of states parties to co-operate with the ICC 
are and remain „only‟ treaty obligations, irrespective of 
how jurisdiction of the Court has been triggered, 
including in the case of a Security Council referral.”89 
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An analysis of the obligation of states to co-operate with the ICC over the Darfur 
situation cannot be made without the contextual benefit of the effect of Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter in Resolution 1593. The binding effect of a decision of the Council is 
not dependent on whether the decision of the Council to act was taken under Chapter 
VII or not. The Security Council can take, and has taken, binding decisions not under 
Chapter VII of the Charter. It is wondered why the Rome Statute (Article 13(b)) 
required the Council to act under Chapter VII in referring a matter to the Court.
90
  
 
The import and effect of Chapter VII of the UN Charter was well known to the 
drafters of the Rome Statute and indeed the signatories. The negotiations at Rome 
preceding the adoption of the Statute of the ICC were in the wake of the establishment 
of the ICTY and the ICTR by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII. By 
providing for the Council acting under Chapter VII in referring a situation to the ICC, 
there are strong reasons for suggesting that this allowed the Council to confer 
jurisdiction on the ICC over situations it would not ordinarily have jurisdiction rather 
than going through the expensive and slow process of setting up an ad-hoc tribunal.
91
 
 
The effect of the Council acting under Chapter VII is that the referral of the Darfur 
and Libya situations to the ICC, as well as the compliance by all states with requests 
for co-operation with the Court, are measures for the maintenance of international 
peace and security.
92
 Resolution 1593 is more than „simply‟ a trigger mechanism for 
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the jurisdiction of the ICC; it is a Chapter VII measure for the maintenance of 
international peace and security in the Darfur region. Being a measure for the 
maintenance of international peace and security, this defines the obligations of states 
towards the ICC. It would be defeatist and futile for the Council to „simply‟ trigger the 
jurisdiction of the ICC, only for Article 98 or for states not party to the Rome Statute 
to defeat the very purpose of the referral. 
 
As such, the requests by the ICC for the arrest and surrender of Al-Bashir and Gaddafi 
are not ultra vires the Court and states parties to the Rome Statute have an obligation 
to arrest and surrender Al-Bashir and Gaddafi if present in their territories. The issue 
of conflict of obligations on the part of states parties with regards to the request for 
arrest and surrender of Al-Bashir and Gaddafi by the ICC, necessitating the 
application of Article 103 of the UN Charter does not arise.
93
  
 
By Article 103 of the UN Charter, obligations of member states arising under the 
Charter prevail over other international obligations in the event of a conflict of 
obligations. The effect of Article 103 in this regard, seemingly, would be that that the 
obligations of member states to be bound by decisions of the Security Council under 
Article 25 of the UN Charter would prevail over the obligations of state parties not to 
violate the immunities of third states and their Heads of states under Article 98. 
However, Article 103 of the Charter does not arise because there are no conflicting 
obligations on states parties because Sudan and Libya, though third states, are in a 
similar position to state parties of the Rome Statute. As such, the requirement for the 
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waiver of immunities by Sudan and Libya under Article 98 is dispensed with. A 
further argument can be made that a purposeful interpretation of Article 27(2) of the 
Rome Statute which provides that immunities shall not bar the exercise of jurisdiction 
by the ICC would mean that Article 27(2) removes, not just immunities before the 
Court, but also immunities before national authorities acting in support of the Court.
94
 
 
Interestingly, the ICC has very recently relied on the „urging‟ of states to co-operate 
with the Court in Resolution 1593 in contending that there is a “clear obligation” on 
the part of Kenya to co-operate with the Court. This follows from the visits of Al-
Bashir to Chad and to Kenya in defiance of the arrest warrant and the requests for his 
surrender, prompting the Court to report Chad and Kenya to the Security Council. 
According to the Court, 
“Noting that the Republic of Kenya has a clear 
obligation to co-operate with the Court in relation to the 
enforcement of such warrants of arrest, which stems 
both from the United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 1593 (2005), whereby the United Nations 
Security Council "urge[d] all states and concerned 
regional and other international organizations to co-
operate fully" with the Court, and from article 87 of the 
Statute of the Court, to which the Republic of Kenya is a 
state party.”95 (Emphasis added) 
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The AU had requested the Security Council to defer the proceedings against Al-
Bashir, in line with Article 16 of the Rome Statute.
96
 Following the refusal of the 
Council to heed the request, the AU decided that its member states shall not co-operate 
under Article 98 of the Rome Statute.
97
 In response to the decision of the ICC 
informing the Security Council of the failure of Chad and Kenya to arrest and 
surrender Al-Bashir to the ICC, the AU has stated that its decision that member states 
are not to co-operate under Article 98 of the Statute is binding upon Chad and Kenya 
and that “it will be wrong to coerce them to violate or disregard their obligations to the 
African Union.”98 
 
It is submitted that the view of the AU is misplaced. Chad and Kenya are states parties 
to the Rome Statute as well as members of the UN. They are obligated under the 
Rome Statute and the UN Charter to co-operate with the ICC.
99
 Their obligation under 
the Charter must prevail over their conflicting obligations to the AU.  
 
It has been argued earlier in this chapter that although states not parties to the Rome 
Statute do not have an obligation under the Statute, they have an obligation under the 
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UN Charter, to co-operate with the Court. The relationship between states not parties 
to the Rome Statute vis-à-vis Sudan and Libya is governed by customary international 
law on Head of state immunity, by which states are under an obligation to respect the 
absolute immunity and inviolability of incumbent Heads of states even for 
international crimes.  There is an apparent conflict of obligations of states not parties 
to the Rome Statute implicit in Resolutions 1593 and 1970 and explicit under Article 
25 of the Charter with their obligations under customary international law. Therefore, 
Article 103 of the Charter would be applicable in this situation making the obligations 
of states not parties to the Rome Statute to prevail over their obligations under 
customary international law.
100
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puts forward the view that, 
“In any case, the practice of the Security Council has continuously 
been grounded on an understanding that Security Council 
resolutions override conflicting customary law. As the Security 
Council is a creation of the Charter, it would be odd if the 
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The obligation of states to co-operate with the ICC is defined by the pervasive nature 
of the Chapter VII powers of the Security Council. The Council had a choice not to 
refer the Darfur and Libya situations to the ICC, having made such a decision under 
Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council is bound by the decision as well as the nature 
of the obligations arising as a result. In negotiating the terms of Resolutions 1593 and 
1970 and trying to avoid the veto of US which has vehemently opposed the 
jurisdiction of the ICC over nationals and officials of states not parties to the Rome 
Statute,
101
 it is not open to the Council to re-negotiate the Charter.  
 
There are strong policy and practical reasons for arguing that the obligation to co-
operate fully with the ICC over the Darfur and Libya situations redounds on all UN 
members. Firstly, parity of reasoning would suggest that since states are bound by the 
decision of the Council referring the matter to the ICC, concomitantly states are also 
bound to co-operate fully with the Court. Secondly, to maintain otherwise would rob 
the international legal order of its very essence by allowing a few states to re-negotiate 
the terms of the Charter without the consent and participation of all members. Thirdly, 
it would also have the insalubrious effect of allowing Security Council members not 
parties to the Rome Statute, to take advantage of the ICC without being obliged to the 
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Court.
102
 Finally, it would be wrong to impose the obligations of ensuring the 
maintenance of international peace and security in the Darfur and Libya regions on 
only parties to the Rome Statute. 
 
6.6.1 THE EFFECT OF THE INCLUSION OF THE CHARGE OF GENOCIDE 
AGAINST AL-BASHIR 
Article IV of the Genocide Convention removes the substantive and procedural 
defence of official capacity with respect to genocide by providing that persons 
committing genocide or genocidal acts shall be punished, whether they are 
constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals.
103
 In 
furtherance of which, Article VI of the Genocide Convention provides that persons 
charged with genocide shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the state possessing 
territorial jurisdiction over the acts of genocide or by an international criminal tribunal 
possessing jurisdiction with respect to contracting parties which shall have accepted its 
jurisdiction.
104
  
 
Having established that the immunity of Al-Bashir does not apply before proceedings 
of the ICC by virtue of Article 25 of the Charter, Resolution 1593 and Article 27 of 
the Rome Statute, it is imperative to consider whether the inclusion of the charge of 
genocide against Al-Bashir has an additional effect on the immunity of Al-Bashir 
before national jurisdictions as well as before the ICC. 
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States parties to the Genocide Convention have an obligation to prevent and punish 
acts of genocide. Jurisdiction may be exercised under Article VI of the Genocide 
Convention by a state party to the Convention in whose territory genocide was 
committed or by an international criminal tribunal where parties to the Convention 
have accepted the jurisdiction of such international tribunal. Firstly, parties to the 
Genocide Convention are not obligated to exercise jurisdiction over genocide in 
Darfur, under the Convention, because territorial jurisdiction over genocide in Darfur 
can only be exercised by Sudan. According to the ICJ,
105
 
“Article VI only obliges the contracting parties to 
institute and exercise territorial criminal jurisdiction; 
while it certainly does not prohibit states, with respect to 
genocide, from conferring jurisdiction on their criminal 
courts based on criteria other than where the crime was 
committed which are compatible with international law, 
in particular the nationality of the accused, it does not 
oblige them to do so.” 
 
By the interpretation of the ICJ, only Sudan is under an obligation to exercise 
territorial criminal jurisdiction and while Article VI does not prohibit other states from 
exercising jurisdiction in line with international law, for instance on grounds of 
nationality of the accused, it does not oblige them to do so.  
 
Secondly, there is the issue of whether states not parties to the Rome Statute have an 
obligation under the Genocide Convention to assist the ICC by arresting and 
surrendering Al-Bashir. Not having ratified the Statute the question whether such 
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states can be said to have accepted the jurisdiction of the ICC arises. Article VI of the 
Genocide Convention specifically provides that the jurisdiction of the international 
tribunal must be with respect to the contracting parties of the Convention which shall 
have accepted the jurisdiction of such a tribunal. The ICJ in the Bosnia Genocide 
Convention Case stated that,  
“The notion of an “international penal tribunal” within 
the meaning of Article VI must at least cover all 
international criminal courts created after the adoption 
of the Convention (at which date no such court existed) 
of potentially universal scope, and competent to try the 
perpetrators of genocide or any of the other acts 
enumerated in Article III.”106 
 
It is not in doubt that the ICC falls within the contemplation of Article VI of the 
Genocide Convention as an international penal tribunal. It is an international criminal 
court which is potentially universal in scope and has jurisdiction over genocide as well 
as the Darfur situation. However, the phrase “which shall have accepted its 
jurisdiction” in Article VI remains unclear. Is the acceptance of the jurisdiction of 
such an international penal tribunal limited to only where states have contractually 
bound themselves to such a tribunal?  
 
The ICJ, in the Bosnia Genocide Convention Case, stated that,
107
 
“The question whether the Respondent must be regarded 
as having “accepted the jurisdiction” of the ICTY within 
the meaning of Article VI [Genocide Convention] must 
consequently be formulated as follows: is the 
Respondent obliged to accept the jurisdiction of the 
ICTY, and to co-operate with the Tribunal by virtue of 
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the Security Council resolution which established it, or 
of some other rule of international law?” 
 
The test for the question of whether a state has accepted the jurisdiction of an 
international penal tribunal within the meaning of the Article VI of the Genocide 
Convention is not whether a state is a party to the constitutive instrument of the 
tribunal but rather it is whether a state is obliged to accept the jurisdiction and to co-
operate with the Tribunal by virtue of its constitutive instrument or by some other rule 
of international law.
108
 
 
Based on this test, clearly the parties to the Rome Statute that are parties to the 
Genocide Convention come within the meaning of having accepted the jurisdiction of 
the ICC with respect to genocide in Darfur by virtue of their obligation to accept the 
jurisdiction of the Court and co-operate with the Court under the Rome Statute as the 
constitutive instrument of the Court. 
 
With respect to states not parties to the Rome Statute that are parties to the Genocide 
Convention, a distinction can be made with regard to their status as members of the 
UN.  Members of the UN that are parties to the Genocide Convention must be deemed 
to have accepted the jurisdiction of the ICC with regard to the Darfur situation for the 
purposes of Article VI of the Genocide Convention, irrespective of their not being 
parties to the Rome Statute. This is because an acceptance by such states, under 
Article 25 of the Charter, to be bound by the decisions of the Security Council is an 
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acceptance of the jurisdiction of the ICC over the Darfur situation. The referral, in 
Resolution 1593, being a Chapter VII measure for the maintenance of international 
peace and security necessarily implies an obligation on UN members who are not 
parties to the Rome Statute but are parties to the Genocide Convention to co-operate 
fully with the ICC.  
 
The decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC to issue a supplementary arrest 
warrant including charges of genocide against Al-Bashir has a legal effect on parties to 
the Genocide Convention that are parties to the Rome Statute as well as parties to the 
Convention that are not parties to the Rome Statute but are members of the UN. These 
states have an obligation to accept the jurisdiction of the ICC and to co-operate fully 
with the Court under Resolution 1593 and the UN Charter, and failure to arrest and 
surrender Al-Bashir, if present in their territory, will engage their international legal 
responsibility under the Genocide Convention.
109
  
 
Non-members of the UN that are parties to the Genocide Convention but not the Rome 
Statute, are not under an obligation to accept the jurisdiction of the ICC because they 
are not bound by Article 25 of the Charter and as such they cannot be deemed to have 
accepted the jurisdiction of the ICC for the purposes of Article VI of the Genocide 
Convention. There can be no engagement of the international responsibility of such 
                                               
109
 See Bosnia Genocide Convention case, supra 105, where the Government of the Republic of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina instituted proceedings against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro) before the ICJ for failure of its international obligation under the Genocide Convention to 
prevent and punish acts of genocide. The ICJ found that Yugoslavia had failed in its obligation to co-
operate with the ICTY and as such had failed to fulfil its obligation to prevent and punish acts of 
genocide under the Convention thereby engaging its international responsibility. 
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states under the Convention for failure to arrest and surrender Al-Bashir. However, the 
general membership in the UN makes this point moot. 
 
 
6.7 CONCLUSION 
 
The establishment of the ICC is a water-shed in the development of a system of 
accountability in international criminal law and heralded the departure from ad hocism 
which characterised international criminal courts in the 1990s to permanence. This 
chapter has shown that the decision of the ICJ in the Arrest Warrant case including the 
ICC as one of the international courts before which immunities of officials including 
Heads of states will not be applicable is limited by the pacta tertiis nec nocent nec 
prosunt principle, i.e. the constitutive instrument theory.  
 
Under a multilateral treaty like the Rome Statute, states parties can modify, and indeed 
have modified, existing customary international law on Head of state immunity 
between themselves, this does not mean that they can modify customary international 
law on Head of state immunity for non-contracting parties. The fact that the Assembly 
of states parties of the Rome Statute is made up of 116 states does not derogate from 
customary international law on Head of state immunity. After all, what one or two 
states cannot do, neither can 116. 
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This chapter has also shown that the Security Council can by-pass the pacta tertiis nec 
nocent nec prosunt principle by effectively removing the immunities of Heads of 
states of non-contracting parties to the Rome Statute by referring a matter to the ICC, 
acting under its Chapter VII powers. This would have the effect of putting a non-
contracting party in a similar position with states parties. As such, the issue of Head of 
state immunity of third states which have been referred to the ICC by the Council is 
determined similarly to the ICTY and the ICTR, i.e. by Article 25 of the UN Charter 
which founds the jurisdiction of an international court in such instance. Where the 
Council so acts, non-contracting parties are under obligation like state parties to co-
operate with the ICC. Also, where a charge of genocide is included against Heads of 
states, states parties as well as states not parties to the Rome Statute, where there has 
been a referral by the Council, may be further obliged under the Genocide Convention 
to co-operate with the ICC. Failure to do so would result in the engagement of the 
international responsibility of such states where they are parties to the Genocide 
Convention. 
 
The ICC has great legal and political significance to the development of an 
international criminal system and is of vital importance to the discourse on whether, 
and the extent to which, there is a new international law on Head of state immunity. 
This is why the non-consideration of the very important issue of the immunity of 
Heads of states and the applicability or otherwise of Article 98 by the Pre-Trial 
Chamber as well as the Appeal Chamber of the ICC, in the cases concerning Al-Bashir 
and Gaddafi, is most regrettable. It is hoped that the Court will address this issue 
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especially in view of the stance of the AU and, in future, embrace the opportunity to 
contribute to the development of international law by fully examining and analysing 
all the issues involved in the case concerning Al-Bashir.  
 
Having considered the last category of international courts, Chapter 7 will consider 
Head of state immunity before internationalised courts. 
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CHAPTER 7: HEAD OF STATE IMMUNITY BEFORE 
INTERNATIONALISED COURTS 
 
7.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
The fight against impunity has led to the establishment of a different generation of 
courts which are characterised by their mixture of national and international elements. 
More popularly termed „hybrid tribunals‟ the definitional challenge inherent in the 
term lends preference, in this thesis, to the term „internationalised tribunals‟. This is 
especially so because of the incorporation of international elements into the operations 
of otherwise domestic courts. This generation of courts is exemplified by the Special 
Panel for Serious Crimes in the Dili District Court in East Timor, „Regulation 64‟ 
Panels in the Courts of Kosovo, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia, and the Special Court for Sierra Leone. These courts vary in their 
particular forms of hybridity. 
 
Usually the products of international crisis, these courts are characterised by 
compositions of international and national staff, international and domestic financing, 
application of domestic and international laws in proceedings, and the co-existence of 
these tribunals alongside local judiciary.
1
 These characteristics, while indicative of a 
degree of internationality, are not conclusive of the status of the courts. Rather, the 
constitutive instruments of the courts determine their status and question of immunity.  
                                               
1
 Etelle R. Higonnet, „Restructuring Hybrid Courts: Local Empowerment and National Criminal Justice 
Reform‟, (2005-2006) 23 Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 347, pp. 352, 356 
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On the one hand, there are the Special Panel for Serious Crimes in the Dili District 
Court in East Timor, the „Regulation 64‟ Panels in the courts of Kosovo and the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) which are essentially 
domestic courts within the existing court structures of the states. Space limitations 
make it imprudent to consider all three of the courts; rather only the ECCC will be 
considered because it is atypical of this class of internationalised courts, also the 
immunity of Heads of states before their states of origin has been considered in 
Chapter 3, and because Sampan Khieu, the former leader of Cambodia is currently 
standing trial before it.  
 
On the other hand, there are the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) and the 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) which are internationalised courts resulting from 
treaties and which are not part of the court structures of Sierra Leone and Lebanon. 
These courts will also feature in the analysis in this chapter.  
 
This chapter will consider the different internationalised courts with a view to 
ascertaining whether Head of state immunity is applicable before proceedings in 
internationalised courts, the emergent trends discernible from the practice of these 
courts and the extent to which these trends inform a new international law on Head of 
state immunity. The constitutive instrument theory will form the backdrop against 
which the analysis in the chapter will be undertaken.  Similarly, the question of 
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obligation of states to co-operate with and assist internationalised courts will be 
addressed in this chapter.   
 
 
7.2 THE EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA  
 
Following the overthrow of Pol Pot‟s government by the invasion of Vietnam, the new 
government of Cambodia sought a mechanism for accountability of the atrocities 
committed by the Khmer Rouge.
2
 In 1979, trials in absentia were held and Pol Pot was 
convicted and sentenced to death. In 1997, Cambodia which was yet to recover from 
the devastation of the Khmer Rouge, requested the assistance of the UN in responding 
to the serious violations of Cambodian and international law by the Khmer Rouge. 
3
 
 
The UN set up a Group of Experts to determine the nature of the crimes committed by 
Khmer Rouge leaders in the years 1975-1979 as well as to explore legal options for 
bringing them to justice before an international or national court.
4
 The Group of 
Experts recommended the establishment of an ad hoc international criminal tribunal 
under the control of the UN to ensure the accountability of the Khmer Rouge leaders.
5
 
 
                                               
2
 Also known as the Communist Party of Kampuchea 
3
 Letter from the Prime Ministers of Cambodia to the Secretary-General (21 June 1997), 
UNDocA/51/930-S/1997/488, Annex 
4
 UNGA Res 52/135 (1997) UNDocA/RES/52/135; Letter from the Secretary-General to the President 
of the General Assembly (31 July 1998) UNDocA/52/1007 
5
 „Report of the Group of Experts for Cambodia established pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 
52/135‟ (16 March 1999) UNDocA/53/850-S/1999/231, Annex 
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In 2001, despite not having reached an agreement with the UN, the Cambodian 
Assembly passed the Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in The 
Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the Period of 
Democratic Kampuchea (“Law on ECCC”).6 However in June 2003, following the 
resumption of negotiations, an agreement was finally reached between the 
Government of Cambodia and the UN on the Khmer Rouge Tribunal.
7
  
 
Despite initial plans and efforts to have the ECCC established by an agreement 
between the Government of Cambodia and the UN, the legal basis, and the 
constitutive instrument, of the ECCC is the Law on the ECCC. Although it was 
originally envisaged that the Chambers was going to fall into the category of courts 
established by international agreement, it ended up differently.
8
 The ECCC is 
therefore, a domestic court established within the existing court structure and judiciary 
of Cambodia by the Government of Cambodia. The Chambers is internationalised to 
the extent that it shall apply Cambodian law as well as international law, and that it is 
composed of international as well as national staff in the form of judges and 
prosecutors.  
 
                                               
6
 Text available at http://www.derechos.org/human-rights/seasia/doc/krlaw.html, (Last accessed 
16/08/2011) 
7
 Daniel Kemper Donovan, „Recent Developments: Joint U.N.–Cambodia Efforts to Establish a Khmer 
Rouge Tribunal‟, (2003) 44 Harvard International Law Journal 551, p.564. Text of Agreement 
available at 
http://www.cambodiatribunal.org/sites/default/files/resources/Agreement_between_UN_and_RGC.pdf, 
(Last accessed 16/08/2011) 
8
 Sarah Williams, „The Cambodian Extraordinary Chambers- A Dangerous Precedent for International 
Justice‟, (2004) 53 ICLQ 227, p.232 
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Since the legal basis, and the constitutive instrument, of the Chambers is the Law on 
the ECCC, the question of the status of the Agreement arises. The purpose of the 
Agreement is the regulation of co-operation between the UN and Cambodia in 
bringing to trial the senior leaders and those most responsible for the crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Chambers and the provision of the legal basis, the principles and 
modalities for such co-operation.
9
  
 
The Agreement does not lay claims to the establishment of the Chambers; it is only 
concerned with the regulation of co-operation between the parties in the functioning of 
the Chambers.
10
 In fact the Agreement recognises the subject matter and personal 
jurisdiction of the Chambers as set forth in its constitutive instrument.
11
 The 
Agreement is a treaty which is to be implemented through the Law on the ECCC.
12
 
Being a treaty, Cambodia cannot rely on its domestic law to defeat its obligations 
under the Agreement.
13
  
 
The personal jurisdiction of the Chambers is with respect to senior leaders of 
Democratic Kampuchea, i.e. those who would ordinarily have been entitled to 
                                               
9
 Article 1 of the Agreement, which entered into force on 19 October 2004 following its ratification as 
specified under Article 31 of the Agreement. 
10
 Helen Horsington, „The Cambodian Khmer Rouge Tribunal: The Promise of a Hybrid Tribunal‟, 
(2004) 5 Melbourne Journal of International Law 462, p.474, argues that the substantive provisions of 
the Agreement on the operation and administration of the Tribunal contradicts its assertion of merely 
regulating co-operation between the UN and Cambodia. 
11
 Supra 7, Article 2(1) 
12
 Ibid., Article 2(2) provides for the application of the provisions of Articles 26 and 27 VCLT to the 
Agreement. 
13
 Cambodia has amended the Law on the ECCC in line with the Agreement, see Law on the 
Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes 
Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea (As Amended), available at 
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/legal-
documents/KR_Law_as_amended_27_Oct_2004_Eng.pdf (Last accessed 16/08/2011) 
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functional immunities, and those bearing the most responsibility for the crimes within 
the subject matter jurisdiction of the Chambers.
14
 The functional immunities of these 
senior leaders including Head of state is removed by Article 29 of the Law on the 
ECCC (As Amended), which provides that, 
“The position or rank of any suspect shall not relieve 
such person of criminal responsibility or mitigate 
punishment.” 
 
International immunity is a sovereign attribute pertaining to a state. The right of a state 
cannot be used to the detriment of the state. As such, Samphan Khieu who was Head 
of state of Democratic Kampuchea and a full rights member of the Khmer Rouge from 
17 April 1975 to 6 January 1979 who is charged with crimes against humanity and war 
crimes before the Chambers cannot rely on immunity to bar the jurisdiction of the 
Chambers. The ECCC is trying Cambodians and so the issue of international 
immunities will not arise. In Sampan Khieu‟s case it is not international immunities 
that would have been implicated before the Chambers but rather national immunities 
which are effectively removed by Article 29 of the Law on the ECCC. Moreover, the 
House of Lords in Pinochet (No.3) stated that the commission of crimes cannot come 
under the official functions of Heads of states so as to entitle former Heads of states to 
immunity ratione materiae.
15
  
 
 
 
                                               
14
 Ibid., Articles 1 and 2 
15
 [1999] 2 All E.R. 97; see Chapter 3 of thesis 
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7.2.1 JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE AND CO-OPERATION WITH THE ECCC 
States are not obligated to assist or co-operate with the Chambers. Neither does the 
Agreement purport to impose such obligation on states.
16
 Rather, by Article 25 of the 
Agreement the Government of Cambodia is obligated to comply without undue delay 
to any request for assistance by the co-investigating judges, the co-prosecutors and the 
Extraordinary Chambers. The obligation under Article 25 is limited to Cambodia and 
it is an agreement which Cambodia is privy to and is bound by. The ECCC, being 
essentially a national court by virtue of the Law on the ECCC, can only rely on 
bilateral or multilateral agreements to secure the co-operation and assistance of states.  
 
 
7.3 THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE 
 
In June 2000, the President of Sierra Leone requested assistance from the UN to bring 
to justice those responsible for crimes against the people of Sierra Leone.
17
 The 
Government requested the UN to establish an international court to prosecute those 
responsible for war crimes committed in the course of the civil war.
18
 The Security 
Council, on 14 August 2000, adopted Resolution 1315 requesting the Secretary-
                                               
16
 Even if the Agreement did, states are not bound by the Agreement- only the Government of 
Cambodia and the UN are bound by it. 
17
 Letter from President of Sierra Leone to the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan UNDocS/2000/786, 
Annex 
18
 For background, see Tom Perriello and Marieke Wierda, „The Special Court for Sierra Leone Under 
Scrutiny‟, International Center for Transitional Justice, March 2006; James L. Miglin, „From Immunity 
to Impunity: Charles Taylor and the Special Court for Sierra Leone‟, (2007) 16 Dalhousie Journal of 
Legal Studies 21 
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General to negotiate an agreement with the Government of Sierra Leone for the 
establishment of an independent criminal court in response to the crimes.
19
  
 
The Council in its recommendation for the establishment of the SCSL proposed that 
the personal jurisdiction of the Court should extend to “leaders” and others who bear 
the greatest responsibility for the commission of crimes against humanity, war crimes 
and other serious violations of international humanitarian law as well as crimes under 
Sierra Leonean law committed in Sierra Leone.
20
 However, it is important to 
remember that jurisdiction does not automatically imply an absence of immunity. 
 
The Secretary-General recommended the establishment of the SCSL by an agreement 
between the Government of Sierra Leone and the UN which would be “a treaty-based 
sui generis court of mixed jurisdiction and composition”.21 The SCSL was created 
following the conclusion of the „Agreement on the Establishment of a Special Court 
for Sierra Leone between the UN and the Government of Sierra Leone‟.22  
 
Like the Statutes of the ICTY, ICTR and ICC, Article 6(2) of the Statute of the SCSL 
specifically provides that, 
“The official position of any accused persons, whether 
as Head of State or Government or as a responsible 
                                               
19
 S/RES/1315 (2000); see Michael Scharf, „The Special Court for Sierra Leone‟, (October 2000) ASIL 
Insights 
20
 S/RES/1315 (2000), Operative Paragraph 3 
21
 Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, 4 October 
2000, UNDoc.S/2000/915, especially paragraph 9 
22
 Appendix II to the “Letter Dated 6 March 2002 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President 
of 
the Security Council”; text available at www.sc-sl.org  
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government official, shall not relieve such person of 
criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment.”23 
 
In March 2003, the SCSL issued a 17-count indictment against Charles Taylor while 
he was still President of Liberia for crimes against humanity and grave breaches of the 
Geneva Conventions.
24
 In December 2003, an international arrest warrant was issued 
against Taylor during a visit to Ghana which was hosting peace negotiations.
 
The 
Ghanaian authorities did not effect the arrest warrant. 
 
In August 2003, Taylor stepped down as Head of state and was granted exile by the 
Nigerian Government. However, due to mounting international political pressure on 
Nigeria particularly by the US, and a request for the surrender of Mr Taylor by the 
Government of Liberia, Nigeria released Taylor to Liberia despite the absence of a 
bilateral extradition agreement. He was arrested by the United Nations Mission in 
Liberia (UNMIL) and was transferred to the SCSL in November 2006 to stand trial. 
 
7.3.1 HEAD OF STATE IMMUNITY BEFORE THE SPECIAL COURT FOR 
SIERRA LEONE: PROSECUTOR V. CHARLES TAYLOR 
In 2003, Charles Taylor filed a motion under protest and without waiving his 
immunity, before the SCSL Trial Chamber to quash the indictment against him and to 
                                               
23
 Statute of the SCSL available at www.sc-sl.org  
24
 Prosecutor v Charles Ghankay Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01, Indictment, 3 March 2003, www.sc-
sl.org; 
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declare his arrest warrant as null and void. The motion was referred to the Appeals 
Chamber of the Court.
25
 
 
Taylor challenged the jurisdiction of the Court on a number of grounds.
26
 In the main, 
he contended firstly that he had absolute immunity from criminal prosecution based on 
the decision of the ICJ in the Arrest Warrant case and his incumbency at the time of 
the indictment. Secondly that rules derogating from the international rule providing for 
immunities can only derive from other rules of international law such as Security 
Council Resolutions passed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Thirdly that the 
SCSL not having Chapter VII powers, its judicial orders are at par with those of 
national courts; and that the indictment was invalid due to his personal immunity. 
Furthermore, the timing of the disclosure of the indictment and the arrest warrant was 
with a view to frustrating his peace-making efforts and prejudiced his functions as 
Head of state. 
 
In response to these contentions, the Prosecutor submitted that the Arrest Warrant 
case concerns the immunities of serving Heads of states from the jurisdiction of 
national courts of other states and customary international law allows the indictment 
of serving Heads of state by international criminal courts. The Prosecutor contended 
that the SCSL is an international criminal court established under international law; 
and that the lack of Chapter VII powers does not affect the Court‟s jurisdiction over 
                                               
25
 Under Rule 72(E) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court, Preliminary motions made in the Trial 
Chamber which raise a serious issue relating to jurisdiction shall be referred to the Appeals Chamber. 
26
 Prosecutor v Charles Ghankay Taylor (Case No. SCSL-2003-01-1),  Decision on Immunity from 
Jurisdiction, 31 March 2004, www.sc-sl.org; [Hereinafter Taylor case] 
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Heads of states as illustrated by the ICC which though lacks the Chapter VII powers, 
its Statute expressly denies Heads of state immunity for international crimes.
27
 
 
Essentially, the arguments of Taylor and the Prosecution concern the effect of the 
decision of the ICJ in the Arrest Warrant case, the status of the SCSL and the effect of 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter on the powers of a court. 
 
The ICJ after analysing state practice, in the Arrest Warrant case, held that serving 
senior officials like Heads of states enjoy absolute immunity from criminal 
proceedings.
28
 However, the ICJ qualified its position by saying that there are 
exceptions to such immunities including “certain international courts where they have 
jurisdiction”.29 It is manifest from the phrase that the ICJ that it did not envisage that 
any international criminal court could override immunities, only certain kinds of 
international court where they have jurisdiction. Unfortunately, the ICJ did not 
elaborate on what makes an international court come within the contemplation of 
Paragraph 61 of its Judgment.  
 
An international court can only come under the contemplation of Paragraph 61 if its 
constitutive instrument is such that expressly or impliedly removes jurisdictional 
immunities and is binding on the state, the immunity of whose official is sought to be 
removed. Any rule of international law allowing the indictment of serving Heads of 
states, if existent, is limited to the ICTY, ICTR and the ICC (with respect to state 
                                               
27
 Ibid. 
28
 (2002) ICJ Reports 3, Paragraph 58  
29
 Ibid., Paragraph 61 
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parties or where there has been a referral by the Security Council acting under its 
Chapter VII powers).  
 
Contrary to Taylor‟s assertion, the SCSL is not a national court. Neither is it a purely 
international one like the Prosecutor argues. The status of the SCSL is determined 
primarily by its constitutive instrument and secondarily by its features as well as in 
comparison with other international criminal courts. 
 
7.3.2 STATUS OF THE SCSL AND THE IMMUNITY OF CHARLES TAYLOR 
The treaty-based nature of the SCSL sets the path of enquiry into the status of the 
Court within an international context. The foundation of the Court in the Agreement 
between the UN and Sierra Leone is an important factor which goes to the 
international status of the Court. Other important indices as to the international nature 
of the SCSL include the international funding of the Court;
30
 its separate legal 
personality and its capacity to enter into agreements with states;
31
 immunity and 
privileges as provided in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 
enjoyed by officials of the Court;
32
 the application of the Rules of Evidence and 
Procedure of the ICTR to the Court‟s proceedings;33 provision for recourse to the 
sentencing practice of the ICTR;
34
 the enforcement of its sentences in penitential 
                                               
30
 Agreement to Establish the Special Court of Sierra Leone, supra 22, Article 6 
31
 Ibid., Article 11 
32
 Ibid., Article 12 
33
 Statute of the Special Court, supra 23, Article 14 
34
 Ibid., Article 19 
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institutions of foreign states;
35
 and the requirement of submission of an annual report 
by the President of the Court to the UN Secretary-General.
36
  
 
Furthermore, by Section 11(2) of the Special Court Agreement (Ratification) Act 2002 
the Court shall not form part of the Judiciary of Sierra Leone.
37
 The Court is to be 
staffed by international judges, prosecutor and registrar for the Court with the 
Secretary-General and the Sierra Leonean government sharing responsibility for their 
appointment.
38
  
 
Thus, the SCSL is an international court. It also has a national dimension and the 
Secretary-General, in his Report to the Council, had proposed that the Special Court 
would be a “treaty-based sui generis court of mixed jurisdiction and composition”.39  
 
The treatment of the status of the Court by the parties and the Appeals Chamber was 
simplistic. On the one hand, it was considered that the fact that the Court is not part of 
the judiciary of Sierra Leone and as well as other indices showing that the Court is not 
a national court were such to make the Court an international one with the implication 
that Head of state immunity is inapplicable before its proceedings.  On the other hand, 
those who assert its national status contend that there is nothing in the Agreement or 
the Ratification Act to suggest that the Court is an international court and as such 
cannot arrogate to itself the powers of an international tribunal. There is no 
                                               
35
 Ibid., Article 22 
36
 Ibid., Article 25 
37
 www.sc-sl.org  
38
 Statute of the Special Court, op.cit., Article 12, 15 and 16  
39
 Report of the Secretary-General on the establishment of the SCSL, supra 21, Paragraph 9 
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consideration of the constitutive instrument of the SCSL and whether states are bound 
by it.  
 
The Appeals Chamber‟s over-emphasis on the involvement of the Security Council in 
the establishment of the SCSL is evident in other decisions of the Court.
40
 This 
misconception has resulted in the misanalysis of the issue of the powers of the Court 
and is evident in its reasoning in Taylor case.
41
 The Appeals Chamber asserted that the 
preamble to Security Council Resolution 1315 recommending the establishment of the 
Court shows that the Court was established to fulfil an international mandate as part of 
the machinery of international justice and therefore is an international court.
42
 The 
Chamber relied on Resolution 1315 and the powers of the Council in Articles 39 and 
41 of the UN Charter in its conclusions on the status of the SCSL.
43
  
 
As stated earlier in Chapter 6, the preamble of an international instrument is merely 
exhortatory and is not legally binding. The Chamber‟s attempt to connect the 
establishment of the SCSL to the Security Council, however remotely, seems 
desperate and was unnecessary. Arguably, the awareness of the limitations of the 
bilateral nature of the Agreement and its non-obligatory nature towards third states 
compelled the Appeals Chamber to desperation.  
 
                                               
40
 See Prosecutor v. Augustine Gbao (Case No. SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E)), Decision on Preliminary 
Motion on the Invalidity of the Agreement between the UN and the Government of Sierra Leone on the 
Establishment of the Special Court, 25 May 2004, Paragraph 5 and also Prosecutor v. Moinina Fofana 
(Case No. SCSL-2004-14-AR72(E)), Decision on Preliminary Motion on Lack of Jurisdiction: Illegal 
Delegation of Powers by the United Nations, 25 May 2004, Paragraphs 23 and 27 
41
 Supra 26, Paragraphs 37-39 
42
 Ibid., Paragraphs 39 and 42 
43
 Ibid., Paragraphs 37-39 
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Although the establishment of a special court was envisaged by the Security Council 
in Resolution 1315, the Council clearly did not establish the SCSL.
44
 The Council 
expressly requested the Secretary-General to negotiate an agreement for the 
establishment of a special court.
45
 The Council was not involved in the negotiations 
and is not party to the Agreement. The legal basis of the Court is the Agreement on the 
Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone. As such, the Statute of the SCSL, 
including Article 6(2), is effective only between Sierra Leone and the UN as an entity.  
 
The Appeals Chamber was of the view that, 
“The Agreement between the United Nations and Sierra 
Leone is thus an agreement between all members of the 
United Nations and Sierra Leone. This fact makes the 
Agreement an expression of the will of the international 
community.”46  
 
Though attractive, this view is extreme. Such a liberal interpretation, if taken to its 
logical end, is at variance with the sovereignty of states. States are at liberty to choose 
whether, or not, to participate in treaties- this is the hallmark of sovereignty. Does the 
conclusion of a treaty under the auspices of the UN make all UN member states parties 
to the treaty? It is difficult to reconcile the view of the Appeal Chamber with the fact 
that many UN conventions, to the extent that they have not become customary 
international law, are binding only on some of its members who have chosen to ratify 
those treaties. An apt example of the extremity of the view of the Appeals Chamber 
would be arguing that the US, which is not a party to the Rome Statute of the ICC, is 
                                               
44
 A distinction must be made between the involvement of the Council and the establishment of the 
Special Court.  
45
 S/RES/1315 (2000), Operative Paragraph 1 
46
 Taylor case, supra 26, Paragraph 38 
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bound by the Rome Statute because the Statute was adopted under the auspices of the 
UN.  
 
The SCSL has the definitive features of international institutions and its international 
status is irrespective of Resolution 1315.
47
 Although the Court shares certain features 
of the mainstream international courts, it is fundamentally different from the ICTY 
and the ICTR with regard to the non-applicability of Head of state immunity to these 
Tribunals.  
 
The SCSL cannot arrogate to itself the powers of an international tribunal like the 
ICTY or the ICTR, powers which even the ICC lacks. The ICTY and ICTR are 
subsidiary organs expressly established by the Security Council.
48
 The constitutive 
instruments of the ICTY and the ICTR (including Articles 6(2) and 7(2) of their 
respective Statutes) are binding upon all states which are members of the UN. The 
ICC on the other hand has its legal basis in a treaty; and its constitutive instrument 
(including Article 27(2)) is binding only upon parties to the treaty.
49
 Being a treaty-
based institution, the SCSL is like the ICC in this regard. 
 
                                               
47
 Charles Chernor Jalloh argues that the conclusion of the Special Court is undermined by the 
methodology adopted in arriving at the conclusion as well as the “weak justifications” given in support, 
see „The Contribution of the Special Court for Sierra Leone to the Development of International Law‟, 
(2007) 15 African Journal of International and Comparative Law 165, p.192, 197-198 
48
 S/RES/827 (1993) and S/RES/955 (1994); see Chapter 5 of thesis. 
49
 Or where the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, refers a matter to the ICC; 
see Chapter 6 of the thesis. 
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The international status of the SCSL, by itself, is not decisive of the issue of Head of 
state immunity before the Court.
50
 The Appeals Chamber in summarising the 
submissions of Philippe Sands stated thus, 
“...In respect of international courts, international 
practice and academic commentary supports the view 
that jurisdiction may be exercised over a serving Head 
of state in respect of international crimes. Particular 
reference may be had to the Pinochet cases and the 
Yerodia case.”51  
 
Also, the Court summarised the submissions of Diane Orentlicher thus,  
“For the purposes of the distinction between 
prosecutions before national and international criminal 
courts recognised by the ICJ and other authorities, the 
Special Court is an international court and may exercise 
jurisdiction over incumbent and former Heads of state in 
accordance with its statute.”52 
 
The Appeals Chamber, in dismissing the application on behalf of Charles Taylor, 
relied on the Arrest Warrant case as well as the fact that Article 6(2) of its Statute was 
materially same as the relevant provisions of the Statutes of the ICTY, ICTR, ICC and 
even the IMT at Nuremberg removing Head of state immunity before their 
proceedings.
53
 It also relied on the view of Lord Slynn of Hadley in Pinochet that 
there is a trend towards the non-recognition of immunity for certain crimes before 
international tribunals.
54
 The Court found that since Article 6(2) of its Statute was not 
                                               
50
 Taylor case, supra 26, pp.11-12.   
51
 Ibid., Paragraph 17(a) 
52
 Ibid., Paragraph 18(a)  
53
 Ibid., Paragraphs 44-47, 50 
54
 Ibid., Paragraph 52   
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in conflict with any peremptory norm of general international law it must be given 
effect.
55
  
 
The scope of the decision of the ICJ in the Arrest Warrant case has been established in 
this thesis and is not authority for an argument that any international court may 
exercise jurisdiction over incumbent Heads of states. The SCSL does not come within 
the contemplation of the ICJ decision that there are „certain international courts‟ 
before which there can be no immunity.
56
 Additionally, the House of Lords‟ decision 
in Pinochet is limited by the applicability of the Torture Convention and Section 134 
of the UK Criminal Justice Act.
57
   
 
The similarity between the provisions of the Statute of the SCSL and those of the 
ICTY, ICTR, ICC and IMTs does not change the nature of the constitutive instrument 
of the SCSL and the extent to which states are bound by it, which is fundamental to 
the question of immunity of Taylor. Neither does the view of Lord Slynn in Pinochet 
justify the dismissal of the application by the Appeals Chamber. The trend towards the 
non-recognition of immunity for certain international crimes before international 
tribunals does not establish the non-applicability of immunities for Heads of states for 
international crimes before any international tribunal.  
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 Ibid., Paragraph 53  
56
 Supra 28, Paragraph 61 
57
 See Chapter 3 of thesis 
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The non-applicability of immunities before international courts is not automatic. In his 
Dissenting Opinion in Prosecutor v Radislav Krstic before the ICTY, Judge 
Shahabudeen asserts that, 
“…there is no substance in the suggested automaticity of 
disappearance of the immunity just because of the 
establishment of international criminal courts. If that is 
the result, it does not come about, as it were, through 
some simple repulsion of opposed juridical forces; a 
recognisable legal principle would have to be shown to 
be at work, such as an agreement to waive the immunity. 
International criminal courts are established by states 
acting together, whether directly or indirectly as in the 
case of the Tribunal, which was established by the 
Security Council on behalf of states members of the 
United Nations. There is no basis for suggesting that by 
merely acting together to establish such a court states 
signify an intention to waive their individual functional 
immunities. A presumption of continuance of their 
immunities as these exist under international law is only 
offset where some element in the decision to establish 
such a court shows that they agreed otherwise.”58   
 
It is submitted that the decision of the Appeals Chamber is flawed. The Chamber 
adopted a „one-size fits all‟ approach in its treatment of the issues of the status of the 
SCSL and the immunity of Charles Taylor. There was no regard to the constitutive 
instrument theory resulting in flawed analysis and conclusions.  
 
Much is made about the lack of Chapter VII mechanism in the establishment of the 
Court- an argument relied on by Taylor in asserting that because the SCSL was not 
established by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Court 
cannot therefore be said to be an international tribunal like the ICTY and ICTR. As a 
                                               
58
  Case IT-98-33-A, Decision on Application for Subpoenas, 1 July 2003, Paragraphs 11-12, available 
at www.icty.org, cited in Dapo Akande, „International Law Immunities and the International Criminal 
Court‟, (2004) 98 AJIL 407, p.418, note 79 
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result, the SCSL is a national court and must respect the immunities of states. This 
view is drastic. Denying the SCSL an international status, which is in all important 
respects due to it, because it was not established like the ICTY(R) is tantamount to 
„throwing the baby out with the bath water‟.  
 
Even more drastic, is the view of the Appeal Chamber, making irrelevant Chapter VII 
powers despite the treaty-based nature of the Court, in its assertion that the Court 
having been established by an Agreement between the UN and Sierra Leone, all UN 
members must be deemed to have entered into the Agreement with Sierra Leone and 
cannot avoid obligations arising under the Agreement. 
 
In view of the treaty-based nature of the SCSL and in the absence of a waiver of 
immunity by Liberia, the Court cannot remove the immunities of third states and their 
officials. The treaty-based nature of the constitutive instrument of the SCSL, and by 
virtue of Article 34 VCLT, is such that the SCSL cannot remove the immunity ratione 
personae of Charles Taylor established under customary international law. 
 
The SCSL does not enjoy a nature that enabled it to issue an indictment against Taylor 
while in office in violation of his personal immunity as Head of state.
59
 However, the 
personal immunity of Taylor is limited to the period of his incumbency as Head of 
state. Having vacated office, Taylor is no longer entitled to immunity ratione personae 
                                               
59
 It is arguable that the Council never intended the Special Court to have jurisdiction over Taylor while 
he was still the President of Liberia. If the Council did, then it is wondered why the Council did not 
establish the Special Court under Chapter VII like the ICTY and the ICTR, knowing fully the 
implications of such an action, rather than making a „recommendation‟ to the Secretary-General. 
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but rather is subject to the jurisdiction of the SCSL for acts which he does not enjoy 
immunity ratione materiae.
60
  
 
The SCSL should have cancelled the indictment and arrest warrant against Mr Taylor, 
as Belgium was directed to do by the ICJ in the Arrest Warrant Case, and issued a 
new indictment and arrest warrant against him. As a former Head of state, Taylor is 
but an ordinary citizen of Liberia who has committed criminal acts in the territory of 
Sierra Leone, and the only immunity he can enjoy will be ratione materiae in nature 
which will avail him only with regards to official acts. Acts of the kind with which 
Taylor is charged were pursued in his private capacity and fall outside the realm of 
functional immunity.  
 
The Appeals Chamber in its decision in Prosecutor v. Taylor even entertained, albeit 
in passing, the possibility of issuing a fresh indictment but only had Taylor‟s 
application challenging the jurisdiction of the Court succeeded.
61
 In view of the fact 
that the Chamber noted in its decision that Taylor no longer being the Head of state 
and the immunity ratione personae he enjoyed no longer attached to him, one fails to 
see why the Court did not cancel the existing indictment and order the issuance of a 
new indictment.
62
 Proceeding to the merits of the case on an invalid indictment flaws 
the whole of the proceedings. The invalidity of the indictment is not just a mere 
procedural error; it is a fundamental error that goes to jurisdiction of the SCSL and the 
entire proceedings.  
                                               
60
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62
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Legal proceedings do not contain a self-correcting mechanism, especially proceedings 
of criminal nature.
63
 Being a jurisdictional issue that even the Appeals Chamber had 
the competence to raise suo motu, the decision of the Appeals Chamber is 
disappointing. Any judgment founded on such a fundamental flaw will ultimately 
affect the legitimacy of the Court‟s decision and will not secure confidence in the 
outcome of the proceedings against Taylor, whether a conviction or a most unlikely 
acquittal.  
 
Although the indictment was amended in May 2007, it is submitted that an 
amendment does not cure the original fundamental defect. A fresh indictment is 
necessary to address this pertinent issue.    
 
7.3.3 JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE AND CO-OPERATION WITH THE SCSL 
In June 2006, following the arrest of Taylor by UNMIL forces and his transfer to the 
SCSL, the Security Council passed Resolution 1688.
64
 The Council, in Resolution 
1688, voiced concern that although Taylor had been brought before the SCSL in 
Freetown, his continued presence in the West African sub-region would impede 
stability and be a threat to the peace of Liberia and Sierra Leone and to international 
                                               
63
 That is the whole essence of amendment of charges in criminal law. 
64
 S/RES/1688 (2006). In S/RES/1638 (2005), the Council determined that Taylor‟s return to Liberia, 
i.e. without his standing trial before the Special Court, 'would constitute an impediment to stability and 
a threat to the peace of Liberia and to international peace and security in the region. As a result, the 
Council extended the mandate of UNMIL  to include Taylor‟s arrest and transfer to Sierra Leone for 
prosecution by the Special Court. See Alexander Orakhelashvili, „The Power of the UN Security 
Council to Determine the Existence of a „Threat to the Peace‟‟, (2006) 1 Irish Yearbook of International 
Law 61, p.83 
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peace and security in the region. Importantly and for the first time since its decision 
requesting the establishment of the SCSL, the Council imposed obligations on states 
to co-operate with the Court. Operative Paragraph 4 of Resolution 1688 provides that, 
“[The Security Council Acting under Chapter VII of the 
Charter of the United Nations], requests all states to co-
operate to this end, in particular to ensure the 
appearance of former President Taylor in the 
Netherlands for purposes of his trial by the Special 
Court, and encourages all states as well to ensure that 
any evidence or witnesses are, upon the request of the 
Special Court, promptly made available to the Special 
Court for this purpose.”   
 
The application of the principle of non-retroactivity to Resolution 1688 would mean 
that the issue of obligation of states to co-operate with and assist the SCSL must be 
considered in two phases.
65
 Firstly, the period between the entry into force of the 
Agreement establishing the SCSL (25 April 2002) and 16 June 2006, and secondly 
from 16 June 2006.   
 
The Agreement establishing the SCSL and the Statute of the Court make no provision 
for third states to co-operate with or judicially assist the SCSL. To do so would violate 
the pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt principle and Article 34 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organisations or 
between International Organisations 1986.
66
 Furthermore, prior to 2006 the Council 
did not invoke its Chapter VII powers in its exhortation of states to co-operate with the 
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 See Lockerbie Case, Preliminary Objection, (1998) I.C.J. Reports 9, p.26, Paragraph 44; Marko 
Divac Öberg, „The Legal Effect of Resolutions of the UN Security Council and General Assembly in 
the Jurisprudence of the ICJ‟, (2006) 16 EJIL 879, p.893 
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 (1986) 25 I.L.M. 543. The Convention is not yet in force but its provisions are reflective of customary 
international law. Article 34 of the Convention is in pari materia with Article 34 VCLT, 1969.  
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SCSL.
67
 Even in Resolutions under Chapter VII, the Council ensured that the 
exhortations did not come under the sections passed under Chapter VII.
68
 
 
The Agreement establishing the SCSL is not binding on other states for example, 
Nigeria, Ghana or Liberia. States cannot lawfully come to an agreement to deprive 
another state of its sovereign right. The number of parties to such an agreement is 
irrelevant so long as the state whose right is sought to be deprived has not given its 
consent to the deprivation.
69
 The Secretary-General cannot make decisions or take 
actions binding on the individual members of the UN.
70
 The involvement of the UN in 
the establishment of the Court cannot justify a reliance on Article 103 of the UN 
Charter. This provision is clearly inapplicable to the situation since there is no conflict 
of obligations of states. 
 
Unlike the ICTY and ICTR which have primacy over states and their constitutive 
instruments effectively imposing obligations of co-operation and assistance on states, 
the SCSL is devoid of such powers. A priori, the SCSL having its legal basis in an 
agreement between the UN and the Government of Sierra Leone, it cannot assert 
primacy over third states and compel them to try accused persons in their territory or 
to surrender them to the Court or even subpoena witnesses or documents.
71
 As such, 
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Ghana was not under an obligation to co-operate with the Court when it sought 
Taylor‟s arrest in 2003.72 Likewise, Nigeria could not have been legally compelled to 
surrender Taylor to the SCSL. The only option that was open to the SCSL was to enter 
into agreements for co-operation and assistance with states, like the ICC.
73
 The 
argument therefore, that UN members are bound by the Agreement between the 
Secretary-General on behalf of the UN and the Government of Sierra Leone is too 
remote to create obligations for states to co-operate with the SCSL. 
 
Prior to Resolution 1688, the SCSL did not enjoy primacy over third states and could 
not compel co-operation and assistance by these states. The orders of the Court were at 
par with those of national courts- they could not be enforced in another state without 
the consent of that state established in a legal agreement. However, despite the 
absence of an extradition agreement with Liberia, Nigeria released Taylor to Liberia 
and he was arrested by peacekeeping forces in Liberia and transferred to the SCSL.
74
  
 
However, effective from 16 June 2006 states are under an obligation to co-operate 
with and assist the SCSL by ensuring the appearance of Charles Taylor at his trial in 
the Netherlands and promptly making available to the Court any evidence or witnesses 
requested by the Court for the purpose of the trial. This is because of the decision of 
the Security Council to invoke its Chapter VII powers in the imposition upon states 
                                               
72
 In fact, Ghana would have violated its customary law obligation to respect the immunity of Liberia 
and its Head of state had it arrested Taylor in 2003 when he was still a serving Head of state upon his 
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73
 Rome Statute, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, Article 87(5) 
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see Ilias Bantekas and Susan Nash, International Criminal Law, 2
nd
 edition, (London: Cavendish 
Publishing, 2003), p.179 
368 
 
the obligation of co-operation with the SCSL in Resolution 1688. By Article 25 of the 
UN Charter, states are bound by the decision of the Security Council expressed in 
Resolution 1688. The source of the obligation of co-operation proceeds from the 
Charter and by virtue of Article 103, the obligation of states to co-operate with the 
SCSL, since 16 June 2006, prevails over any other international obligation. The use of 
the terms „requests‟ and „encourages‟ in the language of Resolution 1688 does not 
affect the binding nature of the obligation.
75
 
 
 
7.4  THE SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON 
 
Following the assassination of former Prime Minister of Lebanon Rafic Hariri, and 22 
others on 14 February 2005, in Beirut, Lebanon the international community decried 
the assassination as an act of terrorism against Lebanon.
76
 The Security Council, 
having reaffirmed acts of terrorism as one of the most serious threats to international 
peace and security,
77
 decided to establish an international independent investigation 
commission to assist the Lebanese authorities in the investigation of all aspects of the 
assassination.
78
 
 
The Government of Lebanon requested the Council to establish a tribunal of an 
international character to try all persons involved in the assassination. Following this 
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request, the Council asked the Secretary-General to negotiate an agreement with the 
Government of Lebanon for the establishment of such tribunal. 
79
  
 
An Agreement to establish the STL was reached and signed between the Government 
of Lebanon and the UN. Unfortunately, the Agreement was not ratified by the 
Lebanese Parliament because of the political crisis between the Government and the 
opposition which prompted the refusal of the Speaker of the Parliament to convene the 
Parliament for the ratification of the Agreement.
80
 The deadlock in Lebanese domestic 
politics pre-empted the decision of the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII, to 
bring into force the Agreement to establish the Tribunal for the investigation and 
prosecution of the perpetrators of the Hariri assassination and related attacks.
81
 It 
becomes pertinent to consider, in light of Resolution 1757, the status of the STL- 
whether it is a treaty-based Tribunal or whether it was established by the Government 
of Lebanon or Security Council. This would have implications for the question of 
Head of state immunity before the STL and judicial assistance and co-operation with 
the Tribunal. 
 
 
 
                                               
79
 S/RES/1664 (2006) 
80
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 7.4.1 THE NATURE OF THE STL 
The effect of Chapter VII of the Charter in Resolution 1757 and the establishment of 
the STL is circumscribed by the Resolution itself. Operative paragraph 1 of Resolution 
1757 expressly provides as follows, 
“[The Security Council] Decides, acting under Chapter 
VII of the Charter of the United Nations, that: 
(a) The provisions of the annexed document, including 
its attachment, on the establishment of a Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon shall enter into force on 10 June 
2007, unless the Government of Lebanon has provided 
notification under Article 19 (1) of the annexed 
document before that date.”  
 
Following the failure of the Government of Lebanon to notify the UN in writing of 
compliance with the legal requirements for entry into force of the Agreement 
establishing the STL, the Security Council merely acted under Chapter VII of the 
Charter to bring the Agreement already concluded between the Government of 
Lebanon and the UN into force. Resolution 1757 did not establish the STL- the 
Tribunal had already been established by the Agreement.
82
 The decision of the 
Council to act under Chapter VII of the Charter was simply to by-pass the 
constitutional ratification procedure of Lebanon and to ensure the entry into force of 
the Agreement thereby making it binding on Lebanon.
83
 The Council has come under 
criticism for undermining state sovereignty and interfering with domestic affairs of 
states contrary to Article 2(7) of the UN Charter.
84
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It is proposed by a School of thought that the STL was established directly by the 
Security Council.
85
 The most articulate expression of this view comes from 
Fassbender.
86
 He argues that the „legal quality‟ of the Agreement is uncertain because 
Resolution 1757 does not mention the Agreement but rather refers to it as „the 
annexed document‟. He argues that it can be argued that operative paragraph 1(a) of 
the Resolution integrates the Agreement into the Resolution. Secondly, he argues that 
the decision of the Council to substitute the ratification requirement of a treaty by a 
Chapter VII decision is unprecedented. To him, the action of the Council was ultra 
vires the powers of the Council under the Charter as it had the effect of generating a 
treaty obligation, in the form of a treaty between Lebanon and the UN without the 
consent of Lebanon. Furthermore, the fundamental element of consent in treaty-
making is absent by virtue of Resolution 1757. As such “in the absence of clear 
indications to the contrary, it therefore appears that the Security Council did not intend 
to bring the Agreement into force as an international treaty binding upon Lebanon 
under the law of treaties.”87 
 
Firstly, the issue of uncertainty of „legal quality‟ of the Agreement establishing the 
STL is misleading. An agreement is either legal or illegal. If the Agreement 
establishing the STL is an illegal agreement, the fact of its integration into Resolution 
1757 cannot imbue it with legality. Likewise, if the Agreement establishing the STL is 
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a legal agreement, then the fact of its non-integration into Resolution 1757 does not 
affect its legality.  
 
Secondly, the fact that an action of the Council is unprecedented cannot make illegal 
an otherwise legal action of the Council. Prior to the 1990 it was unprecedented for the 
Security Council to establish a judicial body. The unprecedented action of the Council 
in the establishment of the ICTY does not make illegal, the otherwise legal action of 
the establishment of the ad hoc tribunal. Although Resolution 1757 is unprecedented 
to the extent that the Council had expressly by-passed the requirement of ratification 
by Parliament of a state, previous actions of the Council have had similar effect. In 
1998, the Council imposed on the UK Government the obligation to make necessary 
arrangements allowing for a Scottish court to sit abroad without a jury in the 
Lockerbie case- an obligation that had the effect of enabling the Government to act by 
by-passing the requirement for the introduction of primary legislation in Parliament.
88
  
 
Thirdly, the action of the Council was not ultra vires its powers under the Charter. 
Resolution 1757 did not generate a treaty obligation for Lebanon. Lebanon had 
assumed the treaty obligation by the request for the establishment of the STL, the 
negotiation and signing of the Agreement establishing the Tribunal. Resolution 1757 
merely avoided the impasse that was created by domestic political squabbles in 
Lebanon by ensuring the entry into force of the Agreement. It is important to note that 
the Government of Lebanon supported by members of Parliament, following the 
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failure to convene Parliament, had requested the Council to exercise its powers under 
Chapter VII.
89
 
 
Ratification of a treaty and consent to a treaty are separate issues. That a treaty is not 
ratified does not mean that the treaty was concluded without consent. Consent of a 
state to a treaty is manifest in the authority of its representative to negotiate and sign 
the treaty. Parliamentary ratification of a treaty is merely an approval of a treaty and is 
distinguishable from international ratification of a treaty.
90
 It would, therefore, be 
wrong to argue that Lebanon did not consent to the treaty or that the wording of 
Resolution 1757 is such that coerces consent from Lebanon to the Agreement 
establishing the STL.  
 
Talmon contends that, 
“In Resolution 1757 (2007), the Security Council in 
effect set an ultimatum to Lebanon to ratify the treaty 
within ten days or have the content of the treaty imposed 
upon it. While the Security Council could not substitute 
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representatives, and not from the day of its ratification, and that 
there is no essential difference between such treaties as need, and 
such as do not need, ratification.” 
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a Chapter VII decision for the ratification by Lebanon 
and, consequently, could not bring into force the 
Agreement itself, it could and indeed did prescribe the 
provisions of the annexed Agreement for Lebanon in a 
binding decision… There is thus no treaty in force 
between the United Nations and Lebanon on the 
establishment of the Special Tribunal. The STL is not a 
treaty-based internationalised tribunal, such as, for 
example, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, but an 
independent international tribunal set up by the Security 
Council using its Chapter VII powers.”91 
 
This would mean that the STL is a subsidiary organ of the Security Council with the 
attendant financial obligation of the UN to fund the Tribunal, like the ICTY and ICTR. 
Knowing the implications of this obligation and the reluctance of the Council to 
assume such obligations, it is doubtful that the Council would have intended the 
creation of the STL as its subsidiary organ or have passed Resolution 1757 if it 
remotely purported to do so. Moreover, by Article 5(1) of the Agreement establishing 
the STL the funding of the STL is from voluntary contributions from states (51%) and 
the Government of Lebanon (49%). If the STL were set up by the Council, it becomes 
difficult to see how the Council can shirk the responsibility of funding a subsidiary 
organ by prescribing differently in a binding resolution. 
 
Talmon‟s position is not borne out by the express language of Resolution 1757. 
Suffice it to re-iterate that the Resolution expressly provides that the provisions of the 
Agreement establishing the Court shall enter into force on 10 June 2007 failing 
notification of ratification by the Government of Lebanon as provided under the 
Agreement. It is difficult to reconcile the argument that the Council could not bring 
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into force the Agreement with the express provision of the Resolution.
92
 Also, if 
Resolution 1757 is taken to prescribe the provisions of the Agreement and not to make 
it enter into force, one wonders the fate of certain provisions of the Agreement, for 
instance Article 19 providing for the entry into force of the Agreement, Article 20 on 
amendment of the Agreement and Article 21 on the duration of the Agreement. Do 
they survive Resolution 1757, bearing in mind the difficulty of prescribing these 
provisions into the Resolution? Furthermore, if the STL was established by the 
Council using its Chapter VII powers, then what was the need for the ratification or 
entry into force of the Agreement? 
 
It is submitted that the better view is that the STL is a treaty-based internationalised 
court established by an agreement between the UN and the Government of Lebanon.
93
  
 
In his Report on the establishment of the STL, the Secretary-General copiously 
referred to the international character of the Tribunal.
94
 Other factors which support 
the international character of the Tribunal, but which are not on their own conclusive 
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Cassese (edited), Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice (Oxford: OUP, 2009) 424. 
Agreement establishing the STL contained in S/RES/1757 (2007) Annex 
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 UNDocS/2006/893 
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evidence of internationality of a court, include the composition of the Chambers,
95
 the 
appointments of the judges,
96
 the Prosecutor
97
 and Registrar
98
 of the Tribunal by the 
Secretary-General of the UN who shall also be consulted by the Government of 
Lebanon on the appointment of the Deputy Prosecutor of the Tribunal, as well as the 
financing of the Tribunal
99
 and the seat of the Tribunal in the Netherlands.  
 
The applicable law to the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is the Lebanese 
Criminal Code.
100
 International crimes, like genocide, crimes against humanity and 
war crimes are excluded from the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, which is limited to only 
domestic crimes. The jurisdiction of the STL over domestic crimes alone, cannot take 
away a status which the Court has. Likewise, the exercise of jurisdiction over 
international crimes by domestic courts does not change the character of the court to 
an international one. 
 
7.4.2 HEAD OF STATE IMMUNITY BEFORE THE STL 
Immunities of Heads of third states are not affected by the Statute of the STL. Firstly, 
for the reason that the constitutive instrument establishing the STL draws its legality 
and consequent legal effect not from Resolution 1757, but from the Agreement 
establishing the Tribunal annexed to Resolution 1757. Secondly, the Statute of the 
                                               
95
 Agreement establishing the STL, op.cit., Article 2(3)  
96
 Ibid., Article 2(5)  
97
 Ibid., Article 3  
98
 Ibid., Article 4 
99
 Ibid. 
100
 See Statute of the STL, Article 22. Statute contained S/RES/1757 (2007) Attachment 
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STL and the Agreement establishing the Tribunal do not contain any provision 
removing immunities from its proceedings. Cécile Aptel argues that, 
“This omission of a fundamental principle of 
international criminal justice could be construed as 
deliberate, for derogations to the general rules on the 
immunity of state officials are usually limited to 
international crimes stricto sensu (i.e. genocide, crimes 
against humanity and war crimes) and could not 
therefore apply before the STL.”101 
 
Even if the Statute and the Agreement contained a provision purporting to remove the 
immunities of Heads of states before the STL, such a provision would have no effect. 
The constitutive instrument of the Tribunal being treaty-based, it is limited by the 
pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt principle. The STL falls outside the scope of 
„certain international courts‟ in Paragraph 61 of the ICJ decision in the Arrest Warrant 
case.
102
 Therefore, the immunities of Heads of states would be extant before the STL. 
 
The fact that the UN is a party to the Agreement cannot justify an argument that the 
immunities of Heads of UN member states would be inapplicable before a court that 
was established as a result of an agreement between a state and the UN. The obligation 
of states to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council under Article 25 
of the UN Charter is restricted to decisions of the Council. It does not extend to other 
organs of the UN. These arguments are rendered moot by the fact that the Statute of 
the STL, does not remove Head of state immunity before the STL as well as by the 
                                               
101
 „Some Innovations in the Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon‟, (2007) 5 JICJ 1107, p.1111. 
102
 William A. Schabas, „The Special Tribunal for Lebanon: Is it a „Tribunal of an International 
Character‟ Equivalent to an „International Criminal Court‟?‟, (2008) 21 Leiden Journal of International 
Law 513, pp.524-527 
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express provisions of Resolution 1757, whereby the action of the Council was only to 
ensure the entry into force of the Agreement establishing the STL. 
 
It has been argued that the issue of immunity is left to the STL to decide for itself.
103
 
This argument seems to hinge the non-applicability of Head of state immunity on the 
disposition of a particular tribunal. In essence, if the judges of a Tribunal are inclined 
towards removing a right pertaining to states then it would mean that immunity would 
be inapplicable in the proceedings of that Tribunal. The constitutive instruments 
establishing the ad hoc tribunals (ICTY and ICTR) are by their nature binding upon 
states including the express provisions removing the immunities of Heads of states. 
The matter of immunities before the ICTY and ICTR was not left for them to decide; 
it was settled by Articles 25 and 103 of the Charter irrespective of the disposition of 
the Tribunals.  
 
7.4.3 JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE AND CO-OPERATION WITH THE STL 
By virtue of Article 15(1) of the Agreement establishing the STL, Lebanon is 
obligated to co-operate fully with the STL at all stages of the proceedings. There is 
also an obligation on Lebanon to comply without delay with any request for judicial 
assistance by the Tribunal.
104
 These obligations are contractual terms which the 
Government of Lebanon had agreed to in the negotiation and signing of the 
                                               
103
 Shehadi and Wilmhurst, supra 80 
104
 Agreement establishing the STL, supra 95, Article 15(2)  
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Agreement. As such, Lebanon is bound by the principle of pacta sunt servanda to 
keep to the terms.
105
 
 
Having brought into force the Agreement establishing the STL, Resolution 1757 does 
not create any obligation of judicial assistance and co-operation for states not parties 
to the Agreement. The Statute of the STL, being a product of an agreement, cannot 
and does not impose any obligation of co-operation on states not parties to the 
Agreement. Additionally, there is no provision in the Agreement imposing an 
obligation of co-operation upon third states, in line with the pacta tertiis nec nocent 
nec prosunt principle.  
 
Neither can it be remotely argued that the decision of the Security Council to act under 
Chapter VII in Resolution 1757 expressly or impliedly creates such obligations on 
states. The Council is silent on co-operation with the STL in Resolution 1757, unlike 
Resolutions 1595, 1636 and 1644 where the Council expressly imposed the obligation 
of co-operation with the Independent Investigative Commission (UNIIC).
106
 
Resolution 1757 is solely concerned with the entry into force of the Agreement and 
nothing more. To argue otherwise would be against the express and clear provision of 
the Resolution. 
 
                                               
105
 This principle of customary international law is also reflected in Article 26 of the Convention on the 
Law of Treaties between States and International Organisations or between International Organisations, 
supra 66. 
106
 S/RES/ 1595 (2005), S/RES/ 1636 (2005), S/RES/ 1644 (2005). See also Swart, supra 85, p.1156 
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In the absence of agreements on co-operation and assistance between states and the 
STL, states are at liberty to choose to co-operate with, or render judicial assistance to, 
the STL. 
 
 
7.5 CONCLUSION 
 
The establishment of internationalised courts has transformed the traditional binary 
categorisations of courts as either international or national. Internationalised courts 
operate essentially either as national courts (for instance the ECCC) or an international 
court (for instance the SCSL). As such, despite the term „internationalised courts‟, the 
issue of Head of state immunity before these courts is dependent upon this traditional 
binary categorisation and subjected to the linear test of the constitutive instrument 
theory.  
 
Although, in substance the immunities of Heads of states before internationalised 
courts is circumscribed by the pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt principle manifest 
in the constitutive instrument theory, a trend is evident in this chapter that the Security 
Council can act subsequently, even where the Council does not establish an 
internationalised court, to impose obligations of co-operation to ensure the trial of 
Heads of states.  Additionally, where an internationalised court results from a treaty, 
the Council can employ its Chapter VII powers to bring the treaty force. As such, if a 
treaty effectively removes Head of state immunity but is rendered inoperative due to 
internal constitutional challenges, the Council can act to ensure the entry into force of 
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such a treaty. Such action is validly within the competence of the Security Council 
under its peace and security mandate. 
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CONCLUSION: WHITHER A NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW ON HEAD 
OF STATE IMMUNITY? 
 
The unfettered nature of state autonomy and its likelihood of abuse necessitated a 
consideration, in the introductory chapters of this thesis, of the value-content of 
sovereignty, i.e. whether there are values to be promoted and achieved through the 
exercise of sovereignty and in the event of a conflict of values, how the values are to 
be reconciled.  
 
Chapter 1 establishes that sovereignty is not devoid of value and justifies the existence 
of Head of state immunity. By defining institutional competences both at the national 
and international level and by establishing a framework for a pluralistic international 
order, sovereignty and sovereign equality represent an intricate network of rights, 
duties, privileges and immunities developed to regulate the international system. 
Despite the fact that there have been erosions into the idea of sovereignty of states 
within the economic sphere, this has not been achieved in the political sphere. The 
criticisms levelled against the foundational principles of immunity call for a re-
examination of the theories resulting in the proper application of immunities.
  
 
Despite agitations to the contrary, a system of immunities including Head of state 
immunity does not conflict with international human rights because the substance of 
the former does not negate the normative content of latter. The prescriptive nature of 
human rights when faced with the exemptible nature of immunities highlights a 
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problem of enforcement of the normative content of human rights instruments as seen 
in Chapter 2. Chapter 2 considers the various approaches adopted to resolve the 
competing interests of human rights and immunities and the weaknesses of the 
approaches, ranging from the uncertainty and artificiality that plagues the normative 
hierarchy theory of jus cogens, the lack of state practice in support of universal 
jurisdiction for violations of jus cogens, the non-existence of a human rights exception 
to legal instruments on immunity as well as the non-acceptance of the theory of 
implied waiver of immunity.  
 
Other policy and practical arguments against the approaches include the fact that the 
nature of jus cogens is necessarily such that it is vulnerable to its biggest criticism of a 
system of immunities, namely abuse. There is the potential of frivolous litigation 
which will benefit the lawyers, not victims and may inundate judiciaries. Again, there 
is the likelihood of breakdown of international relations which may adversely affect 
international peace and security; as well as the inundation of governments and 
officials thereby affecting the efficiency of governance; the implication of political 
considerations better left to diplomatic channels; and very importantly, the possibility 
of adverse effects on transitional societies. 
 
Chapter 3 distinguishes national immunities of Heads of state from international 
immunities. The chapter shows that the jurisprudence of the courts of UK, US, France 
and Senegal uphold the customary law principles that serving Heads of states have 
absolute immunity ratione personae while former Heads of states have limited 
384 
 
immunity ratione materiae and that the immunity of a Head of state may be waived by 
his state. It also establishes that where a court is lawfully established in accordance 
with international humanitarian law following the conduct of an invasion, the legality 
of which is doubtful, the lawful jurisdiction of the court even over Heads of state 
remains unaffected by the illegality of the invasion.  
 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 consider Head of state immunity before international courts 
established by a peace agreement between states in the aftermath of hostilities, by the 
Security Council under its peace and security mandate and by treaty, respectively. 
Chapter 4 establishes that a victorious state can exercise jurisdiction over the Head of 
a vanquished state where there has been an unconditional surrender and the possibility 
of criminal accountability of state officials is included in a peace agreement between 
the parties.  
 
Chapter 5 shows that the peace and security mandate of the Security Council includes 
the establishment of the judicial bodies as subsidiary organs of the Council under 
Article 29 of the UN Charter.  
 
While the issue of Head of state immunity before a court established by treaty between 
parties is straightforward, Chapter 6 addresses the more difficult issue of whether the 
Security Council can alter the customary obligations and rights of non-parties to a 
treaty by placing them on a similar footing with parties. 
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As the last substantive chapter of the thesis, Chapter 7 considers Head of state 
immunity before internationalised courts. The constitutive instrument of 
internationalised courts being either national or international in nature, the trends 
elicited and the conclusions reached in Chapter 7 are essentially same as Chapters 3 
and 6. 
 
The absence of enforcement machinery in the international system and the inability of 
international courts to enforce their orders made the consideration of the obligation of 
states to judicially assist and co-operate with international courts were considered in 
Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 imperative. These chapters establish that the obligation of 
judicial assistance and co-operation is also determined by the constitutive instrument 
theory. 
 
In the main, this thesis has utilised the theory that the question of Head of state 
immunity before international courts is determined by the nature of the constitutive 
instrument establishing the court and whether states are bound by the instrument, a 
theory which is necessary for the consideration of emergent trends in Head of state 
immunity. 
 
Emergent trends in Head of state immunity are rife in the thesis. The Treaties of 
Versailles and Sèvres represent a shift in international law because prior to these 
Treaties, there were no efforts to set up tribunals for trial of war crimes by state 
officials, including Heads of states. However, the provisions of the Treaties are to be 
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interpreted subject to the customary international law principle of pacta tertiis nec 
nocent nec prosunt contained in Article 34 VCLT and manifest in the constitutive 
instrument theory. 
 
Despite the criticisms of the Nuremberg and Far East Tribunals as instances of victor‟s 
justice and being show trials, their proceedings impacted on the development of 
international criminal law by establishing legal criteria for judging official conduct. 
The trials were pivotal in the establishment of contemporary international courts and 
are indicative of a shift from the classical international law approach of sovereign 
immunity for international crimes by the provision of a normative and substantive 
framework for the assessment of individual criminal responsibility. 
 
While it may be unfortunate that political considerations took precedence over 
legalism in the Far East, it is clear that both Nuremberg and Far East are indicative of 
an emergent trend in the Head of state immunity for international crimes. However, 
this trend is limited by the constitutive instrument theory which is evident in the 
application of the pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt principle. 
The establishment of the ICTY and the ICTR by the Security Council is ground-
breaking in the sense that it represented a departure from international practice prior to 
the 1990s. A trend is evident, from 1993, of the Council‟s involvement in establishing 
international criminal tribunals as measures under its peace and security mandate. The 
decisions of the ICTY in the Tadic, Milosevic and Blaskic cases as well as the decision 
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of the ICTR in the Kambanda case support the proposition that there is an emergent 
trend removing Head of state immunity for certain international crimes.  
The trend which became evident in the beginning of the 1990s is that the Security 
Council is empowered under the UN Charter to establish judicial bodies of a criminal 
nature and that by virtue of Articles 25 and 103 of the Charter, Heads of states are not 
entitled to immunity before such tribunals. It is submitted that by virtue of Articles 25 
and 103 of the Charter, states have modified their customary international law rights 
according immunity to their Heads of states. This modification is manifest where the 
Security Council establishes an international criminal tribunal under its Chapter VII 
powers effectively removing the immunities of Heads of member states. 
The Pinochet and Habré cases are illustrative of a trend of states entering into 
contractual agreements like the Convention against Torture to limit their rights under 
customary law. Likewise, the establishment of the ICC illustrates the conventional 
trend of states limiting their sovereign rights and prerogatives under customary 
international law. Again, these trends are circumscribed by the pacta tertiis nec nocent 
nec prosunt principle.  
The establishment of the ICC is a culmination of the development of the trend of 
accountability in international law and has made permanent the ad hoc practice of the 
Security Council, first utilised in the Balkans, of using international criminal 
proceedings as a means of restoring international peace and security. This trend is also 
furthered by the practice of internationalized courts as evident in the Special Tribunal 
for Lebanon and the Special Court for Sierra Leone. A further trend is manifest in the 
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Al-Bashir and Gaddafi cases of the Security Council, despite the consensual nature of 
international law, acting to place non-parties to a treaty in a similar position with 
parties by referring a situation to the ICC as a necessary measure under its peace and 
security mandate.  
There is the discernible trend of the Security Council acting under its peace and 
security mandate to by-pass the constitutional ratification procedure of states to ensure 
the entry into force of agreements for the establishment of criminal tribunals which 
may affect existing customary international law on Head of state immunity.  
As stated in the introduction, the methodology adopted in this thesis in the 
determination of whether there is a new rule of customary international law on Head 
of state immunity is case law specific. The reliance on mostly case law to elicit state 
practice and opinio juris in the determination of the customary status of the 
international law rule on Head of state immunity is one necessitated by the procedural 
nature of the concept of jurisdictional immunities. Nevertheless, recourse is had in the 
thesis to various national, regional and international instruments on state immunity as 
well as the Reports of the Special Rapporteur of the ILC on the immunity of state 
officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction.  
 
It has been thematically maintained that the non-applicability of immunities before an 
international court is dependent on the extent to which states are bound by the 
constitutive instrument establishing the court. It is an accepted principle of 
international law that states can alter their rights under customary international law by 
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entering into an agreement to the contrary, i.e. states by ratifying a multilateral treaty 
can modify existing custom. However, this conventional trend of modification of 
custom is limited to parties to the treaty. The question is to what extent can a 
conventional agreement be a source of customary international law?  
 
It is inherent in the term „customary international law‟ that it is applicable to the 
generality of states and must be a source of rights and obligations for the generality of 
states. This thesis has shown that the customary international law nature of the rule on 
absolute immunity for Heads of states even for international crimes is supported by 
ample state practice, for example the Pinochet case, Tachiona v. Mugabe, Gadaffi 
case, and is evident in the ICJ decisions in the Arrest Warrant case and Djibouti v. 
France, just to name a few. Likewise, evidence of state practice in support of this rule 
is evident in the various State Immunity legislations of US, UK, Australia, Canada, 
South Africa, Singapore and Pakistan as well as the UN Convention on the 
Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Properties and regional State Immunity 
conventions in force, for example the European Convention on State Immunity 1972 
which in codifying a restrictive approach to State immunity, exclude criminal 
proceedings from the scope of their provisions. 
 
The subjective nature of opinio juris makes it difficult to evidence. However, opinio 
juris as to the absolute nature of Head of state immunity ratione personae, can be seen 
in the US practice of filing suggestions of immunity, in the Memorial of France before 
the ICJ in Djibouti v. France. 
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This thesis has also shown that it is a rule of customary international law that former 
Heads of state are entitled to a limited immunity ratione materiae, only with respect to 
official acts. The Pinochet case is at the forefront of state practice with regard to the 
limited nature of Head of state immunity, ratione materiae for international crimes 
like torture and opinio juris is evident in the practice of the UK and Spanish 
governments which vigorously challenged the immunity of Pinochet and the 
deportation of Pinochet by the UK government back to Chile, having found that he 
could not be extradited to Spain because of the requirement of double criminality 
under English Law. 
 
The requirement for a conventional rule to become a customary rule of international 
law, as held by ICJ in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, include widespread and 
representative participation in a convention and that it is imperative that state practice, 
especially of affected states, is such as to show a general recognition that a rule of law 
is involved. 
 
The conventional trends in Chapters 4, 6 and 7 of the thesis show a different source of 
obligation of state parties and as such, it would be misplaced to rely on them as source 
of a new customary international law on Head of state immunity. They are merely 
contractual terms, inter partes and no more. However, these chapters are authority for 
the proposition that states may vary customary international law on Head of state 
immunity in three instances: firstly, by an express agreement between states parties to 
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a treaty. Secondly, where a state not party to an agreement to establish an international 
court consents implicitly to the exercise of jurisdiction by the international court over 
its Head of state by its unconditional surrender to a group of states that have expressed 
their intention to prosecute the Head of the surrendering state. Finally, where a state, 
not privy to an agreement to establish an international court expressly, consents to the 
exercise of jurisdiction by that international court over its Head of state. 
 
Though the trends in Chapters 4, 6 and 7 are not reflective of a new rule of customary 
international law on Head of state immunity de lege lata, they are indicative of 
international law on Head of state immunity de lege ferenda.  
 
However, the generality of membership of states in the UN, the provisions of Articles 
25 and 103 of the UN Charter and the trend evident in the practice of the ICTY(R), as 
established in Chapter 5 of this thesis are such that it is submitted that there is in 
existence a new rule of customary international law on Head of state immunity which 
is limited to where the UN Security Council, acting under its Chapter VII powers, 
establishes a international criminal tribunal and its constitutive instrument expressly 
makes Head of state immunity inapplicable in its proceedings. State practice in 
support of this rule of custom is evident in the Milosevic and Kambanda cases. Opinio 
juris in support of this rule of custom can be found in the very fact of membership of 
the UN which is not obligatory but rather open to states which accept the obligations 
contained in the Charter.  
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Approaching the concept of immunities from the perspective of responsibility 
complicates issues in the discourse on reconciling human rights imperatives and 
immunities. The matter is better dealt with where immunities are approached from the 
perspective of the adjudicatory competence of a court over actions of other states and 
state officials. It is maintained, alongside the ICJ, that immunity does not mean 
impunity. Immunity does not mean absence of liability; rather it means that the 
enforcement of the liability against those to whom the immunity attaches could be 
limited in time or depending on the forum seeking to enforce this liability. If there 
were no means of addressing the impunity of Heads of states then one would be 
endorsing a carte blanche for atrocities and human rights devastations but the reality is 
that there exist avenues for addressing impunity. 
 
The reality of international law is that immunity does not necessarily mean impunity.  
While the multiplicity of mechanisms, whether national, international or 
internationalised, to deal with international crimes of state officials may complicate 
matters because of inconsistencies of practice, the imperfections of international law 
are not such as to render it impotent in the face of egregious violations of human rights 
norms by Heads of state. 
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